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Pr eface
This book began life as my PhD dissertation, which I successfully defended 
in September 2013. I had started the doctoral program in political science 
at York University in Toronto six years earlier, just before the world was 
plunged into the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. Looking back on my journey through the PhD program, it is difficult 
to envision a more remarkable set of circumstances in which to study politi-
cal economy. Historians of thought have a knack for demonstrating how the 
ideas of a given age were shaped by their historical context. My case is really 
no different: the research path that I chose to pursue during my time at York 
was undoubtedly influenced by the spectacular upheaval in the global politi-
cal economy that I saw unfolding.
One thing that the global financial crisis made plain was the indispensable 
role of public debt within contemporary capitalism. As governments across 
the advanced capitalist world sought to combat the crisis, a process of private 
deleveraging was met by large-scale public borrowing, the likes of which had 
not been seen since World War II. The global financial system was, in large 
part, saved from the brink of collapse by the explosive rise in public indebted-
ness. I became especially fascinated with the US case, not only because of 
the country’s position at the center of global capitalism, but also because the 
massive growth in its public debt seemed to defy its reputation as a liberal 
bastion of small government and free markets.
And so I started to read into the history of the public debt to understand 
its origins and how it had evolved over time. I quickly discovered that the 
developments during the crisis were not as novel as I had originally thought. 
As the historical record shows, the public debt has been central to capitalist 
states from the very beginning, even if its function within them has changed 
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considerably. The public debt initially served to bolster the war-making prow-
ess of states in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, governments borrowed to develop massive public 
works projects, including railways and canals. It was only in the twentieth 
century that the public debt was “discovered” as a key tool of macroeconomic 
policy and crisis management.
What most piqued my interest in this historical reading were the color-
ful debates concerning ownership of public debt, the power of government 
bondholders, and the redistributive effects of government borrowing on class 
relations in Western Europe and the United States during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. On one side of this debate, tales were told of the 
capitalists who effectively controlled governments thanks to their power 
as dominant owners of the public debt. Dissenting accounts, which have 
become more and more prevalent from the late nineteenth century onward, 
claimed that the public debt was, in fact, a democratizing force because it 
was mainly those of modest means, including widows and orphans, who 
owned it.
These unresolved historical debates resonated with me because of another 
development that the crisis had laid bare: the growing wealth and income 
inequality and the percolating “class warfare” in the liberal market heart-
land of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It was during 
the early years of my PhD program that the research of Thomas Piketty, 
Emmanuel Saez, and others on the stunning increases in inequality within 
these countries was just starting to be noticed. Later on, in 2011, awareness of 
issues of inequality and corporate power was increased thanks to the occupy 
movement, which began in Zuccotti Park near Wall Street and which quickly 
spread to become a global protest movement against crisis-era capitalism.
This, in essence, was the historical milieu in which I operated, and my 
intuitive response was to put two and two together. On the one hand, there 
was the public debt, which had long played a central role in capitalist societ-
ies, a role that had been further solidified during the crisis. On the other 
hand, there were the growing inequities in the distribution of wealth and 
income that had intensified as a result of the crisis.
As far as I could tell, the academic literature on the contemporary US 
political economy had not yet managed to link issues of public debt and 
inequality, at least not in any systematic way. In other words, rich accounts 
of the class conflict at the heart of the public debt, such as those found in the 
historical literature, were simply absent from more contemporary research.
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What I did find was that most of the contemporary research suffers from 
an aggregate fixation with the macroeconomic consequences of government 
borrowing. Disaggregate studies of the public debt focus on generations, not 
classes, as their primary units of analysis. And the abstract, even esoteric, 
assumptions that inform the generational debates to me seemed, to put it 
mildly, otherworldly. I found the sparse contemporary accounts that do draw 
attention to the class underpinnings of the public debt unsatisfying, mainly 
because they offer little in the way of empirical evidence to substantiate their 
claims.
So it was out of these twin interests in the public debt and in inequality 
that my PhD research project emerged. I started the research process with a 
simple question that contemporary accounts had failed to address: namely, 
who exactly are the major domestic owners of the US public debt? A long 
and painful process of empirical inquiry yielded quite shocking results. My 
research findings showed that, since the 1980s, domestic ownership of the 
public debt had rapidly become concentrated in favor of the now-infamous 
top 1 percent of US households and the top 2,500 US corporations. What 
stunned me most was the finding that ownership of the public debt had 
become even more heavily concentrated during the crisis.
Almost immediately after it was first posted online, my research caused a 
stir not normally associated with PhD dissertations. And I was unexpectedly 
thrust into the spotlight when, in November 2013, Gillian Tett, one of the 
world’s most astute financial journalists, published a full-length article on 
my findings in the Financial Times. While most of the responses to the Tett 
article were decidedly positive, some were less charitable. In a small minority 
of cases, I was the subject of ad hominem attacks, the intensity of which was 
likely fueled by Tett’s mentioning of the “leftwing political bent” of my analy-
sis. This small minority dismissed the research findings outright as fudged 
numbers compiled by a radical student with a revolutionary axe to grind.
Others offered more constructive and thoughtful criticism. They won-
dered whether the concentration in ownership that I covered was of any 
significance now that widely held money manager funds, including pension 
and mutual funds, own a substantial portion of the public debt. They asked 
about the political consequences of my findings and the effect that concen-
trated ownership of the public debt might have on government policy. They 
wanted to know why foreign ownership of the public debt, which now stands 
at roughly 50 percent, was excluded from the analysis and how it might relate 
to the domestic pattern of ownership I uncovered in my research. They also 
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wondered what political solutions might be necessary to address the growing 
inequalities that characterize ownership of the public debt.
The buzz generated by the dissertation was one of my main motivations 
for transforming it into a book. And over the past two years, I updated and 
expanded the empirical findings, incorporated the constructive criticisms, 
and, more generally, tried to push the limits of what we can know about 
ownership of the public debt and its underlying consequences. The result is 
this book, a document that is very different from the one that I defended as 
a doctoral candidate.
During this undertaking, much of my effort has been aided by studies that 
were published after my PhD defense. The most famous of these is Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Justifiably renowned for its 
contribution to our historical and cross-national understanding of wealth 
and income distribution, I found Piketty’s work indispensable in its tackling 
of the methodological and conceptual issues associated with the measure-
ment of ownership concentration.
Wolfgang Streeck’s Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic 
Capitalism came as a revelation and helped to refine my thinking on the 
redistributive and political consequences of the public debt in a world 
plagued by wealth and income inequality. As the reader will see, I leaned on 
Streeck’s work and, in recognition of his influence, I reference his concept of 
the debt state in the subtitle of the book.
Finally, Eswar Prasad’s The Dollar Trap: How the U.S. Dollar Tightened 
Its Grip on Global Finance informed what turned out to be one of the more 
challenging aspects of writing this book: incorporating foreign ownership of 
the US public debt into the analysis. I had always found the debates concern-
ing foreign ownership of the public debt to be lacking because of their overt 
aggregate bias. In examining the consequences of foreign ownership for US 
power and influence in the global arena, these debates had overlooked the 
interplay between domestic politics and global financial processes, especially 
the role that the former plays in shaping and reinforcing the latter. Prasad 
makes what is, to my knowledge, the only sustained effort to go beyond this 
aggregate bias. And a critical engagement with his work has guided my own 
story about the linkages between domestic and foreign ownership of the US 
public debt.
This project has been a long time in the making and much of that time 
has been spent writing in isolation. But every so often, the loneliness of the 
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research process was interrupted by welcome interactions with people, who, 
in various ways, provided the support that propelled me in my efforts to com-
plete this manuscript.
It has been a pleasure to work with Niels Hooper, Bradley Depew, and 
Ryan Furtkamp at the University of California Press. Whether they were 
responding to my emails, arranging reviewers for the manuscript, design-
ing a book cover, or coordinating marketing and promotional materials, all 
three have been professional and friendly. The process of completing my first 
(single-authored) book was made a little less daunting thanks to their efforts.
Anyone who has conducted exploratory research using disparate data 
sources has had plenty of questions. And one of the most refreshing aspects 
of conducting the research for this book has been witnessing the enthusi-
asm with which staff at various statistical agencies responded to my queries. 
Kurt Schuler at the US Department of the Treasury; Marty Harris, Ruth 
Schwartz and Nuria McGrath at the Internal Revenue Service; and Richard 
Wind, Alice Henriques, and Gerhard Fries at the Federal Reserve clearly 
outlined the possibilities and limitations of the data sources they manage, 
and, in some cases, verified my calculations when the results seemed too 
shocking to be true.
A number of people deserve thanks for giving feedback, challenging me 
with pointed questions, providing boosts of morale at opportune moments, 
and discussing my research findings in private or in public. In this regard, I 
am thankful to Joseph Baines, Jordan Brennan, Katerina Dalacoura, Tim Di 
Muzio, Jeff Frieden, Eric George, Randall Germain, Julian Germann, Jeremy 
Green, Peo Hansen, Paddy Ireland, Izabella Kaminska, Jongchul Kim, 
Covadonga Meseguer, Mark Peacock, Jesse Schreger, Herman Schwartz, 
Engelbert Stockhammer, Gillian Tett, and Robert Wade. I am especially 
grateful for the support and guidance I have received from Jonathan Nitzan, 
whose teaching, as well as his research with Shimshon Bichler, first inspired 
me to conduct independent research.
To my family, especially to my parents, Graham and Sue, thanks for love 
and encouragement. To Natasha, thanks for your beautiful soul and your 
sharp mind . We met near the tail end of this project, but I can’t help but see 
your imprint on every word that is written here.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the generous financial assistance 
I received to conduct this research. Doctoral and postdoctoral funding 
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
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relieved some of the financial stresses that come with pursuing a PhD 
and allowed me considerable breathing room in making the perilous 
transition to an academic career. Research funds from the Department of 
International Relations at the London School of Economics also provided 
crucial support.
 Sandy Brian Hager
 Cambridge, MA
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Introduction
Public Debt, Inequality, and Power
Every man and woman who owned a Government Bond, we 
believed, would serve as a bulwark against the constant threats to 
Uncle Sam’s pocketbook from pressure blocs and special-interest 
groups. In short, we wanted the ownership of America to be in 
the hands of the American people
H e n r y  Morg e n t h au  J r .
In the Beginning
In the early years of nationhood, the political economy of the United 
States would be shaped in crucial ways by its public debt.1 Revolutionary 
forces accumulated debts of $54 million during the War of Independence 
(1775–83). A difficult task for the first secretary of the Treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton, was to devise a plan to manage this debt burden. Should the debts 
be repaid in full? And if so, by what means should the federal government 
honor its commitments to creditors?2 The answers to these questions would 
go a long way in determining the nature of the US system of public finance, 
a crucial lynchpin of the power and cohesiveness of nation states.
Defaulting on foreign debts was out of the question. Revolutionary forces 
borrowed heavily from the French and the Dutch to finance the war, and 
estimates suggest that nearly one-quarter of wartime debt was in foreign 
hands.3 The United States did not want to alienate itself from allies that 
had assisted its drive for independence. In these formative years of nation-
hood, the federal government’s unquestioned commitment to its foreign 
creditors was widely accepted as a means of breaking the shackles of British 
dominance, establishing creditworthiness on global capital markets, solidify-
ing geostrategic alliances, and, later on, fueling highly lucrative territorial 
expansion.4
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The federal government was also hesitant to renege on its commitments 
to domestic bondholders. Most of the debt had been purchased by a small 
group of wealthy elites, with Robert Livingston’s estimate suggesting that, at 
the time of independence, only 0.025 percent of the US population owned 
government bonds.5 Furthermore, among the tiny elite that owned the debt 
were the chief architects of the country’s nascent political system.  In his 
classic study An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States, Charles Beard noted that forty of the fifty-five men who drew up the 
constitution had lent money to the government.6
These men would provide a powerful force against repudiation and would 
rally against any attempt to default on a debt in which they and their class 
peers had a significant interest. The writers of the Constitution also had an 
interest in creating a system of taxation that would ensure reliable revenue 
streams to service the public debt. This system would prove especially advan-
tageous if the burden of taxation were to fall on someone else: that someone 
else being the vast majority of Americans who did not own government 
bonds.
Hamilton decided that the debts were to be paid in full. And in order 
to raise the revenue needed to honor these commitments, the US Congress 
approved Hamilton’s recommendation to levy a highly regressive excise tax 
on distilled spirits. Small-scale farmers saw the new tax as a threat to their 
livelihood and would eventually vent their frustrations through violent 
attacks against tax collectors in western Pennsylvania.
For Hamilton, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 served as a grave menace to 
the power and legitimacy of the fragile federal government. So concerned was 
Hamilton with the unrest that he personally accompanied General George 
Washington, and the thirteen thousand troops he commanded, to put down 
the rebellion. One critic, William Findley, seized on the events, suggesting 
they were proof that Hamilton’s system of public debt had created a “new 
monied interest” that wanted nothing other than “oppressive taxes.”7
The Debate Continues (without Data)
Early critics treated Hamilton’s plan with suspicion. They saw the public 
debt, and the broader system of public finance of which it was a part, as a 
culprit of worsening inequality and social instability. Well over two centuries 
later, the public debt remains a source of great controversy. Over this time, 
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an intense debate has raged over the unequal power relations that underpin 
the public debt.
Some continue to insist, in the critical spirit of the likes of Livingston and 
Findley, that the public debt is heavily concentrated in the hands of the rich 
and powerful. According to this argument, the public debt serves as a vec-
tor of regressive redistribution, transferring income from low- and middle-
income taxpayers to a small group of elites. The wealthy are said to use their 
ownership of the public debt as a powerful lever to influence government 
policy and decision-making.
Others suggest that the public debt is, in fact, widely owned by broad 
swathes of the US population. Government bonds, so the argument goes, 
provide a safe investment opportunity for vulnerable elements of society, 
including widows and orphans. The development of savings bonds and the 
rise in pension and mutual funds are said to have made ownership of the 
public debt even more diffuse. Proponents of this view argue that, thanks to 
the development of a progressive tax system over the course of the twentieth 
century, the public debt redistributes income from the rich to the Americans 
of modest means who own the bulk of the public debt. The public debt, in 
this way, has played a key role in democratizing the public finances. In the 
words of former secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, a widely owned public debt would put owner-
ship of the United States in the hands of the American people.
The rapid increase in foreign ownership of the US public debt since 
the early 1970s has provided a further source of controversy. Early on in 
US history, reliance on foreign financing was seen as a necessary part of 
nation-building. And this sentiment is often echoed today. Some sug-
gest that the fact that foreigners now own roughly half of the US public 
debt is merely proof of the attractiveness of the United States for global 
investors. According to this view, foreign ownership of the public debt is 
a clear sign of US strength; it frees up domestic capital for private invest-
ment and it allows the federal government to finance its large budget 
deficits on the cheap.
Others argue precisely the opposite. They claim that foreign owners of the 
public debt hold the United States hostage, exacting tribute in the form of 
interest payments and using their significant holdings of government bonds 
to influence policy. That about 20 percent of the US public debt is now 
owned by the central bank of a geostrategic rival, China, is often invoked as 
proof of the dangers of foreign indebtedness.
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What explains this lack of consensus on ownership of the US public debt? 
The answer, I contend, is quite simple: we do not know the basic facts. Despite 
centuries of speculation and heated debate, only a handful of studies have 
attempted to map empirically the ownership pattern of the US public debt, 
and even fewer have tried to theorize and analyze the broader consequences 
of this pattern as it evolves over time. To make matters worse, analysts tend 
to keep domestic ownership of the public debt strictly separate from foreign 
ownership, precluding any possibility of understanding the potential inter-
linkages between the two.
Thus participants in the existing debates are engaged in what we might call, 
borrowing from Thomas Piketty, a “debate without data”—a protracted and 
seemingly endless dispute that is based on “an abundance of prejudice and 
paucity of fact.”8 Without recourse to the basic facts, we have no way of know-
ing which of the competing views is correct. The lack of systematic data leaves 
us with no way of identifying the winners and losers of the public debt. As a 
result, we are not able to identify, let alone develop solutions to, the potential 
conflicts and injustices that surround this vital component of public policy.
A Timely Intervention
The purpose of this book is to address shortcomings in the existing debates 
by offering the first comprehensive study of the ownership structure of the 
US public debt as it has evolved over time. In particular, the book addresses 
the following questions: Who are the dominant owners of the public debt? 
Are government bonds heavily concentrated in the hands of a specific class 
or social group or are they widely held? Does the public debt redistribute 
income from taxpayers to bondholders? Does the public debt exacerbate or 
mitigate wealth and income inequality? In what ways, if any, does ownership 
of the public debt give bondholders power over the government and society? 
Is it of any significance that foreigners have increased their share of the public 
debt from 3 percent in the postwar period to about 50 percent today? What 
are we to make of the fact that a geostrategic rival, China, owns roughly 
20 percent of this foreign share of the public debt?
Finding answers to these questions is imperative given the growing 
centrality of the public debt to contemporary capitalism. Representing $18 
trillion as of this writing (autumn 2015), the US Treasury market is one of 
the largest and most liquid financial markets in the world. Save for a period 
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of budget surpluses in the late 1990s, the US public debt has been growing 
rapidly since the early 1980s and has exploded since the onset of the global 
financial crisis of 2007–8. In 2013, the public debt breached the 100 percent 
mark of gross domestic product (GDP) for the first time, excluding World 
War II, and continues to hover above this mark today.
With the collapse of tax revenues and with the increases in government 
spending that accompany a crisis of this magnitude and duration, the public 
debt plays an indispensable role in the federal government’s macroeconomic 
strategy. And even with signs of recovery on the horizon, a large public debt 
is likely to persist. In fact, projections from the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) suggest that public debt levels will remain stubbornly high for at least 
the next decade.9
What is more, increasing levels of public indebtedness over the past 
three-and-a-half decades have coincided with an unprecedented bull market 
for US Treasury securities. Figure 1 plots the “real” total return for 10-year 
US Treasury bonds from 1790 to 2015.10 This total return index measures 
the performance of the US Treasury market by adding together the price 
changes (capital gain or loss) on 10-year Treasury bonds with interest pay-
ments (for the purposes of constructing the index, all interest payments are 
assumed to be reinvested in 10-year Treasury bonds).11 Over the long haul, 
the most recent increase in the total return for 10-year Treasury securities is 
both stunning and unprecedented. From 1980 to 2015, the average annual 
return has been 5.5 percent. Contrast this with the previous thirty-five-year 
period (1944–79), when investors in 10-year Treasury securities faced average 
annual losses of 1 percent.
In this era of rampant wealth and income inequality, it is crucial. perhaps 
now more than ever, to investigate who exactly has purchased this ever-
growing pile of public debt and who is profiting from this unprecedented 
bull market for US Treasury securities.
Findings and Arguments
The remainder of this introductory chapter summarizes the book’s main 
findings and arguments. Chapter 3 presents this book’s key finding: since the 
early 1980s and especially since the onset of the global financial crisis, there 
has been a rapid concentration in ownership of the public debt. Specifically, 
the stunning increases in ownership concentration over this period have 
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taken place in favor of the top 1 percent of US households and the top 2,500 
US corporations.
What the research also shows is that the distribution of the public debt 
is tightly correlated with the distribution of wealth more generally. In other 
words, when the share of wealth owned by wealthy households and large 
corporations increases or decreases, so, too, does their share of the public 
debt. Thus there is an intimate relationship between growing inequality, on 
the one hand, and a rising public debt, on the other. On the basis of these 
findings, I argue that the spectacular increases in public indebtedness over 
the past three-and-a-half decades have served the interests of the dominant 
owners at the apex of the wealth and income hierarchy.
To explain this rapid concentration in ownership of the public debt, I make 
use of Wolfgang Streeck’s concept of the debt state.12 As we will see in chapter 
4, under the debt state, the primary driver of the recent increases in the pub-
lic debt has been stagnating federal tax revenues, which in themselves are the 
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Figure 1. The “real” total return index for 10-year US Treasury bonds, 1790–2015.
The index was calculated by combining bond prices and bond interest payments (which 
are assumed to be reinvested in 10-year Treasury bonds). The series is deflated by the con-
sumer price index. (From Global Financial Data. Series mnemonic for US Treasury bonds: 
TRUSG10M; series mnemonic for consumer price index: CPUSAM.)
Pu bl ic  De b t,  I n e qua l i t y,  a n d  P ow e r  • 7
tax revenues constitute a dwindling portion of national income, but wealthy 
households and large corporations are also paying less and less in taxes as a per-
centage of their total income. Thus, declining tax progressivity means greater 
inequality and increased savings for those at the top of the wealth and income 
hierarchy. As a result of changes in the tax system, these elites have more money 
to invest in the growing stock of US Treasury securities, which, thanks to their 
“risk-free” status, become particularly attractive in times of crisis.
In essence, what the debt state means is that the US federal government 
has come to rely on borrowing from elites instead of taxing them. Significant 
changes to the system of public finance over the past century mean that the 
public debt no longer redistributes income upward from the laboring masses 
of taxpayers to the dominant owners of the public debt. Yet at the same time, 
these dominant owners do not finance their own interest payments either. 
Instead, the interest income paid out on government bonds is met by further 
increases in government borrowing. And, I argue, that in choosing to furnish 
elites with risk free assets instead of levying taxes on their incomes, the debt 
state comes to reinforce the existing pattern of wealth and income inequality.
The debt state is anything but stable, and since the crisis, concerns about 
ever-increasing public indebtedness have come to the fore. Assessing the 
situation from the top down, the dominant owners of the public debt fear 
that consistent deficit spending will eventually bring into question the cred-
itworthiness of the federal government. In order to at least prevent further 
substantial increases to the public debt, the interests of wealthy households 
and large corporations are best served by an austerity program of social 
spending cuts. Austerity, therefore, would seem to be the ideal strategy for 
the dominant owners of the public debt because it would serve to keep public 
debt levels in check and bolster the value of their existing investments in US 
Treasury securities.14 But in a climate of growing inequality, austerity is also 
risky and socially destabilizing.
Thus I argue that the dominant owners of the public debt are conflicted: 
though they do not want further substantial increases in the public debt, 
they are also likely to resist significant decreases in the supply of risk-free US 
Treasury securities, at least until there are clearer signs of a sustained global 
recovery. In this sense, the interests of the dominant owners of the public debt 
are, at present, best served by maintaining the status quo of the debt state.
Assessing the situation from the bottom up provides us with a different 
view of the stability of the debt state. Progressive groups have bought into 
fears about growing public debt and the need to enhance the creditworthiness 
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of the federal government. But these groups strongly oppose austerity and 
argue that responsibility for debt repayment should fall on the wealthy house-
holds and large corporations, which have seen their tax burdens decrease in 
step with a rising public debt.
The legitimacy of the debt state has thus been called into question. Despite 
its fragility, I argue, the debt state is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. 
The reason, explained in chapter 5, has to do in large part with the role that 
foreign ownership of the public debt plays in reinforcing the unequal power 
relations that underpin the debt state.
The seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for US Treasury securities puts 
downward pressure on interest rates, providing US households and corpora-
tions, as well as the US government, with an abundant source of cheap credit. 
This has two main effects. First, cheap credit for the federal government 
relieves pressures for socially disruptive spending cuts, as well as increased 
taxation, which would fall more heavily on the incomes of the dominant 
domestic owners of the public debt. Second, access to cheap credit allows 
low- and middle-income Americans to maintain consumption habits in the 
face of decades-long wage stagnation.15 In this way, the flow of cheap credit 
from abroad deflects challenges to the dominant position of the domestic 
owners of the public debt within the wealth and income hierarchy.
At the same time, I claim that foreign owners have something to gain 
from the concentration in domestic ownership of the US public debt. Foreign 
investors, especially China, have expressed fears that the federal government 
might “print money” in order to inflate away its ever-growing pile of debt. 
The existence of a powerful group of domestic owners invested in the cred-
itworthiness of the federal government helps to alleviate these fears.16 The 
wealthy households and large corporations that dominate domestic owner-
ship of the public debt hold considerable sway within the US political system 
and provide a powerful check against policy measures that might compro-
mise the risk-free status of US Treasury securities.
Analyzing the global dimensions of the debt state reveals a formidable 
“bond” of interests uniting domestic and foreign owners of the public debt. 
In relieving some of the domestic tensions engendered by growing wealth and 
income inequality, this bond of interests works to maintain the status quo of 
the debt state. In helping to sustain foreign confidence in the US Treasury 
market, this bond of interests also bodes well for the continued role of the 
United States as a safe haven for global investment, a role that has served as a 
lynchpin of US power and influence in the global political economy.17
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Finally, chapter 6 explores the political consequences of the debt state 
and the increasing concentration in ownership of the public debt. In his own 
work, Streeck has insisted that the emergence and consolidation of the debt 
state has had dire consequences for democratic representation in advanced 
capitalist countries. Specifically, he argues that under the debt state govern-
ments have come to prioritize the interests of the dominant owners of the 
public debt, or the Marktvolk, over the interests of the general citizenry, or 
Staatsvolk.18
Of course, anecdotal accounts of the incredible power wielded by the 
bond market abound. In the US context, one of the more famous examples 
of this supposed influence occurred when investors reacted negatively to Bill 
Clinton’s election as president in 1993. As the federal government’s borrowing 
costs began to escalate in response to the general election results, Clinton’s 
campaign manager, James Carville, famously remarked, “I used to think that 
if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope 
or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. 
You can intimidate everybody.”19 In the early stages of the global financial 
crisis, some commentators warned of reprisals from dreaded “bond market 
vigilantes”—powerful investors who would punish the federal government’s 
deficit spending with higher interest rates.20
But going beyond anecdotes and subjecting Streeck’s highly stylized 
conceptual framework to more rigorous empirical scrutiny proves dif-
ficult for a number of reasons. After all, the federal government (and 
federal policy making) is subject to many different channels of influence 
that extend well beyond the public debt. And even if it were possible to 
isolate the bond market as a channel of influence, our efforts would still 
be hampered by the limitations of data on the concentration in ownership 
of the public debt, which, despite my best efforts, still remain patchy and 
inconsistent.
What we can do, however, is examine US federal government policy to 
see if it has been transformed in ways that might privilege the Marktvolk 
over the Staatsvolk. A simple content analysis allows us to count the fre-
quency with which the terms that Streeck identifies with the interests of 
the Marktvolk (e.g., international, investors, interest rates, confidence) and 
the Staatsvolk (e.g., national, public opinion, citizens, loyalty) appear in the 
Economic Report of the President (ERP). While the relationship of the terms 
as they appear in the report is not perfectly correlated, the content analysis 
does show roughly that, as concentration in ownership of the public debt 
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increases, references to the terms associated with the Marktvolk do indeed 
increase relative to the terms associated with the Staatsvolk.
Although these findings do not prove any direct power of the Marktvolk 
over the government, they do indicate that inequality in ownership of the 
public debt and inequality in representation within policy are really two 
sides of the same coin. The debt state not only reinforces wealth and income 
inequality but it also contributes to the broader erosion of democracy. Thus 
the findings in this book are consistent with a growing body of literature that 
has systematically revealed the negative consequences of growing inequality 
for democratic representation in the United States.21
What Should Be Done?
Inequality has become one of the defining issues of contemporary capital-
ism, so it is perhaps unsurprising that it pervades the public finances as well. 
If the debt state reinforces wealth and income inequality and if that, in 
turn, is detrimental to democracy, then what should be done? What sort of 
political measures should be taken to counteract the growing inequities that 
characterize ownership of the public debt? These questions are addressed in 
chapter 7, the concluding chapter of the book.
Before I explore possible responses to the debt state, a word of caution 
about what the book is not trying to say. The story that unravels in this 
book is not one about the dangers of a large public debt. Early Keynesian 
theorists of the public debt, including Abba Lerner and Alvin Hansen, first 
demonstrated in the 1940s that the outstanding level of public indebtedness 
is inconsequential so long as it is being accumulated as part of a macroeco-
nomic strategy of attaining noninflationary full employment.22 And as the 
sectoral balances approach makes clear, the government sector must run a 
deficit in order for external entities (i.e., the domestic private and foreign 
sectors) to run a surplus (see the appendix).
In fact, for a monetarily sovereign entity like the US federal government 
(i.e., an entity that issues debt in a currency it fully controls), bankruptcy is 
never really an issue because the Federal Reserve can always purchase gov-
ernment bonds when the private sector does not want them.23 Thanks to 
monetary sovereignty, the United States simply cannot end up in a situation 
like that of Greece, which ceded control over its national currency when it 
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joined the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).24 The findings in this 
book provide no solace for “deficit hawks” eager to find evidence to support 
their fear mongering about the unsustainability of the US public debt.
Thus the story that I tell here is not one about the dangers of a large 
public debt but about the dangers of a large unequally distributed public 
debt. The distinction is absolutely crucial. In the words of Bill Mitchell, 
“the only issues a progressive person might have with public debt would 
be the equity considerations of who owns the debt and whether there is an 
equitable provision of private wealth coming from the deficits.”25 As a result, 
I am not interested in advocating measures that would reduce or eliminate 
the public debt but in finding ways to combat the inequality that underpins 
the public finances.
In order to reverse the unequal power relations at the heart of the debt 
state, we have to identify what created them in the first place. As mentioned 
above, my empirical analysis indicates that the emergence and consolidation 
of the debt state, with its rising levels of public indebtedness and increasing 
inequality in ownership of the public debt, is driven by tax stagnation and 
declining tax progressivity. In other words, the debt state has come into being 
because the federal government has come to rely on borrowing from wealthy 
households and large corporations instead of taxing them. It follows logi-
cally from this observation that the strengthening of progressive tax policies 
that have been undermined since the early 1980s would go a long way in 
addressing grave inequalities in the ownership of the public debt and in the 
ownership of wealth more generally.
Increasing federal income tax rates on wealthy households and large 
corporations, along with the implementation of some form of global wealth 
tax, would restore some of the lost progressivity to the federal tax system. 
Measures such as these will no doubt encounter stiff political resistance from 
powerful groups, and they will have little impact unless they are combined 
with coordination at the global level to minimize international tax competi-
tion and to clamp down on tax evasion. To deal seriously with the problem of 
growing inequality, progressive taxation also needs to be attached to a much 
broader progressive strategy, one that would involve, among other things, 
efforts to combat corporate concentration and rein in CEO compensation, 
redress gender and racial wage disparities, restore the power of trade unions, 
and increase much-needed spending on public infrastructure and social 
services.
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Despite the political challenges involved, a concerted effort to restore 
progressivity to the federal system is, in my view, a goal worth pursuing. This 
is precisely because of the strong relationship between tax cuts and wealth 
and income inequality. As the empirical work of Piketty has clearly shown, 
developed countries that have seen the largest decreases in top tax rates since 
the early 1980s have also seen the largest increases in the income share of the 
top percentile.26
In a world of deregulation, global capital flows, and a justice system that 
seems toothless in punishing corporate crime, taxation remains one of the 
few coercive tools that governments have at their disposal to influence the 
behavior of the dominant elites. Thus carefully designed measures to bolster 
the progressivity of the federal tax system would not only tackle inequality 
but would also, perhaps most importantly, go a long way in reasserting demo-
cratic control over elements of the population that have seen their power 
grow inordinately under the debt state.
What Comes Next
The arguments in this book build gradually, chapter by chapter, and roughly 
follow the sequence outlined above. To ensure that these arguments are 
properly comprehended, the reader is asked to tackle the book in its entirety. 
Before proceeding with the task at hand, I would like to briefly mention what 
the reader should expect from the analysis that follows.
The research process is one of discovery. And one of the most satisfying 
parts of the process involves uncovering new facts and adding new insights 
into unresolved debates. But as the following pages will attest, conducting 
research also involves plenty of frustrations. The data are often difficult to 
obtain, they are often patchy and inconsistent, and quite often they simply do 
not exist. Thus the reader should be aware that the analysis in this book does 
not just contain answers. An important part of my own process of discovery 
has been to unravel, not only what we know, but also what we do not and 
cannot know about the ownership of the public debt. Where it is relevant, 
I highlight what I regard as some of the limits to our collective knowledge. 
And I warmly invite other minds more capable than my own to show the way 
in overcoming these limits.
With this in mind, we are ready to move on to chapter 2, which sets 
the stage for my analysis by surveying the long-term evolution of debates 
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 surrounding ownership of the public debt. A comprehensive survey of the 
existing literature serves to confirm one of the main points raised in this 
introductory chapter: that despite centuries of speculation and heated 
debate, experts have come to no consensus on even the most basic facts con-
cerning ownership of the public debt. As we will see, there are some key 
exceptions, but for the most part, the absence of the basic facts themselves is 
what explains this lack of consensus.
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A Breakthrough
During its first century of existence, the US public debt aroused 
sentiments that were based on political expediency rather than any system-
atic theory or rigorous empirical scrutiny. Because there was little data avail-
able on ownership of the public debt, claims were backed up by little more 
than rumor and conjecture.
By the late nineteenth century, however, things started to change. In 
his Public Debts: An Essay in the Science of Finance, Henry Carter Adams 
developed a coherent framework with which to analyze the effects of public 
indebtedness on the class structure of capitalist societies.1 Most importantly, 
Adams sought to substantiate his theoretical claims through an empirical 
examination of US census data from 1880. For the first time, the ownership 
structure of the US public debt was to be subjected to serious theoretical and 
empirical scrutiny. This pathbreaking inquiry would expose surprising and 
uncomfortable truths about the interests served by the US system of public 
finance.
Adams’s research uncovered the “spectacle of a highly centralized public 
debt.” He found that ownership of the public debt in the late nineteenth 
century was highly concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest individuals 
and the largest corporations. These two entities composed what he referred to 
Ch a p t er  T wo
The Spectacle of a Highly Centralized 
Public Debt
The capitalists are in a very small minority, and any legislation 
repudiating in whole or in part the obligations of the bonds of 
the government would fall most severely upon widows, orphans 
and people of small capital . . . Out of the three million subscrib-
ers to our various public loans, over nine-tenths are of the class 
called the people.
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as a “bondholding class,” which wielded considerable power over government 
and society through its ownership of the public debt.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the historical evolution of 
thinking about ownership of the public debt from Adams to the present. 
As we will see, there have been many twists and turns in the debate, all of 
which are bound up with historical transformations in the broader US politi-
cal economy. We will also see that despite more than a century of debate, 
political economists have come to no lasting consensus on even the most 
basic facts concerning ownership of the public debt. As a result, political 
economists have little idea of what happened to the bondholding class that 
Adams first theorized and mapped well over a century ago. To navigate this 
journey through the topsy-turvy history of public debt ownership, I begin by 
fleshing out Adams’s pioneering contribution.
H. C. Adams and the “Science of Finance”
Adams’s study of public finance was shaped by developments that were 
unfolding in the latter half of the nineteenth century. During this period, 
government borrowing had become a nearly universal feature of the global 
political economy. What had started as the exclusive practice of commer-
cial powers such as Holland and England was now being adopted by other 
Western powers and emulated by societies in all corners of the world. The 
purpose of Adams’s study was to explain this unprecedented spread of public 
debt and to analyze its underlying consequences.
As a starting point Adams wanted to understand the conditions that 
facilitated the emergence of successful systems of public borrowing such as 
the one that developed in England in the seventeenth century. Surveying 
the historical development of public debts, Adams suggested that govern-
ments that were able to borrow vast sums cheaply had two fundamental 
characteristics: established financial markets and constitutional govern-
ments. Deep and highly liquid money markets were themselves a product 
of industrial development and the emergence of a new propertied class, 
the capitalists, with money to lend to the government. Constitutional 
governments offered a guarantee against repudiation that boosted their 
creditworthiness. For Adams, these two characteristics were fundamen-
tally intertwined. On the one hand, the new class of capitalists possessed 
surplus funds, and on the other, the government was in need of these 
16 • a  H ig h ly  C e n t r a l i z e d  Pu bl ic  De b t
funds to carry out wars. Constitutionalism tied the government and capi-
talists together.
But this dynamic also engendered a contradiction. Constitutional gov-
ernment, after all, had emerged out of the principle that people should 
be able to govern themselves. But in Adams’s view, “the historical fact 
is that, in the attempt to realize this theory, the actual control of pub-
lic affairs had fallen into the hands of those who possess property.”2 In 
short, the capitalists lent money to the government and controlled it as 
dominant shareholders control a corporation. The decision to make loans 
to the government was not based on patriotic sentiment; it was merely a 
sign “that in some way the moneyed interest has captured the machinery 
of government.”3 According to Adams, constitutional government was a 
prerequisite for government borrowing. But once government borrow-
ing is institutionalized, it comes to undermine the very foundations of 
constitutionalism.
Public Debt and Class Politics
Adams claimed that the public debt institutionalized the relationship 
between government and capitalists, subjugating the former to the latter. At 
the same time, Adams also considered the “social tendencies” of the public 
debt, which concerned the influence that government borrowing had on the 
class structure of capitalist societies. In general, two social tendencies char-
acterized the public debt: either it could change the class structure entirely 
or it could make existing class relations permanent. Adams maintained that 
only the second variety was relevant.
To be sure, large fortunes had been amassed from trading in government 
bonds. But Adams argued that these fortunes were the result of poor finan-
cial management by the government and not the existence of the public debt 
per se. “Men,” Adams affirmed, “hold bonds because they are rich, they do 
not become rich by holding bonds.”4 A strict class division, under which 
private property was sufficiently concentrated in the hands of the capital-
ist class, was one of the main prerequisites to the development of successful 
systems of government borrowing. All the emergence of the public debt did 
was render permanent existing class relations by dividing society into taxpay-
ers that finance interest payments on government bonds and bondholders 
that receive those tax-financed interest payments. In this way, the division 
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between government bondholders and taxpayers mirrored the class division 
in capitalism between the propertied and propertyless.5
Adams referred to the powerful capitalists that owned the public debt as 
the “bondholding class.” Crucially, he did not consider the bondholding class 
as separate from the capitalist class as a whole; Adams’s distinction referred 
more to a set of interests that the capitalist class held in relation to the public 
debt, rather than to a specific group or faction of capitalist interests that 
stood apart from the broader class interest.
What exactly were the underlying interests that united capitalists-as-
bondholders into a class? Adams is usually straightforward in his reasoning, 
but he never gives a coherent account of what it is that unites the bondhold-
ing class and pits it against the broader taxpaying population. It is possible, 
however, to piece together these interests from his analysis.
First, the bondholding class advocated for the permanency of the pub-
lic debt, as government bonds were key to business interests and were the 
foundation of the entire national banking system. The permanency of the 
public debt, however, was to be balanced with assurances that the govern-
ment would refrain from excessive borrowing, which would compromise 
its creditworthiness. Second, the bondholding class favored a regressive tax 
system that would serve to redistribute income upward to bondholders and 
reinforce existing class relations. Though the public debt served the exclusive 
interests of a small group of powerful capitalists, the primary political task of 
the bondholding class was to convince ordinary people that “what proves to 
be of personal advantage must of necessity benefit the community at large.”6
Mapping the Bondholding Class
Ultimately, Adams thought that these social tendencies would depend on 
how the public debt was distributed. In order for the bondholding class to 
impose its will on government and society, it would need to dominate own-
ership of the public debt. With this in mind, Adams set out to measure the 
“concentration of bondholding interests.” 7 Examining US census data from 
1880, Adams uncovered what he referred to as the “spectacle of a highly cen-
tralized public debt.”8
The main census data cited by Adams are reproduced in table 1.9 The first 
column divides federal bondholders into investment classes based on the 
total amount they invested in the public debt. These ranged from class I, 
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which includes investments from $50 to $500, to class VIII, which includes 
investments exceeding $50,000. The next four columns provide data on the 
percentage of investors in each investment class and on the percentage held 
by the respective investment classes within the US household and corporate 
sectors.
Let’s begin with the data on individual holdings of the public debt in 
columns II and III. Though it represented only 1.4 percent of the total popu-
lation of individual public creditors in 1880, the top investment class (VIII), 
with investments exceeding $50,000, owned 48 percent of the individual 
holdings of the US public debt. The unequal distribution of the public debt 
becomes even more apparent when we divide the investment classes in half. 
Classes V through VIII, those with investments exceeding $5,000, made 
up only 15 percent of the number of government bondholders, and yet they 
owned 82 percent of the individual share of the public debt. Given that the 
average annual per capita income in the United States in 1880 is estimated 
to have been around $176, it can be safely assumed that only the wealthiest 
individuals had any significant ownership stake in the US public debt.10
The data on corporate ownership of the US public debt in columns IV 
and V are not as easy to interpret. When it comes to corporate holdings, the 
expectation is that individual corporations would hold more government 
bonds than individuals, given that the size of the average corporate balance 
sheet normally outstrips that of the average household. Yet even with this 
discrepancy, the same classes were used to differentiate the amounts held 
by individuals and corporations. As a result, the census data on corporate 
table 1 Individual and corporate ownership of the US public debt in 1880
Class by amount ($) 
held










I. 50–500 36 1.8 4 0.007
II. 500–1,000 21 3 4 0.03
III. 1,000–2,500 17 5 4 0.04
IV. 2,500–5,000 12 8 10 0.3
V. 5,000–10,000 7 9 13 0.8
VI. 10,000–25,000 5 13 17 2
VII. 25,000–50,000 1.8 12 15 4
VIII. Over 50,000 1.4 48 35 93
Source: Adapted from Adams, Public Debts, 46.
Note: Percentage values in columns may not total 100 due to rounding.
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holdings tell us very little about the relative ownership shares of large versus 
small corporations.
Given that average corporate holdings were around $22,500, even fairly 
insignificant players would have been included within the top investment 
class (VIII). Further, the low cutoff point (holdings exceeding $50,000) 
meant that 35 percent of corporations made it into the top investment class. 
Still, there is nothing in the data in table 1 to suggest that the pattern of 
ownership concentration for the corporate sector differed significantly from 
that of individuals. The top class of owners may have been diluted by this 
low cutoff point, but the fact that top corporate owners held around 93 per-
cent of government bonds still indicates a staggering pattern of ownership 
concentration.11
Overall, the census data confirm that ownership of the public debt in 1880 
was concentrated in the hands of a bondholding class of wealthy individuals 
and large corporations.12 The findings would provide much-needed clarity to 
the debates that had been taking place in the years prior to the publication 
of Adams’s study.
During the American Civil War (1861–64), President Abraham 
Lincoln claimed that large increases in the public debt would create unrest 
unless efforts were made to ensure that it was widely distributed.13 In 1865, 
Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, claimed that such efforts had largely 
failed, and he insisted that the northern states had come under the control 
of an aristocracy based on the ownership of the public debt. Jay Cooke, a 
banker and government loan contractor during the Civil War, vehemently 
denied such claims.14 According to Cooke, campaigns to market govern-
ment bonds to the masses had made large capitalists minority stakeholders 
in the public debt. And, as the quotation at the beginning of this chapter 
makes clear, Cooke thought that attempts to repudiate the public debt 
would greatly harm all the widows, orphans, and small-time investors, 
who had invested their modest savings in the market for federal govern-
ment bonds.
In contrast to Jay Cooke, Adams argued there were no empirical 
grounds for arguments that the public debt is “a good thing because it 
permits easy and safe investments for the funds of those who are weak 
and dependent.”15 Because of the significant concentration in ownership, 
Adams dismissed as “ludicrous” any suggestion that the public debt should 
be maintained for the benefit of widows, orphans, and other vulnerable 
elements of society.16
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The Foreign Element
What, then, did Adams have to say about the issue of foreign ownership of 
public debt? To understand his thinking on this matter, we need to return 
to what Adams said about successful systems for government borrowing. 
Successful systems were “natural” in the sense that they sprang organically 
from certain domestic conditions: namely, developed financial markets with 
consolidated bondholding classes, on the one hand, and constitutional gov-
ernments, on the other. Societies without either of these could still engage 
in government borrowing, but they would have to rely on funds from the 
bondholding classes of countries that met these conditions. The bondhold-
ing classes that engaged in foreign lending did so, not out of confidence in 
the debtor, but out of confidence in their own governments to enforce the 
contract with the debtor state.
It is important to point out the specific historical circumstances under 
which Adams was writing about the politics of international borrowing and 
lending. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the world witnessed a 
frenzied expansion of government borrowing and a rapid globalization of the 
government bond market. As Adams notes, from 1862 to 1872, the value of 
foreign securities on the London Stock Exchange, comprising the securities 
of approximately 150 nations and quasi nations, increased from £698 million 
to £2.4 billion.17 A great deal of this borrowing was done by underdevel-
oped states. China, Japan, Persia, Siam, Egypt, Liberia, Orange Free States, 
Zanzibar, and the nations of South America were all keen to attract funds 
from the bondholding classes of Western Europe. Adams, therefore, assumed 
that foreign borrowing was a sign of weakness and foreign lending a sign 
of strength. The countries that borrowed from abroad created “unnatural” 
systems of public debt, which led to two main problems.
First, just as domestic borrowing compromised the constitutional integ-
rity of strong states, foreign borrowing often destroyed the autonomy of weak 
states. Lacking capitalist institutions and norms, weak countries would often 
fall into hardship and renege on their financial obligations. When weak 
governments attempted to repudiate their debts, the bondholding classes 
of the West would rally their own governments to engage in an aggressive 
foreign policy that, “under certain conditions, leads inevitably to conquest 
and occupation.”18 And in these situations, Adams proclaimed, “it is not at 
all exceptional for the inferior people to find themselves delivered over to 
practical servitude.”19
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Second, Adams noted that these unnatural systems of public debt can 
“introduce new and perplexing complications between the greater powers 
themselves.”20 When a strong creditor takes steps to occupy a weak debtor, 
the strong creditor often finds itself in tense negotiations with other pow-
ers over the terms of debt settlement. The occupier also increases its power 
within the international arena, thereby upsetting the balance of power and 
potentially destabilizing the interstate system.
The US Context
By the time Adams was writing, foreign ownership had ceased to be an 
important issue for the United States. From its historic highs after the 
Louisiana Purchase, foreign ownership of the US public debt had drastically 
fallen in the face of rapid development and was “negligible” by the 1870s.21 
According to the 1880 census data cited by Adams, foreigners owned a mere 
2 percent of the US public debt.
In the late nineteenth century, the United States had also been spared 
the complications of foreign lending experienced by its Western European 
counterparts. There were still plenty of profitable investment opportunities 
at home and, therefore, there was no need for the US bondholding class to 
undertake risky lending operations in foreign countries. As a result, the fed-
eral government did not need to become embroiled in foreign conquests in 
the name of its domestic bondholding class.
Adams concluded his analysis of foreign borrowing with a prediction, a 
warning, and a recommendation. He predicted that profitable investment 
outlets at home would eventually be exhausted and that this would entice 
the US bondholding class to invest in foreign government bonds. He warned 
that this move into foreign lending would create challenges for the isolation-
ist stance of the United States. And he recommended that the federal govern-
ment begin immediately to develop a policy that could respond effectively to 
the turbulent and often unpredictable world of foreign lending.
A Case of Bad Timing
Not only did Adams create the first map of the ownership structure of the US 
public debt, he also linked his research to a theoretical framework, one that 
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took into account both the domestic and the global aspects of indebtedness. 
This stands as a considerable feat, and yet the timing of Adams’s pioneering 
study was inopportune.
As was already mentioned, foreign ownership of the US public debt in the 
late nineteenth century was insignificant and the US bondholding class was 
not heavily invested in the debts of foreign governments. Even the signifi-
cance of unearthing domestic ownership concentration was compromised in 
a context of rapidly declining government debt levels. As figure 2 indicates, 
the level of US public debt as a percentage of GDP fell from around 32 per-
cent in the immediate post–Civil War period to 12.6 percent in 1887, the year 
that Adams’s study was published.
With the public debt in decline, debates about its ownership all but disap-
peared in the late nineteenth century.22 It was not until the first half of the 
twentieth century, which witnessed two world wars, the Great Depression, 
and the largest expansion of government borrowing in US history, that these 
debates would eventually resurface.
The Keynesian Revolution
If the historical circumstances of the late nineteenth century detracted atten-
tion from the political economy of the public debt, those of the first half 
of the twentieth century made it impossible to ignore. To understand this 
renewed focus on public indebtedness within the context of political and 
academic debates, it is necessary to discuss how the instability of this period 
was theorized and analyzed by its greatest thinker, John Maynard Keynes.
With unemployment exceeding 20 percent in the United States and 
Great Britain during the Great Depression, Keynes and his followers 
were compelled to develop a liberal alternative to the “classical” theory 
of employment.23 In The General Theory, Keynes notes that liberal politi-
cal economy had previously assumed that all unemployment was either 
frictional or voluntary.24 In the former case, unemployment was a short-
lived phenomenon that resulted from temporary mismatches of demand 
and supply in isolated markets, while in the latter case it was a result of 
workers’ demanding wages higher than their marginal productivity. In 
the long run, however, there was simply no room for chronic involuntary 
unemployment within the liberal framework. The classical liberal view 
elevated the market to a self-regulating mechanism governed by Say’s law, 
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which Keynes summarized as “supply creates its own demand.” This meant 
that in the long run, aggregate supply and aggregate demand would reach 
an equilibrium point at full employment.
The experiences of the 1930s flew in the face of the classical account. 
Unemployment was proving stubbornly persistent and continued, at least 
in the United States, even in the context of declining wages and workers 
who were obviously willing but unable to find work at any wage.25 Keynes 
argued that most of the unemployment in the 1930s was involuntary. And 
involuntary unemployment, it followed, should be understood as a problem 
of “effective demand.” According to Keynes, the aggregate supply of goods 
and services willingly supplied by capitalists could, and often did, equal 
aggregate demand at an equilibrium point below full employment. As such, 
Keynes argued that active government intervention was needed in order to 
combat involuntary unemployment. Expansionary government spending 
would serve as a compensatory mechanism filling in for the lull in effective 
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Figure 2. US gross public debt as a percentage of GDP, 1792–2014.
(US nominal GDP, 1792–2012 [series mneumonic: GDPUSA]; US gross public debt, 1792–
2012 [series mneumonic: USFYGFDA], from Global Financial Data. Federal gross public 
debt as a percentage of GDP, 2013-14, from White House Office of Management and Budget 
[table 7.1].)
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If they were to provide the first systematic theoretical justification for 
active government intervention from within the liberal tradition, Keynes and 
his followers would need to provide a convincing alternative to the liberal 
faith in the doctrine of sound finance, which called for balanced budgets 
and minimal government borrowing. Part of the challenge was to demon-
strate how the public debt, previously used to fund war-making and public 
works projects, could also be used as an effective tool of macroeconomic 
management.26
Keynes left it to his followers to address this challenge.27 And in the 1940s, 
the most prominent early Keynesians, Alvin Hansen and Abba Lerner, took 
up the task of rethinking the role of government borrowing within capital-
ist societies. For Hansen and Lerner, rethinking the public debt also meant 
integrating the class politics of public debt ownership, which were central 
to Adams’s analysis, into their own aggregate macroeconomic frameworks.
Private versus Public
Keynesian theorists of the public debt hold diverse views.28 Yet there is one 
argument that provides the basis for a distinctly Keynesian critique of, and 
alternative to, the doctrine of sound finance: namely, that a public debt dif-
fers fundamentally from a private debt.
Followers of Keynes acknowledge that for private individuals and busi-
nesses success or failure is determined by the principles of private accounting. 
The primary benchmark of success in the private sphere is net wealth, which 
is calculated by subtracting debts from assets. Thus in the private sphere, 
Lerner proclaimed, “indebtedness is impoverishment,” and minimizing 
debt and balancing budgets formed “an eminently well-established rule of 
private prudence.”29 Private borrowing, Lerner maintained, is restricted by 
the principles of sound finance because the debt is external to the borrower. 
Any private entity that owes money to another private entity is burdened by 
interest payments on their debt because they involve a transfer of income and 
purchasing power from the debtor to the creditor.
In contrast, Keynesian theorists argued that the success or failure of 
the government should not be subjected to the same principles as private 
accounting.30 According to Lerner’s functional finance approach, govern-
ment policy actions “shall all be undertaken with an eye only to the results of 
these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional doctrine 
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about what is sound or unsound.”31 The benchmark of success for the govern-
ment was whether its policies were successful in creating noninflationary full 
employment. So long as this was achieved and maintained, the outstanding 
level of public debt was inconsequential.
The reason public debt was harmless, Keynesians argued, was that it was 
internal, at least when viewed in aggregate macroeconomic terms. Income 
transferred from taxpayers to government bondholders in the form of inter-
est payments flows internally within the same entity, the national economy. 
In aggregate accounting terms, one person’s asset is another person’s liability. 
Therefore, in the macroeconomy, the two cancel each other out. As Lerner 
explained, a domestically owned public debt involves no external creditor: 
“We owe it to ourselves.”32
External Public Debt
The discerning reader will have noticed the qualification made in the previ-
ous section. For Keynesians, the outstanding level of public debt is incon-
sequential so long as it is owned by domestic entities. Public debt owned by 
foreigners is an external form of debt. In the latter case, the interest payments 
constitute a transfer of income and purchasing power from one entity (the 
borrowing government) to an external entity (a foreign citizen or govern-
ment). Unlike the domestically owned portion, foreign-owned public debt is 
subject to the traditional rules and limits of sound finance.
An external public debt might have been a cause for concern, but it was 
largely irrelevant to the context in which Keynesian theories of public debt 
were first being formulated. Reliable data from the Federal Reserve’s flow of 
funds accounts begin in 1945 and indicate that, from 1945 to 1949, the “rest 
of the world,” a category that included foreign private investors and foreign 
central banks, owned on average 1.2 percent of the US public debt. Given the 
insignificance of foreign ownership, it seems reasonable that the Keynesians 
decided to emphasize the consequences of domestically owned public debt.33
“We” ≠ “Ourselves”
In the aggregate, Lerner argued that domestically owned public debt was not 
subject to any predefined limits. But he conceded that, in the disaggregate, 
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a domestically owned public debt brought with it potentially negative con-
sequences. One of the potential dark sides of a rapidly growing public debt 
would be the effect that it would have on the domestic distribution of wealth 
and income. Lerner readily admitted that, once we start to disaggregate the 
national macroeconomy, “we” does not consist of the same people as “our-
selves.”34 In other words, if the identity of bondholders were distinct from the 
identity of taxpayers, then the public debt would redistribute income from 
the latter to the former. The old concerns that Adams expressed regarding 
ownership of the public debt and its redistributive effects had resurfaced in 
the Keynesian frameworks.
Hansen, for his part, was also keenly aware of the negative effects that 
a rapidly growing public debt might have on distribution. For example, he 
argued that the lower and middle classes would have the means to invest a 
substantial stake in government bonds in the event of small, gradual increases 
in the public debt. Minor increases in the public debt would, in other words, 
have negligible effects on the general distribution of wealth and income. But 
Hansen went on to suggest that the rich would purchase government bonds 
in disproportionate numbers in the event of large, rapid increases in the pub-
lic debt, which would only serve to intensify existing inequality. The negative 
effects of the public debt on the distribution of wealth and income were, in 
Hansen’s view, “the most fundamental objection[s] that can be raised against 
financing mainly by borrowing.”35
Early Keynesian theorists of the public debt were uncomfortable with 
the idea that government borrowing might have such adverse distributional 
effects. Although this point is never made explicit in the work of Hansen or 
Lerner, there are at least two plausible reasons for their discomfort.
On the one hand, if a policy prescription could be shown to serve the 
interests of the rich and powerful, then it would compromise the seemingly 
objective (i.e., politically neutral) nature of Keynesian macroeconomic policy 
prescriptions. A highly concentrated public debt would invite criticism from 
committed neoclassicists, who were eager to point out the “distortionary” 
effects of Keynesian policies on the free market, and Marxists, who were 
keen to expose the limits of Keynesianism as part of their political project to 
transcend capitalism altogether.
On the other hand, a highly concentrated public debt might limit the 
efficacy of debt-financed government spending. The so-called marginal pro-
pensity to consume was, after all, much higher for those with lower incomes, 
and a pattern of distribution skewed toward top earners would, if unequal 
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enough, eventually undermine, rather than enhance, the much vaunted 
“multiplier effect.”36 These dynamics, if pushed far enough, would eventually 
undermine the efficacy of countercyclical deficit spending.
Though there were widespread worries about the distribution of the pub-
lic debt in the 1940s, Keynesians expressed confidence about the situation. In 
an article written with Guy Greer, Hansen declared that the distribution of 
government bonds in the 1940s was more equitable than at any other point 
in history.37 Hansen also suggested that wide swathes of the population now 
benefitted indirectly from the public debt through their ownership of life 
insurance plans, savings accounts, and social security assets that were heavily 
invested in government bonds.38 Both Hansen and Lerner argued that the 
negative effects of the public debt on distribution would, within certain lim-
its, be a reasonable trade off for the attainment of full employment.39 Finally, 
both were confident that any lingering inequities in the distribution of the 
public debt could be offset through progressive taxation.
The Evidence: “Scanty and Scattered”
Neither Hansen nor Lerner offered any compelling counterevidence to back 
up their assertions. And as one commentator noted, when it came to debates 
about ownership of the public debt during this time, there was “rarely . . . any 
substantive evidence offered for conclusions reached.”40 In the first book-
length study of Keynesian views on the public debt, Seymour Harris was 
forced to concede that the “available information on distribution of holdings 
of government securities is scanty and scattered.”41
More than a half-century has passed since the early Keynesians devel-
oped new insights into the role of public debt within capitalist societies. 
And in the intervening years, political economists have failed to come to 
any sustained consensus on the ownership structure of the public debt. 
Some echo the optimistic views of Hansen and Lerner and suggest that 
the public debt has become widely held, while others, harkening back to 
the views of Adams and the earliest critics of Alexander Hamilton, insist 
that ownership of the public debt is concentrated in the hands of the rich 
and powerful.42
Why have experts had such trouble coming to any consensus? The main 
reason is that the empirical record of the existing literature remains almost 
as “scanty and scattered” as it was in the mid-twentieth century. Table 2 
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lists all of the existing studies that have offered some empirical data on 
disaggregate ownership of the US public debt. The results are, to put it 
mildly, underwhelming. At least four things stand out.





Adams (1887) 1880 1.4% of private investors 
owned 47.8% of privately held 
government bonds. Top 35% 
of corporations held 93% of 
corporate share
Revealed “spectacle of a 










0.25% of individuals owned 
20% of tax-exempt 
government debt (1935), and 
0.1% owned 28% of tax-
exempt federal debt (1938). 
0.09% of corporations received 
57% of corporate income share 
on government debt (1937)
“Concentration appears in 
both the institutional and 
individual holdings of 
public debt” (187) 
Miller (1950) 1945 Top 5.31% of taxpayers 
(income ≥$5000) paid ca. 
50–56% of all federal taxes 
and received 58.7% of interest 
payments
Progressivity of federal tax 
and public debt structures 
the same; public debt does 
not redistribute income
Cohen (1951) 1946 Top income class (≥$5000) 
paid 47–55% of all federal 
taxes and received 39% of 
interest payments
Public debt distributional 
effects favor lower-income 
groups
Michl (1991) 1982, 
1984 for 
taxes
Top 1% of households owned 
6.2% of savings bonds and 
43.3% of other Treasury issues, 
received 22.5–33.3% of direct 
and indirect interest payments, 
paid 11.9–14.6% of federal 
taxes
“Seems clear that the 
conventional textbook 
wisdom that we ‘owe to 
ourselves’ is wrong. Interest 





1992 1992 Lorenz curve showed 
interest distribution more 
progressive than federal 
income tax 
“Principal investor in U.S. 
Treasury securities is John 
Q. Public, not John D. 
Rockefeller” (63)
Sources: Data from Adams, Public Debts; Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation 
of Concentration of Economic Power (Washington, DC, 1941); Donald C. Miller, Taxes, the Public Debt 
and Transfers of Income (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950); Cohen, “Distributional Effects; 
Thomas R. Michl, “Debt, Deficits, and the Distribution of Income,” Journal of Post Keynsian Economics 
13 (1991): 351–65; Frances X. Cavanaugh, The Truth about the National Debt: Five Myths and One 
Reality (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1996).
a  H ig h ly  C e n t r a l i z e d  Pu bl ic  De b t  • 29
First, even though data have become more readily accessible and statisti-
cal methods more refined, subsequent studies have done little to improve 
on the rather rudimentary empirical methods developed by Adams over a 
century ago. Like Adams, these studies offer narrow snapshot measures for 
single years. Second, all the studies use different methods to measure owner-
ship concentration and redistribution. This makes it difficult to adjudicate 
between their competing claims and impossible to compare their research 
results over time. Third, all of the studies, save for that of Adams and a report 
by the Temporary National Economic Committee, are focused on house-
holds and completely neglect corporate ownership of the public debt. Fourth, 
the most recent attempt to measure the pattern of public debt ownership was 
published in 1996. This means that we have no idea what has happened to the 
ownership structure during the massive buildup of the US public debt from 
the early 2000s through the global financial crisis.
Thus competing claims, regardless of whether they assert that the pub-
lic debt is concentrated or widely held, are constructed on shaky empirical 
foundations. The poor empirical record outlined in table 2 gives us a starting 
point for explaining why the existing literature has had so many difficulties 
agreeing on even the most basic facts: there has been insufficient effort to 
establish these facts in the first place.
And while confusion reigns domestically, dramatic changes in foreign 
ownership of the US public debt have only confounded matters further. 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods dollar-to-gold exchange standard 
in the early 1970s, foreigners have started to accumulate a substantial share 
of the US public debt. This rapid of accumulation of US debt by foreigners 
represents another turning point in the debate.
Flowing Uphill
As figure 3 shows, the share of the US public debt owned by the “rest of 
the world” has risen rapidly over the past four decades. During the postwar 
period (1950–70), foreigners owned on average less than 4 percent of the US 
public debt. This share increased to 16 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, before 
climbing further to 23 percent in the 1990s. Then, from 2000 until 2007, the 
share of the US public debt owned by the rest of the world increased from 29 
to 47 percent. Since the onset of the crisis, the foreign share of the public debt 
has held remarkably steady, hovering around the 50 percent mark.
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The recent meteoric rise in foreign ownership of the US public debt has 
upset the conventional wisdom, of which Adams’s analysis is representative. 
Foreign borrowing had always been seen as a sign of weakness and underdevel-
opment; it was a necessary evil resorted to by countries that had yet to develop 
functioning financial markets and political institutions that would allow 
them to raise finances domestically. In other words, the conventional wisdom 
assumed that capital would flow downhill from rich countries to poor ones.43
Yet around the turn of the millennium the world’s greatest power had 
become the world’s largest debtor.44 And to make matters more complicated, 
the United States has become increasingly indebted not only to other rich 
countries but also to China: an emerging market ruled by an authoritarian 
communist regime.
In the 1990s, strategic allies such as Japan and the United Kingdom 
owned most of the foreign share of the US public debt. But since then, China 
has emerged as one of the major buyers of US Treasury securities. China’s 
ownership share of the US public debt increased from 3 percent in 1994 to 15 
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Figure 3. 
The share of the US public debt owned by the rest of the world (official and private investors), 
1945–2015. Annual data from 1945–50 and quarterly data from 1950 onward. (From Federal 
Reserve flow of funds accounts [table L.209].)
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of the public debt.45 China had become the largest foreign creditor to the 
US federal government by 2010, and it still held that position in 2015, by 
which time its foreign share of the US public debt was 21 percent. Contrary 
to popular assumptions, capital now flows uphill. And political economists 
of all ideological persuasions have not been able to agree on what this coun-
terintuitive development means for the global political economy.
Strength, Weakness, or Interdependence?
Some argue that the rapid rise in foreign ownership reinforces the role of the 
Treasury securities market as a powerful “safe haven” for global capitalism.46 
According to this view, foreign ownership of the public debt is a sign of US 
strength: the steady flow of foreign investment in federal securities allows the 
United States to finance budget deficits on the cheap while freeing up domestic 
funds to invest in higher-yielding private investments at home and abroad.47
Those who claim foreign indebtedness is a sign of US strength point to the 
fact that foreign ownership of the US public debt has held remarkably steady 
since the onset of the crisis. Continued global reliance on the US Treasury 
market as a global safe haven is seen as an indication of US strength. For 
example, Panitch and Gindin argue that continued foreign investment in the 
public debt is a sign of the continued prowess of the US empire that validates 
the sanctity of the US dollar as a reserve currency and gives US policy makers 
considerable leeway in their efforts to manage the crisis.48
According to this argument, the US position as the primary safe haven 
for global investment allows it to exploit its foreign creditors. Foreign cen-
tral banks such as the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan are 
particularly frustrated. They own trillions of dollars in Treasury securities 
but, given the likely prospect of a long-term gradual decline of the US dol-
lar, they would face substantial losses when the time comes to cash in their 
Treasury securities for domestic currency. Foreign central banks could try 
to avoid this long-term pain by off-loading Treasury securities now, but this 
might initiate a panicked sell-off. From the perspective of the central banks 
of export-led economies, a sell-off of this type would have the undesirable 
effect of lowering the value of the US dollar and boosting the competitiveness 
of the United States in global markets.49 In essence, foreign investors are 
trapped by their investments in US Treasury securities, which only serves to 
bolster US financial power.50
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Others argue that the increase in foreign ownership of the US public debt 
is a clear sign of US decline. For declinists, the accumulation of Treasury secu-
rities by the rest of the world is an outcome of persistent trade deficits, which 
reflect the inability of the United States to compete in globalized markets, 
and unsustainable budget deficits, which reflect grave dysfunction within 
the US political system. According to this argument, the capital inflows 
witnessed before the financial crisis did not fuel productive investment but 
instead funded the wasteful military adventures of a profligate government 
and an unsustainable housing bubble.51 Most importantly, proponents of this 
stance claim that foreign ownership of the US public debt renders the federal 
government hostage to its foreign creditors.
Most declinists stress that foreign indebtedness did not become an obvi-
ous weakness until the early to mid-2000s when the central bank of a major 
geopolitical rival, China, became the second largest foreign creditor to the 
US federal government.52 The fear was that China might use the threat of 
“exit” (i.e., a massive sell-off of its US debt holdings) to force the United 
States to acquiesce to its demands.53 Foreign ownership would then push the 
United States to make an uncomfortable decision: it could forego some of 
its autonomy or it could risk a massive Chinese sell-off of Treasury securities 
that would drive down the value of the US dollar, drive up US interest rates, 
and finally bring an end to America’s “exorbitant privilege” in the global 
financial system.
The crisis is regarded as the first step in this calamitous direction. Writing 
with Stephen Mihm, Nouriel Roubini argues that the crisis signals the 
beginning of the end for US dominance in global finance.54 Foreigners might 
not yet have engaged in a panicked sell off of Treasury securities, but they 
have begun the process by shortening the maturities of their holdings. And 
this is a surefire sign that foreign owners are preparing for the inevitable: a 
significant diversification of their investments away from the US dollar.55
Still others put a more positive spin on the situation. They see US foreign 
indebtedness as a sign of interdependence between the US government and 
its foreign creditors, a stable and symbiotic relationship that is likely to sus-
tain itself for the foreseeable future.56 According to this view, the United 
States and its foreign creditors are locked into a powerless relationship of 
mutual advantage, whereby neither side has the incentive to induce systemic 
change or to influence the decisions of one another. The continued faith of 
foreigners in the US Treasury market, even throughout the crisis, is seen as a 
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sign of the remarkable resiliency of the interdependence between the United 
States and its foreign creditors.57
With the conventional wisdom turned on its head, experts cannot agree 
on the consequences of the globalization of US public debt ownership. Even 
the onset of the crisis did nothing to solve the polarized debates about the 
underlying consequences of foreign ownership of the US public debt. Instead, 
each of the opposing views has taken crisis-era developments as a vindication 
of their respective arguments.
What Happened to the Bondholding Class?
At present we are faced with two unresolved debates. One is focused exclu-
sively on domestic ownership, and participants in this debate cannot tell us 
whether the public debt is highly concentrated or widely held. The other 
focuses on foreign ownership and has produced no consensus on what the 
globalization of the public debt means for US power and influence in the 
global political economy. To make matters worse, the commentators involved 
in these respective debates do not speak to one another and have, therefore, 
abandoned the type of holistic analysis of public debt ownership that Adams 
pioneered in the late nineteenth century. In the end, political economists 
have little idea of what has happened to the bondholding class that Adams 
first theorized a century and a half ago.
This sorry state of affairs presents us with an opportunity to rethink and 
research the political economy of public debt ownership. In the next chapter, 
I lay out the conceptual and empirical foundations by mapping the domestic 
ownership structure of the public debt.
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Mapping Domestic Ownership
This chapter dr aws what is to my knowledge the first compre-
hensive map of the domestic ownership structure of the US public debt.1 
Those readers with a sufficient grasp of government budget accounting and 
the sectoral composition of the public debt are invited to continue reading, 
while those needing a primer are encouraged to consult the appendix at the 
end of this book before proceeding any further.
To speak of a map is to evoke an almost triumphant process of discov-
ery, one of traversing and documenting with precision what was previously 
uncharted territory. But in unearthing hitherto unavailable facts, plenty of 
stumbling blocks are encountered along the way. When it comes to the dis-
aggregate distribution of the public debt, there are headaches related to the 
collection of data, which are often sparse, patchy, inconsistent, and for long 
stretches of history, simply unavailable. Recognizing these problems with the 
data helps us to explain why the existing studies surveyed in chapter 2 have 
done little to improve on our collective understanding of domestic ownership 
of the public debt since the late nineteenth century.
In this chapter, I focus on mapping the share of the public debt owned 
by the top 1 percent of households and the top 2,500 corporations, which 
together serve as my modern day proxy for Adams’s bondholding class. What 
my empirical analysis reveals is that the ownership pattern of the public debt 
has transformed dramatically over time. Changes in the distribution of the 
public debt are bound up with changes in the distribution of wealth more gen-
erally. Thus when the share of wealth owned by wealthy households and large 
corporations increases or decreases, so too does their share of the public debt.
Ch a p t er  T h r e e
The Bondholding Class Resurgent
We should never forget, then, that the National Debt represents 
the savings of the poorer classes, rather than the money-bags and 
coffers of the rich and luxurious.
W i l l i a m  S ta n l e y  J e vons
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What matters most are the profound changes that have taken place over 
the past few decades. My research indicates that there has been a rapid con-
centration in ownership of the public debt since the early 1980s and especially 
since the onset of the crisis. Twentieth-century developments such as the 
introduction of savings bonds and intragovernmental debt, as well as the 
emergence of pension, mutual, and other investment funds, are often invoked 
to downplay concentration in ownership of the public debt. But as I will 
show, these counterarguments do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. The 
research in this chapter thus points toward a recent, dramatic resurgence of 
the bondholding class that Adams first identified over a century ago.
Before presenting these findings, I will first reflect on the concepts and 
assumptions that underpin the measurement of ownership concentration. 
This type of reflection is almost entirely absent from the existing literature 
on ownership of the public debt. In addition to presentation of new empiri-
cal findings, clarification of some theoretical matters is crucial in order to 
address long-standing ambiguities concerning ownership of the public debt 
and its consequences.
Ownership, Class, Power
The survey of the existing literature in chapter 2 revealed a debate in con-
stant flux, but one thing remained constant: political economists have been 
unable to come to any consensus on who actually owns the public debt. As 
table 2 showed, the empirical track record of the existing literature is patchy, 
inconsistent, and outdated. Researchers have compiled only snapshots of 
ownership concentration for a handful of years. And all of the existing stud-
ies used different cutoff points to measure ownership concentration, making 
it difficult to assess their competing claims and impossible to compare their 
research results over time. Thus the first step in trying to overcome some of 
the shortcomings in the existing literature is to develop clear and consistent 
cutoff points for measuring concentration in ownership of the public debt.
The process of actually choosing cutoff points is, however, less straightfor-
ward than it might seem at first glance. For example, why choose to measure 
the wealth and income shares of the top four hundred billionaires instead 
of the top one hundred or the top five hundred? Why focus on the top 1 
percent of households instead of the top 0.1 percent or the top 5 percent? 
What is the conceptual motivation that lies behind these seemingly arbitrary 
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methodological choices? These questions speak to the fundamental issue of 
how we aggregate seemingly heterogeneous human beings into social groups.
Thanks in large part to the spectacular successes of Thomas Piketty’s 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, these types of questions have been sub-
jects of renewed interest both in the academy and more widely. In Capital, 
Piketty roughly divides society into three main classes: the “lower class” (the 
bottom 50 percent of distribution), the “middle class” (the next 40 percent 
of distribution), and the “upper class” (the top 10 percent of distribution).2 
He then splits the upper class in two, with the top 1 percent representing 
the “dominant class” and the remaining 9 percent representing the “wealthy 
class.” As a group that occupies a prominent place within many societies, the 
top 1 percent forms the analytical focus of Piketty’s top-down, class-based 
statistical schema.
Piketty readily admits that his statistical categories lack the poetry and 
tangibility of traditional class categories (e.g., proletariat versus bourgeoisie, 
workers versus top managers). But the main advantage of designating classes 
based on their statistical position within the wealth and income hierarchy is 
that it gives us a uniform set of categories through which to explore inequal-
ity across space and time. Although it is mostly implicit within his work, 
Piketty suggests that the appropriateness of our chosen categories rests on 
what they tell us about the prevailing political economic order and, espe-
cially, on what they tell us about the power of the dominant class to shape 
that order. This argument is expressed most explicitly when Piketty states 
that the very purpose of mapping inequality is “to determine whether ‘the 1 
percent’ had more power under Louis XVI or under George Bush and Barack 
Obama.”3
It follows from the passage just quoted that the purpose of mapping 
inequality is also to assess how the power of the top 1 percent evolves within 
a given society. While Piketty and his collaborators have focused on mapping 
patterns of wealth and income distribution and developing laws to explain 
them, other more sociologically and politically grounded studies have exam-
ined in detail the evolving power and influence of the top 1 percent within 
the US political economy. What these studies indicate is that the power of 
the top percentile has increased greatly in recent decades. This growing prow-
ess has to do with the cohesive interests and the effective political action that 
we would expect from a group that has been identified as the dominant class.
In addition to commonly held cultural and consumptive practices,4 
the top percentile is also bound together by a shared ideology. Benjamin I. 
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Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright’s pathbreaking Survey of 
Economically Successful Americans (SESA) reveals that there is “political 
homogeneity” among members of the top 1 percent.5 SESA shows that the 
political preferences of the top percentile contrast starkly with those of the 
general public. For example, support for certain policies, such as deregulation 
and cuts to social expenditures, is much higher for the top 1 percent than 
for ordinary Americans. In addition, SESA finds a high degree of cohesion 
within the top percentile on partisan preferences. Of those surveyed, 58 
percent identified with the Republican Party and only 27 percent with the 
Democratic Party. What is more, affluent Americans that do identify with 
the Democratic Party tend to be much more conservative than the average 
Democrat on economic issues.
What the SESA findings also indicate is that political cohesion among the 
top percentile is matched by unusually high political activism. Of affluent 
Americans surveyed by SESA, 99 percent voted in 2008 (as opposed to 66 
percent of the total American voting-age population) and around two thirds 
contributed money to political campaigns (as opposed to 14 percent of the 
general public).6 The top percentile was much more likely to contact politi-
cians directly and in SESA interviews often referred to them on a first-name 
basis.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, other studies have shown that cohesion of inter-
ests and sustained political activism on behalf of affluent Americans trans-
lates into significant influence over public policy outcomes.7 With a great 
deal of statistical precision, these studies show that the preferences of elites 
consistently influence political decision-making, whether in terms of con-
gressional and senate voting or actual policy changes. This pervasive influ-
ence comes at the expense of low- and middle-income groups whose voices 
are underrepresented in democratic institutions.
Some Lingering Questions
The work of Piketty and others on the political economy of wealth and 
income inequality provides us with some of the conceptual tools for analyz-
ing concentration in ownership of the public debt. Through its position at 
the top of the distributional hierarchy, the top percentile is unified as a class 
entity. The more concentrated the ownership share of the top percentile, the 
more cohesive its interests and the more effective its political agency. Put 
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simply, ownership can be hypothesized as the foundation of class power. And 
our statistical categories for measuring ownership concentration should be 
evaluated based on what they tell us about the political economic order and 
the power of the dominant class within that order.
Once we recognize that questions of distribution and ownership con-
centration (“Who gets what?” and “Who gets what at whose expense?”) are 
at their root questions of power, this linkage has obvious intuitive appeal.8 
Yet the discussion to this point still leaves some lingering questions. Where 
do corporations fit within this class framework? What exactly is it that 
unites dominant owners at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy 
into a class force? How should we define power? What more can we say in 
methodological terms about the relationship between ownership concen-
tration and power? Insights into each of these questions can be found in 
the novel theory of “capital as power” pioneered by Shimshon Bichler and 
Jonathan Nitzan.9
In the historical overview of chapter 2, we saw that it was individuals or 
households that formed the primary focus of existing debates, with rich pit-
ted against poor, capitalists against widows and orphans, John D. Rockefeller 
against John Q. Public. But as Bichler and Nitzan argue, power in contempo-
rary capitalist societies is not reducible to the struggle between rich and poor 
that is implied in the focus on the top 1 percent.10 One important reason for 
this has to do with the growing centrality of giant corporations in producing 
and reinforcing unequal power relationships within society.11
Affluent individuals and households exercise their power primarily 
through organizations, and the corporation is one of the central organiza-
tions of contemporary society. Yet corporations do not just serve the interests 
of individuals and households; they are stand-alone entities that serve the 
broader logic of capitalism. It thus makes sense to place corporations at the 
center of the analysis. And Bichler and Nitzan do this by making dominant 
capital—the top 1 percent of households and the giant corporations at the 
center of accumulation—their analytical focus.12 In centering the analysis on 
wealthy households and large corporations, the category of dominant capital 
has obvious affinities with Adams’s bondholding class.
What unites dominant capital into a class force? The simple answer might 
be to make money. But from the perspective of capital as power, this simple 
answer is inadequate because it neglects the relative and forward-looking 
nature of capital accumulation. As Bichler and Nitzan are careful to note, 
dominant owners often compete with one another; they engage in conflicts 
T h e  B on dhol di ng  C l a s s  R e s u rg e n t  • 39
and they align themselves into warring fractions. But at the root, dominant 
owners are united in trying to achieve differential accumulation or differen-
tial capitalization: the augmentation of the market value of their ownership 
claims relative to some average benchmark. It is through this overriding 
financial logic of differential capitalization—the discounting of risk-adjusted 
future earnings into present value—that dominant owners understand the 
world; it is the main ritual at the heart of modern business enterprise and 
the metric through which they measure their performance. In seeking dif-
ferential accumulation, dominant owners try to impose this financial logic 
on government and society.
Capitalization in this sense represents nothing other than commodifed 
power. How do we then define power, one of the most contested concepts in 
the social sciences? Nitzan and Bichler offer a definition of capitalized power 
as “confidence in obedience.”13 Increasing differential capitalization signifies 
and measures the confidence of dominant capital in others’ acquiescing to 
the supposed imperatives of capitalization. As dominant owners accumu-
late a bigger share of capitalized assets and income streams, they accumulate 
more power to shape government and other elements of society in their own 
interests.
It should be stressed that the quantitative mapping of distribution is merely 
a starting point for the capital-as-power framework. Methodologically, the 
quantitative map of distribution that emerges from the research only acquires 
significance once we link it to the qualitative manifestations of power. These 
linkages are necessarily speculative, and their validity hinges on our abilities 
to tell “a ‘scientific story’—a systematic historical analysis that convincingly 
ties the quantities and qualities of capitalist power.”14
In the remainder of this chapter, I chart a quantitative map of domestic 
ownership of the public debt. The chapters that follow then explore what 
this quantitative map tells us about the political economy of the public debt, 
about the winners and losers of the public finances, and about the underlying 
consequences of the changing pattern of ownership for the prevailing order.
The Top 1 Percent
Let’s begin by mapping the distribution of the US public debt within the US 
household sector, focusing specifically on the share of the public debt owned 
by the top percentile of US households.
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Two data sources can be used to develop a map of concentration in house-
hold ownership of the public debt: the IRS’s federal estate tax database 
(ETD) and the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). There 
are two important differences between these sets of data. First, the primary 
unit of observation for SCF data is the household, which includes all the 
interdependent adults living at the same residence, while the primary unit of 
the ETD is the individual.15 Second, the SCF data is survey-based, while the 
ETD is based on information gathered from estate tax filings with the IRS.16
The SCF consists of a two-part survey design: “a standard, geographi-
cally based random sample and a special oversample of relatively wealthy 
families.”17 Based on a sample of US households, the SCF contains detailed 
questions about household income, savings, and net worth, as well as the 
composition of their assets and liabilities.18 Data compiled for the ETD are 
based on estate tax filings with the IRS. For example, in 2010, descendants 
were required to file estate tax returns if the gross assets in the estate exceeded 
$5 million, and there were just over fifteen thousand that reached this filing 
threshold. In their filings, descendants are required to report in detail the 
components of income and the asset composition of the gross estate. Both 
data sources use multiplier variables for each group to “blow up” the data 
sample to represent its corresponding size in the US population as a whole.
Despite the differences in the purpose and design of both data sets, 
Johnson and Moore suggest that the statistics of the SCF and the ETD in 
general and, in particular, in regard to the measurement of ownership con-
centration “compare quite favorably.”19 Johnson and Moore go on to con-
clude that the SCF and the ETD are “complementary sources of data on both 
wealth and income.”20 As such, it seems reasonable to splice together data 
from these two different sources in order to develop a long-term historical 
time series of the top percentile’s ownership share of the public debt.
Piecing together the available data, figure 4 maps the long-term histori-
cal share of the public debt owned by the top percentile of US households 
(ranked by net worth). The figure comprises two series: the thin dotted series 
measures the top percentile’s share of household wealth in general and is based 
on recent data from Saez and Zucman.21 The thick solid series measures the 
top percentile’s share of the US public debt owned by the household sector.
Though it spans nearly a century, the thick series is based on observations 
from only sixteen years and uses a combination of the ETD and SCF data. 
The data for the missing years are interpolated linearly by connecting adjacent 
observations. Data on the top percentile’s share of the public debt for 1922, 
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1945, 1949, and 1953 are from Robert J. Lampman’s pioneering study The Share 
of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922–1956, which relies on the 
ETD.22 The data for 1969 are pieced together from two sources: for the top 
percentile’s holdings of the public debt (the numerator), I rely on the 1969 IRS 
Personal Wealth Report, again based on IRS estate tax data, and for the total 
amount of public debt held by individuals (the denominator), I rely on the 
estimates of Jared D. Smith.23 The data for 1962, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013 are based on my own analysis of the SCF.
Let’s start by examining the distribution of the public debt in the thick 
series. In 1922, ownership was heavily concentrated, with the top percentile 
owning 45 percent of the public debt held by the household sector. This share 
fell gradually over the course of the next four decades, and reached its nadir, 
at least according to the available data, in the 1960s. The 1970s present an 
empirical blind spot in the study, as no data were found to measure concen-
tration in household ownership of the public debt during this entire decade. 
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Figure 4. The top percentile’s share of the US public debt and net wealth.
Wealth is total assets net of liabilities. Missing data on public debt are interpolated lin-
early by connecting adjacent observations. (Net wealth from Saez and Zucman, “Wealth 
Inequality”; public debt from Lampman, Top Wealth-Holders, Federal Reserve Survey of 
Consumer Finances, 1962–68, 1970–2010, IRS Personal Wealth Statistics for the top percen-
tile’s share of the public debt in 1969. www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/69inpwar.pdf.)
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top 1 percent stood at 33 percent, and this share gradually increased over the 
next three decades, climbing to 38 percent in 2007. Where major changes 
start to take place is with the onset of the global financial crisis. In 2010, 
ownership concentration neared the historical highs of the 1920s, with the 
top percentile increasing its share of the public debt to 42 percent. By 2013, 
the last year for which data are available, the top percentile’s share of the 
public debt increased even further to an astonishing 56 percent.
Turning to the distribution of wealth, the figure reveals remarkable syn-
chronicity in the movements of the two series. The top percentile’s share of 
net wealth also peaked in the 1920s, reaching 51 percent in 1928. This share 
then declined rapidly during the 1930s and 1940s, and continued to fall more 
gradually through the postwar period until the late 1970s. During the three 
decades prior to the crisis, there was a steady increase in the wealth share of 
the top percentile, a trend that has continued since. By 2012, the last year for 
which data are available, the top percentile’s share of wealth had climbed to 
42 percent. It remains to be seen whether the staggering increases in the top 
percentile’s share of public debt in 2013 will be mirrored by a similar increase 
in its share of wealth.
There are two main points to take away from the data in figure 4. First, 
it is clear that ownership of the public debt within the household sector has 
become heavily concentrated since the early 1980s and especially since the 
onset of the crisis. Second, the analysis suggests that the rising concentration 
in ownership of the public debt is bound up with growing inequality in the 
distribution of wealth more generally.
The Death of Savings Bonds
If household ownership has become rapidly concentrated over the past three-
and-a-half decades, then why has the misleading view of a widely held public 
debt persisted? There are at least two plausible explanations for the resilience of 
the widely held view. The first and most general explanation has to do with the 
concentration of the public debt relative to other financial assets such as corpo-
rate stocks and bonds. Table 3 offers a disaggregate view of the share of various 
forms of financial wealth owned by the top 1 percent. As the table indicates, 
up until recently, concentration in ownership of the public debt (total federal 
bonds in table 3) has been consistently lower than for both corporate stocks and 
corporate bonds. In some periods, especially during the postwar era, the top 
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percentile’s share of the public debt was less than half of what it was for these 
other financial assets. Taking into consideration this disaggregate pattern of 
wealth ownership by the top percentile, it should come as no surprise that the 
public debt has historically been seen as a (relatively) widely held asset.
The second reason for the persistence of the widely held view might have 
to do with the role savings bonds have played as an investment for lower- and 
middle-income households. One key proponent of this view was former US 
Treasury official Francis Cavanaugh, who in in the mid-1990s claimed that 
the public debt had become widely held because most households owned 
shares of it in the form of savings bonds.24 As table 3 confirms, household 
ownership of savings bonds is indeed diffuse. The available data show that 
the top percentile’s share of savings bonds has always been below 20 percent 
and stood at a meager 6 percent in 2013.
Savings bonds were introduced in the 1930s with the express purpose of 
democratizing public finance, giving broader swathes of the population a 
direct stake in the fiscal politics of the federal government.25 Offering a safe 
and secure asset in small denominations, savings bonds were meant to appeal 
to lower- and middle-class households in particular.
The precursor to savings bonds, so-called Liberty Bonds, were introduced 
during the first world war to encourage ordinary Americans to hand over 
their savings to the federal government to finance the war effort.26 During 
World War II, propaganda implored Americans to fulfill their patriot duty 
by investing in war savings bonds, a move that would not only ensure an 
Allied victory but also help them to ensure financial security. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, national bond drives headed up by NASA, as well as Hollywood 
and Broadway celebrities, continued to play on patriotic sentiments, urging 
table 3 The top percentile’s share of financial wealth
 1922 1953 1962 1983 1992 2001 2013
Total federal bonds 45 32 25 34 29 37 56
Other federal bonds* 88 40 52 60 82
Federal bond funds 16 15 69
Savings bonds 9 13 9 19 6
Corporate stocks 62 76 61 57 49 53 46
Corporate bonds 69 78 39 57 69 64 58
Source: For 1922 and 1953, Lampman, Top Wealth-Holders; for 1962–2013, Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Consumer Finances.
*Includes all federal securities (notes, bills, certificates) other than savings bonds.
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Americans to underwrite the might of the federal government by investing 
in savings bonds.27
Most personal encounters with the public debt are likely to come from 
investment in savings bonds, at least for older generations that were exposed 
to these high-profile campaigns. So it is little wonder that the image of a 
widely held public debt comes from its association with mass investment in 
savings bonds. This image, however, is a relic of the distant past. In the brave 
new world of complex and highly vendible finance, savings bonds have been 
dying a rapid death. Although savings bonds are widely held, they constitute 
a shrinking part of the overall composition of the public debt.
According to flow of funds data, savings bonds on average accounted for just 
over 20 percent of the outstanding debt held by the public from 1945 to 1970. 
By the 1980s, this share fell to just over 6 percent and has fallen steadily ever 
since. In 2014, savings bonds made up a paltry 1.4 percent of the public debt. 
Thus the U-shaped pattern of concentration in figure 4 can at least in part be 
explained by the gradual replacement over the past four decades of widely held 
savings bonds with more heavily concentrated types of federal securities.
Intragovernmental Debt: In Whose Interest?
Savings bonds aside, there are other factors that might serve to offset grow-
ing inequities in direct household ownership of the public debt. Consider, 
for example, intragovernmental debt, the basic mechanics of which are dis-
cussed in the appendix. Here again the arguments of former US Treasury 
official Francis Cavanaugh are illustrative.28 For Cavanaugh the trillions of 
dollars of the public debt held in government trust fund accounts such as 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid represent the interests of ordinary 
Americans and play a key role in combating inequality in direct ownership of 
the public debt. If these intragovernmental holdings were shown to benefit a 
broad segment of the US population, then this would indeed serve to offset 
the growing concentration in direct household ownership of the public debt 
that was captured in figure 4.
The crucial issue, then, is how to go about evaluating the claim that these 
substantial intragovernmental holdings benefit ordinary Americans. How do 
we empirically explore whose interests are served by intragovernmental debt? 
And what bearing would this have on the analysis of concentration in direct 
household ownership of the public debt?
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In and of itself, the overall level of intragovernmental debt tells us nothing 
about whose interests it serves.29 But as a matter of accounting, the federal 
government cashes in some of the Treasury securities held as intragovern-
mental debt to pay out transfer payments to individuals and families in dol-
lars and cents. An examination of the disaggregate flow of transfer payments 
will, therefore, help to determine at least indirectly whose interests are served 
by intragovernmental ownership of the public debt.
In the empirical analysis that follows, the bottom 99 percent of house-
holds serve as my proxy for ordinary Americans. If the bottom 99 percent of 
households receive the bulk of government transfer payments, then intragov-
ernmental debt would indeed serve ordinary Americans and this would go 
some way in offsetting the top percentile’s increasing ownership of the public 
debt that is owned directly by households.
Transfer Payments and Class Hierarchies
A study by the CBO offers a rare glimpse into the distribution of govern-
ment transfer payments.30 The CBO data indicate that the share of transfer 
payments received by the top percentile of US households has changed little 
in recent decades. Since 1979, the top 1 percent has received on average a 
miniscule 0.89 percent of transfer payments, and this share amounted to only 
0.68 percent in 2009. As a result, there is really no question that intragovern-
mental debt serves the interests of the bottom 99 percent.
But the fact that the bulk of transfer payments flow to the bottom 99 
percent of households should not lead us to overstate the role of intragovern-
mental debt as a progressive redistributive force. The reason for this can be 
seen once the distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99 percent 
is further broken down.
Though the bottom 99 percent has in recent years become a catchall cat-
egory used to distinguish the majority from the wealthy elite, it is in reality a 
diverse group with its own hierarchical structure.31 It includes social groups 
ranging from the “power belt” of professionals in the 90th to the 99th per-
centiles of income distribution that “surrounds, serves and protects” the top 
1 percent, (Piketty’s wealthy class)32 all the way down to the forty-six million 
Americans who live in poverty.33 Once this hierarchical structure within 
the bottom 99 percent is taken into account, sweeping transformations in 
distribution of transfer payments since 1979 become evident.
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Figure 5 offers a breakdown of the CBO data on the distribution of trans-
fer payments within the bottom 99 percent of households. Specifically, the 
figure is divided into two broad categories: the thin line shows the share of 
transfer payments received by households in the 60th to the 99th percentiles 
of income distribution (i.e., the top 40 percent minus the top 1 percent), 
while the thick line shows the share of transfer payments received by house-
holds in the bottom 40 percent.
The CBO data indicate that the share of government transfer payments 
received by the upper strata of US households within the bottom 99 per-
cent (i.e., households in the 60th to the 99th percentile of income distribu-
tion) has increased modestly from 15 percent in 1979 to 20 percent in 2009. 
Meanwhile, households in the bottom 40 percent saw their share of transfer 
payments fall from 73 percent to 63 percent over the same period. The fall 
has been particularly dramatic for households that are most likely to rely on 
government transfers in order to survive, with the share of transfer payments 
received by households in the bottom 20 percent falling markedly from 54 
to 40 percent.
Invoking intragovernmental debt to downplay concentration in the 
direct household ownership of the public debt turns out to be misleading. 
It is undoubtedly true that the top percentile of households have never had 
a significant stake in the transfer payments that flow from the intragovern-
mental debt held in government trust fund accounts. And in this sense the 
intragovernmental portion of the public debt can be said to broadly represent 
the interests of the bottom 99 percent of households. Yet digging deeper 
into the CBO data and breaking down the distribution of transfer payments 
within the bottom 99 percent, it becomes clear that intragovernmental debt 
has, if anything, intensified social inequality and polarization since 1979.
The Top 2,500 Corporations
Let’s now move on to examine corporate ownership of the US public debt. 
Existing studies of the political economy of public debt ownership have 
focused on the household sector, with the corporate sector thus far escaping 
serious empirical scrutiny. As we discussed earlier, this represents a severe 
oversight because it ignores the crucial role that corporations play in con-
temporary capitalism. And as revealed in the appendix, corporations warrant 
our attention because the share of the public debt held by the business sector 
T h e  B on dhol di ng  C l a s s  R e s u rg e n t  • 47
(incorporated nonfinancial firms as well as incorporated and unincorporated 
financial firms) is much more significant than that of households.
Once again my empirical mapping of the pattern of public debt ownership 
for the corporate sector needs to be prefaced with a discussion of the chal-
lenges involved in conducting the research. As with the household sector, 
the researcher encounters many problems in assembling disaggregate data 
on corporate ownership of the public debt. In fact, the data for the corporate 
sector are in much worse shape than the household data, and this sheds some 
light on why the few contemporary studies that do exist have focused their 
attention on households.
The problem has to do with the only data set available to track the pattern 
of public debt ownership for large corporations, the IRS Statistics of Income 
(SOI).34 The IRS does not make publicly available a raw data set that would 
allow users of the SOI to freely choose their own cutoff points, and the data 
that are available do not use a fixed number or a fixed proportion of top cor-
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Figure 5. The distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99 percent, 1979–2009.
Transfers include federal, state, and local government cash (e.g., social security) pay-
ments and in-kind (e.g., voucher) payments. (Congressional Budget Office. www.cbo.
gov/publication/43373.)
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Instead, the SOI tabulates the share of the public debt owned by corpora-
tions based on the size of their total assets. From 1954, when reliable data 
first surface, to 2000, any corporation with assets of $250 million or more 
was placed into the top asset bracket. In 1954, only 391 corporations, or 0.06 
percent of total corporations, were included in the top asset bracket of $250 
million or more. By 2000, the last year that the cutoff point of assets of $250 
million or more was used to designate the top bracket, 10,883 corporations, 
or 0.2 percent of total corporations, made the cut. In 2001, the IRS finally 
refined its categories and made assets of $2.5 billion or more the top cutoff 
point. With the refined categories introduced in 2001, 1,896 corporations, 
or 0.04 percent of total corporations, were included in the top bracket, and 
these totals had increased to 2,772 and 0.05 percent, respectively, by 2010.
Keeping the cutoff at a given level of assets means that the number of 
top corporations, the proportion of top corporations, and therefore the asset 
share of top corporations increase greatly over time. As a result, a change 
in the share of public debt owned by corporations in the top asset bracket 
could reflect a change in the number of corporations, as well as a change in 
concentration.
Historical Snapshots
The limitations of the IRS SOI data might help to explain why the empirical 
record for corporations is patchy and outdated. But there is still a roundabout 
method that can be used to tease out insights from the SOI data.
This method involves using the SOI asset-class categories to isolate a fixed 
number of corporations in different snapshots of time. As mentioned, the 
SOI finally refined its asset classes in 2001, increasing the top cutoff point 
from assets of $250 million or more to assets of $2.5 billion or more. For the 
most recent five years (2006–10), around 2,500 corporations were included 
in this top asset bracket.
It should be noted that the top 2,500 corporations do not represent an 
ideal proxy for the corporate component of the bondholding class, as it is 
likely to contain not only the largest corporations, but also a significant num-
ber of medium-sized entities. But this is the limitation imposed by the SOI 
data. Going back historically, the SOI asset classes can be used to isolate the 
largest 2,500 corporations at different points in time. For the five-year period 
from 1977 to 1981 there were on average just over 2,500 corporations with 
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assets of $250 million or more. Going back further to 1957–61, there were 
around 2,500 corporations with assets of $50 million or more.
Using these three snapshots periods (1957–61, 1977–81, 2006–10) gives a 
consistent view of ownership concentration for a fixed number of top corpo-
rations in the numerator. The historical snapshot data for these three periods 
are presented in table 4.
Skeptical readers will likely note that the number of corporations in the 
first period (1957–61) in the second column of table 4 is 14 percent lower than 
for the latter two periods. But this discrepancy is compensated for in the third 
column of the table, which measures the proportion of top corporations. 
The successive decline in the proportion of top corporations throughout the 
three periods is far more significant than the increase in the fixed number of 
corporations from 1957–61 to 1977–81. Given the successive halving in this 
proportion, it could be argued that these data in fact understate the level of 
ownership concentration for the more recent periods.
The data in the fourth column of table 4 track the corporate share of the 
US public debt owned by large corporations. As is clear, the ownership share 
of large corporations was remarkably steady at around 65 percent from the 
postwar golden age (1957–61) through the early years of the neoliberal period 
(1977–81). Significant changes occurred from the second to the third periods. 
The available data indicate that there has been an increase in ownership con-
centration from the early neoliberal to the most recent periods. Although the 
top corporations made up only 0.05 percent of total corporate tax returns in 
2006–10, they now owned 82 percent of the corporate share of the public 
debt. What is perhaps most interesting, and which is not reflected in the 
data in table 4, is the increase in ownership concentration that has taken 
place in the context of the global financial crisis. In 2006, before the onset of 
the crisis, large corporations owned 77 percent of the corporate share of the 
public debt and this share grew to 86 percent in 2010.
The fifth and final column of table 4 maps large corporations’ share of 
total corporate assets. What stands out is the synchronicity of public debt 
and general asset concentration. From the postwar to the early years of 
neoliberalism, the share of total corporate assets owned by large corpora-
tions grew modestly from 62 to 70 percent. Recently there has been rapid 
concentration, as large corporations in 2006–10 owned 81 percent of total 
corporate assets.
Table 4 tells us at least two important things. First, much like the house-
hold sector, there has been a rapid concentration in corporate ownership of 
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the public debt since the early 1980s and especially since the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Second, again like the household sector, the data show 
that concentration in corporate ownership of the public debt is bound up 
with a broader movement toward corporate asset concentration.
The Rise of Money Managers
What is the sectoral identity of these large corporations? Throughout history, 
financial sector firms, and especially banks, have been assumed to be the 
dominant corporate owners of the public debt.35 However, with the so-called 
financialization of contemporary capitalism, it remains to be seen whether 
the financial sector is still dominant. One empirical phenomenon associated 
with financialization is the rising profits of the finance, insurance, and real 
estate (FIRE) sector since the 1980s.36 With a rising share of profits, it might 
be expected that FIRE’s share of corporate holdings of the public debt would 
increase. Yet another empirical phenomenon associated with financializa-
tion is the growing trend toward diversification and conglomeration.37 With 
traditionally “industrial” firms accumulating more financial assets, it might 
just as reasonably be expected that FIRE’s share of corporate holdings of the 
public debt would decrease.
The SOI data on corporate ownership of the public debt give strong 
empirical conformation to the former expectation. During the postwar 
period (1954–69), corporations classified within the FIRE sector owned on 
average 86 percent of all corporate holdings of the public debt; since 1980, 












1957–61 2,344 0.2 66 62
1977–81 2,676 0.1 65 70
2006–10 2,675 0.05 82 81
Source: IRS Statistics of Income, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2.
Note: The values in the last three columns are calculated as simple averages for the corresponding 
five-year periods. The cutoff point for large corporations is assets of $50 million or more for 1957–61, 
$250 million or more for 1977–81, and $2.5 billion or more for 2006–10.
*Refers to the share of corporate holdings of the public debt that are owned by large corporations.
†Refers to the share of corporate holdings of total assets that are owned by large corporations.
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FIRE has owned on average 97 percent of them. Thus ownership of the US 
public debt has become concentrated in the hands of not just large corpora-
tions, but large FIRE sector corporations.
Yet to dwell on FIRE’s dominant ownership share is to ignore one of the 
fundamental changes within the financial sector over the past half-century: 
the rise of money managers, including pension, mutual, and other investment 
funds.38 This fundamental change is captured in figure 6. As the thin series in 
figure 6 indicates, the share of the US public debt owned by these entities rose 
sharply from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s and has remained fairly stable 
from 1985 to the present. Comparing the share of the public debt owned by 
money managers to that of the banking sector (the thick series in figure 6) 
illustrates the changes. The share of the public debt owned directly by banks 
has fallen precipitously since World War II and stood at 4 percent in 2015.
The rise of money manager funds forces us to think in more nuanced ways 
about the class underpinnings of the public debt. If most of these funds are 
widely held, this could mean that individuals outside of the ruling elite are 
the indirect beneficiaries of their concentrated holdings of the public debt. 
And if this were proven to be the case, it would lessen the significance of 
my earlier findings on concentration in direct ownership of the public debt 
within the household sector. But to what extent has the emergence of money 
manager funds actually transformed the class politics of the public debt?
To answer this question requires two further lines of inquiry. First, the 
category of money managers needs to be further disaggregated and the own-
ership structures of various types of money managers need to be examined. 
Second, distribution of the public debt owned by the various money manag-
ers needs to be scrutinized.
Let’s begin with the first line of inquiry. Pensions funds, for their part, are 
indeed widely owned, with the top percentile of US households owning only 
15 percent of their total assets in 2010 (up from 8 percent in 1983).39 The owner-
ship of mutual funds, however, is heavily concentrated, with the top percentile 
owning 47 percent of their total assets in 2010 (up from 40 percent in 1983). 
Put simply, this means that the middle class is the indirect beneficiary of the 
public debt owned by pension funds but not by mutual funds. It follows that 
in order for the financial sector’s holdings of the public debt to serve lower- and 
middle-class Americans, there would need to be evidence that pension funds 
are the major owners of the public debt within the category of money managers.
Moving on to the second line of inquiry, figure 7 provides a breakdown 
of the ownership of the public debt by money managers. The figure indicates 
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that the share of the public debt owned by pension funds has fallen sharply 
from 14 percent in the mid-1980s to 6 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, the share 
of the public debt owned by mutual funds has increased steadily since the 
early 1980s and, despite a significant dip in the past few years, still stands at 
around 10 percent. Expressed as a ratio, the share of the public debt owned 
by heavily concentrated mutual funds was on average only 25 percent of the 
share owned by widely held pension funds from 1980 to 1985. Yet in the past 
five years (2010–15), mutual fund holdings of the public debt were on average 
1.7 times larger than the holdings of pension funds.
The institutionalization of savings into money manager funds is unde-
niably significant. But in and of itself the increasing significance of money 
managers has not counteracted increasing concentration in the corporate 
sector’s direct ownership of the public debt. On the contrary, funds that 
are widely held have seen their share of public debt fall over the past three 
decades, while the share of concentrated funds has increased.40
This analysis indicates that the top 1 percentile of households, in addition 
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Figure 6. The FIRE sector’s share of “debt held by the public,” 1945–2015.
Debt held by the public includes domestic private, official, and private foreign and Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasury securities. Money managers include private pension funds, 
state and local government retirement funds, federal government retirement funds, money 
market mutual funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds, and exchange-traded funds. Banks 
include US-chartered depository institutions, foreign banking offices in the United States, 
banks in US-affiliated areas, and credit unions. Data are annual from 1945–51 and quarterly 
from 1952 onward. (Federal Reserve flow of funds accounts [table L.209].)
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rect beneficiary of the concentrated share of the public debt owned within the 
FIRE sector. Thus the modern day equivalent of Adams’s bondholding class has 
two major components: the top 1 percent of households and the giant money 
manager funds that have replaced banks as the proximate corporate owners of 
the public debt. This modern variant of the bondholding class is tied together 
through its increasing ownership share of the public debt. These ties between 
the two components of the bondholding class are further solidified by the fact 
that the top percentile of households is the major owner of the mutual funds 
that dominate ownership of the public debt within the corporate sector.
Resurgence and Its Consequences
The empirical analysis in this chapter points toward the rapid resurgence of 
the bondholding class in recent years. Obvious changes have taken place in 
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Figure 7. Money managers’ share of “debt held by the public,” 1945–2015.
Debt held by the public includes domestic private, official, and private foreign and Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasury securities. Pension funds include private pension funds, state 
and local government retirement funds, and federal government retirement funds. Mutual 
funds include money market mutual funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds, and exchange-
traded funds. Data are annual from 1945–51 and quarterly from 1952 onward. (Federal 
Reserve flow of funds accounts [table L.209].)
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introduce nuance into our analysis, they do not nullify the significance of 
increasing concentration in ownership of the public debt. The (near) death 
of savings bonds, the increasingly regressive nature of federal transfer pay-
ments, and the growing influence of heavily concentrated mutual funds in 
corporate ownership of the public debt all take out the sting from arguments 
that downplay the resurgence of the bondholding class.
What does it all mean? Why should we even care about the growing con-
centration in ownership of the public debt? In the next chapter, I begin to 
tackle these questions by examining the redistributive consequences of the 
public debt. From the very origins of political economy, one of the main con-
sequences identified with concentration in ownership of the public debt has 
been that it redistributed income from the laboring masses of taxpayers to 
the powerful bondholding class. As we will see, exploring these redistributive 
consequences allows us to come to terms with the complex linkages between 
public indebtedness and inequality in the modern era.
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Public Debt and Class Redistribution
Perhaps the most important consequence associated with a 
highly concentrated public debt is that it redistributes income. In theory, the 
logic of this redistributive process is fairly straightforward. Ownership of a 
government bond entitles its owner to a stream of interest payments. And if 
the class identity of government bondholders is somehow separate from the 
taxpayers that finance interest payments on the public debt, then income will 
be redistributed from the latter to the former.
In practice, however, existing attempts to empirically analyze the redis-
tributive effects of the public debt have yielded little insight. And given the 
rapid concentration in ownership of the public debt that was outlined in the 
previous chapter, it is worthwhile revisiting the linkages between the public 
debt and class redistribution.
What my analysis in this chapter shows is that, despite the recent resur-
gence of the bondholding class, the redistributive effects of the public debt 
are anything but clear. Due to twentieth-century developments, such as the 
rise of progressive taxation and social spending, it is no longer possible to 
say that the public debt redistributes income between the social classes as 
it did in the nineteenth century. But this does not mean that issues of class 
and inequality are no longer relevant to the public debt. Operationalizing 
Wolfgang Streeck’s concept of the debt state helps us to grasp how a rapidly 
growing and heavily concentrated public debt, when coupled with tax stag-
nation and declining tax progressivity, reinforces existing patterns of social 
Ch a p t er  Fou r
Fiscal Conflict
Fiscal Conflict: Past and Present
The budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading 
ideologies. 
Ru d ol f  G ol dsc h e i d
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inequality.1 The concept of the debt state serves a dual purpose here: not only 
does it help to clarify the class redistributive effects of the contemporary 
public debt, but it also helps to explain why the bondholding class has expe-
rienced a rapid resurgence since the early 1980s.
Before exploring the contemporary US experience through the concept of 
the debt state, I begin this chapter by situating the debates on the redistribu-
tive effects of the public debt within their broader context. Examining this 
context takes the discussion back to the very origins of political economy.
Classical Political Economy and Fiscal Conflict
Since the birth of their science in the eighteenth century, political econo-
mists have focused their attention on the redistributive effects of the public 
debt. David Hume, one of the early progenitors of classical political economy, 
was one of the first to criticize the unequal class relations of public indebted-
ness. In his polemic against the British system of public borrowing, Hume 
denounced government bondholders, a group he referred to pejoratively 
as the “monied interest.”2 According to Hume, the burden of taxation in 
eighteenth-century Britain fell on the landowners and laboring poor who 
financed the interest payments received by the city dwelling financiers. This 
redistribution of income had entirely negative consequences. In padding the 
coffers of the idle monied interest, all at the expense of the “productive” ele-
ments of society, the public debt led to “a mighty confluence of people and 
riches to the capital” and sapped the vitality from national industry.3 Hume 
proclaimed that public borrowing gave “great encouragement to an [sic] use-
less and unactive [sic] life,” as government bondholders, plagued not only by 
idleness but also lacking in nationalist sentiment, “sink into the lethargy of a 
stupid and pampered luxury, without spirit, ambition or enjoyment.”4
In contrast to Hume, David Ricardo in his Principles of Political Economy, 
the most advanced theoretical framework of classical political economy, 
entirely ignored the redistributive effects of the public debt.5 Several his-
torians of economic thought have argued that Ricardo’s analysis may have 
been influenced by the fact that Ricardo was himself one of the largest loan 
contractors for the British government.6 Michael Hudson even suggests that 
Ricardo’s neglect of interest payments served an ideological purpose since it 
“implicitly took bond brokers and bankers off the hook from accusations that 
their debt charges impaired the nation’s well being.”7
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It was classical political economy’s greatest critic, Karl Marx, who had 
the most to say about the class redistributive effects of the public debt. In 
his famous section on “primitive accumulation” in volume 1 of Capital, 
Marx argued that the classical liberal account of the development of capi-
talist markets was a “nursery tale.”8 The historical transition to capitalism 
was not, as classical political economy had argued, spontaneous or self-
regulating: the process required state violence from the very beginning. 
During the phase of primitive accumulation, the state was not a fetter 
to, but a direct facilitator of, the extension and deepening of capitalist 
markets. And crucial to state power, Marx argued, was the development of 
the system of public credit. As “one of the most powerful levels of primitive 
accumulation,” the public debt allowed government to meet extraordinary 
expenses without having to immediately burden its population with exces-
sive taxation.9
For Marx, the real significance of the public debt lay in its impact on 
class relations. On the one hand, the public debt gave rise to the “aristocracy 
of finance,” a group Marx colorfully described as a “brood of bankocrats, 
financiers, rentiers, brokers, stockjobbers, etc.” that amassed fortunes from 
trading and also owning government securities.10 On the other hand, the tax 
revenues that were eventually needed to service the public debt were financed 
by overtaxation of “the most necessary means of subsistence.”11 This overtaxa-
tion was not accidental: for Marx it was an entrenched principle of public 
indebtedness. Thus during the phase of primitive accumulation, the public 
debt created a clear-cut conflict, redistributing or “expropriating” income 
from the working masses of taxpayers to the “idle rentier” class of public 
creditors.12
In his sweeping historical account of the global financial system, Niall 
Ferguson contextualizes Marx’s claims about the redistributive effects of the 
public debt.13 According to Ferguson, the system of public finance in nine-
teenth-century Britain gave rise to “fiscal conflict.” This conflict, although 
not as straightforward as the struggle between propertied and propertyless, 
had a distinctive class character. Referring specifically to Britain’s experi-
ences in the 1820s after the Napoleonic Wars, Ferguson suggests that there 
were clear “socially redistributive effects” associated with the public debt that 
could be explained with reference to Marx’s class categories. “Debt service,” 
as Ferguson explains, “was financed largely out of regressive taxation on 
consumption,” and this caused a massive redistribution of income from “the 
property-less majority to a tiny, very wealthy elite.”14
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Writing in these circumstances, it is easy to see why Marx would have 
regarded the public debt as a mechanism for class redistribution. And yet 
Marx himself cautioned against assigning too much importance to the class 
expropriation at the heart of the public debt in the context of nineteenth-
century capitalism in which he wrote. Specifically, Marx criticized socialist 
writers such as William Cobbett, who identified the public debt and the 
system of public finances as “the fundamental cause of the misery of the 
people in modern times.”15
Why was Marx so keen to downplay the class dimensions of public indebt-
edness in the nineteenth century? In Capital, Marx argued explicitly that 
the (premodern) phase of primitive accumulation was merely an “artificial” 
and transitory system that hastened the transition from the out-of-date 
feudal mode of production to the modern capitalist mode of production.16 
According to Marx, active and direct state power was necessary to sever 
workers from the means of production. But once the transition from feudal-
ism to industrial capitalism was completed, state power would linger in the 
background. The sphere of industrial production would take over as the main 
site of exploitation and class struggle.
Of course the state provides the necessary legal and ideological super-
structure that enables and reinforces the economic power of capitalists to 
extract surplus value from the workers over and above the level of subsistence. 
Workers, however, do not need to be directly coerced into this exploitative 
relationship; without having access to property, they are compelled by the 
market to seek out wage labor in order to survive.
But was Marx right to dismiss the class redistributive effects of the pub-
lic debt under industrial capitalism? Was fiscal conflict, as Marx suggests, 
confined to the early phase of primitive accumulation, or was it, as Ferguson 
suggests, still relevant to the industrial capitalism of Marx’s time? A closer 
examination of historical data on the public finances will help us to answer 
these questions.
The Evolution of Fiscal Conflict
Table 5 illustrates how fiscal conflict has evolved over time and space. In the 
Great Britain of the early half of the nineteenth century (1801–50), the public 
debt on average stood at 160 percent of GDP, often exceeding 250 percent of 
GDP during major wars. The interest income of government bondholders 
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constituted a substantial component of government spending. From 1801 
to 1850, debt service charges, which include the total amount the govern-
ment pays in interest and principal on its obligations, made up 47 percent 
of government expenditures and ranged anywhere from 25 to 58 percent of 
total government expenditures in a given year. These massive gains from 
government bonds flowed to a tiny segment of the population. According to 
Ferguson’s estimates, government bondholders made up only 2.7 percent of 
the population of England and Wales in 1815, and this fell to 0.9 percent of 
the population fifty years later.17
In the first half of the nineteenth century, British government spend-
ing was almost solely dedicated to two activities: war and debt servic-
ing.18 As table 5 shows, military expenditures made up 36 percent of 
total government expenditures in the early nineteenth century. In fact, 
military spending and debt charges as a share of government expendi-
tures oscillated countercyclically. New military campaigns would bring 
with them an upsurge in military spending and a decline in debt charges 
as percentages of government expenditures. The conclusion of a military 
conflict would result in decreased military spending and an increase in 
debt charges, as the British state began to repay some of the debt burden 
contracted during the war.
While interest payments constituted a substantial share of government 
expenditures during this period, the bulk of government revenues came from 
indirect forms of taxation. Indirect taxes, especially excise taxes on consump-
tion goods, are generally considered regressive since they are assessed on 
goods that, as a percentage of income, are primarily purchased by the poor 
(Marx’s “most necessary means of subsistence”). Meanwhile, direct taxes, 
especially property and income taxes, are generally considered progressive, 
exempting lower incomes and falling inordinately on the wealth and income 
of the rich. Table 5 indicates that in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
66 percent of British government revenues came from indirect taxes. With 
military spending and debt service dominating government expenditures, 
there was little in the way of social spending to offset the regressive tax bur-
den borne by the working masses.
The data in table 5 give a clearer picture of the historical context in which 
Marx was writing. Even though Marx emphasized the redistributive effects 
of the public debt during the protocapitalist phase of so-called “primitive 
accumulation,” it is clear that these effects still reigned with the emergence 
of industrial capitalism in the early nineteenth century. Fiscal conflict, as 
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Ferguson suggested, was still very much at the heart of British capitalism in 
the first half of the nineteenth century.
What about Adams’s context in the United States of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century? What stands out most in the second column of table 5 
is that the US government of the late nineteenth century was significantly 
smaller than that of Britain in the early part of the century. The United 
States had a much lower public debt, representing only about 15 percent of its 
GDP; as a percentage of GDP, the revenues and expenditures of the United 
States during this time were about a quarter of what they were in Britain in 
the early 1800s. Despite repeated attempts, the federal government would fail 
to implement a reliable income tax until the passage of the Revenue Act of 
1913. Though direct taxes were sometimes levied on an ad hoc basis and were 
temporary, (regressive) indirect taxes made up almost the entirety of the fed-
eral government’s small revenues.19 The military ate up a considerable portion 










Public debt (% GDP) 160 15 54 63.2
Government revenues 
(% GDP)
11 3.4 16.2 16.8
Government expenditures 
(% GDP)
12 4.1 16.7 19.9
Indirect taxes 
(% government revenues)




36 35 52 21.9
Interest (% government 
expenditures)
47 19 7.3 11.8
Source: For Great Britain, GDP (series mnemonic: GDPGBR) from Global Financial Data. All 
other data from Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). For the United States 1851–1900 and 1950–70, GDP (series mnemonic: GDPUSA), govern-
ment revenues (series mnemonic: USFYFRA), and government expenditures (series mnemonic: 
USFYONET), public debt (series mnemonic: USFYGFDA) from Global Financial Data. All other 
data from Susan B. Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, 
Millennial ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For United States 1980–2014, see 
figure 1 for GDP and public debt. All other data from the Office of Management and Budget. https://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.
note: Great Britain GDP data missing for 1802–10, 1812–20, and 1822–29. Great Britain revenues and 
expenditures data missing for 1802.
*Values are missing for this period because of a lack of reliable data. Because direct taxes were only lev-
eled on an ad hoc basis for several years, it could be assumed that indirect taxes made up (almost) 100 
percent of federal revenues at this time.
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of the federal government’s modest expenditures, while interest payments, 
at least relative to early nineteenth century Britain, were of less importance.
Table 5 shows that already in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the lines of fiscal conflict were becoming blurred. Taxes were undoubtedly 
regressive in the United States of the late 1800s, but the smaller size of the 
federal government and its public debt during this period meant that the flow 
of interest payments to Adams’s US bondholding class paled in comparison 
to the interest received in the previous period by creditors to the British state.
The class character of fiscal conflict became even murkier in post–World 
War II America, as illustrated in the third column of table 5. As a percent-
age of GDP, the postwar public debt was fairly large at 54 percent, but this 
was mostly a remnant of the massive borrowing during World War II. 
Throughout the postwar period, the public debt was in sharp decline as the 
federal government consistently ran budget surpluses. In contrast to the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century, the US government during the postwar 
period had grown, as federal revenues and expenditures increased substan-
tially as percentages of GDP.
On the revenue side, taxation became more progressive, with indirect taxes 
making up only 14 percent of the total federal tax haul. On the expenditure 
side, over half of government spending was dedicated to the military, while 
interest payments had fallen to 7 percent of total government expenditures. 
Most of the remaining government spending went toward civilian purposes, 
especially toward social spending. The data in the third column of the table, 
therefore, provide empirical backing to James O’Connor’s famous classifica-
tion of the postwar United States as a “Warfare-Welfare State.”20
The empirical map developed in chapter 3 demonstrated that the public 
debt had become more evenly distributed during the postwar period than at 
any other point for which reliable data are available. This more equitable dis-
tribution, coupled with historically unprecedented tax progressivity, a bur-
geoning welfare state, and only a tiny amount of government expenditures 
dedicated to interest payments, meant that the class redistributive effects of 
the public debt were not at all clear-cut. During the postwar period, fiscal 
conflict appeared to be a relic confined to the nineteenth century.
What about the most recent period, since 1980, which has seen the resur-
gence of the bondholding class? Table 5 shows that public debt levels as a 
percentage of GDP began to increase during this period. According to the 
data, these increases in the public debt have been driven primarily on the 
expenditures side, which climbed from 17 to 20 percent of GDP. It is not 
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only the magnitude but also the character of government spending that has 
changed. Over 20 percent of government spending is still dedicated to the 
military, but this is down significantly from the postwar period. Debt service 
as a percentage of government spending has increased alongside the growth 
of the public debt from 7.3 to 11.8 percent of the total.
Perhaps the most significant change in the character of government 
expenditures, not shown in table 5, has to do with the increases in social 
spending. The US federal government now dedicates around 35 percent of 
its spending to social security and healthcare. And although figure 5 in the 
previous chapter demonstrated that the distribution of transfer payments has 
become much more regressive, it is difficult to deny that, at least in compari-
son to military spending and debt service, a substantial part of this spending 
benefits lower- and middle-income Americans.
This is not to say that violence and war are no longer relevant to the con-
temporary political economy of US public finance.21 In absolute terms, US 
military expenditures totaled $581 billion in 2014, four and a half times more 
than the next largest spender, China, and only slightly less than the total 
spending of the next fourteen largest spenders combined.22 At 18 percent in 
2014, military spending still eats up a significant portion of all federal expen-
ditures. However, with the growing importance of welfare and social spend-
ing, it can no longer be said that military spending is the primary driver of 
government spending—and therefore deficits and public debt—as it clearly 
was in earlier periods.
While government spending has expanded significantly since 1980, gov-
ernment revenues as a percentage of GDP have increased only slightly. In 
the current period, around 56 percent of government revenues came from 
individual and corporate income taxes and a miniscule 5 percent from indi-
rect forms of taxation.
The public debt has increased along with interest payments, and growing 
concentration in ownership makes it clear that most of this recent expan-
sion in government borrowing serves to bolster the wealth and income of 
the bondholding class. Yet with the rise of progressive taxation and social 
spending, the class redistributive effects of the public debt are still difficult 
to pin down.
Corporate income taxes make up only 10 percent of total US federal rev-
enues, but the large corporations sampled in chapter 3 contribute the most. 
In fact, in the most recent period (2006–10), the top 2,500 corporations paid 
68 percent of all corporate income taxes. Household income taxes make up 
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nearly half of all federal revenues, and the top 1 percent of Americans pay a 
large share. According to recent data from the CBO, the top 1 percent paid 
35 percent of household income taxes in 2011, nearly double the amount it 
paid in 1979.23 With large corporations and wealthy households paying the 
bulk of federal taxes, the US public debt does not redistribute income from 
the taxpaying masses to wealthy government bondholders as it did in early 
nineteenth-century Britain.
But does this mean that issues of class and inequality are no longer relevant 
to the public debt? Should we, as Ferguson and many others recommend, 
abandon class analysis and focus on the generational conflict that underpins 
the public finances of today? The short answer to both of these questions is 
no. In the next section, I suggest that the class approach does not need to be 
abandoned, but instead needs to be updated to account for the contemporary 
realities. What I argue is that a new, more complex type of conflict between 
the social classes has emerged. The nature of this new conflict is effectively 
captured with reference to Wolfgang Streeck’s concept of the debt state.
Fiscal Conflict and the Debt State
In Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, Streeck traces 
the transformation of capitalism in the advanced democracies from the post-
war to the neoliberal period.24 Key to this broader transformation has been 
the shift in public finances. For Streeck, the advanced capitalist democracies 
have shifted from a postwar tax state, which relied primarily on progressive 
taxation to finance its expenditures, to a debt state of the past four decades, 
which finances its expenditures through borrowing.25
The debt state is the outcome of three interrelated processes: tax stagna-
tion, declining tax progressivity, and increasing government expenditures. 
Taken together, the interaction between these three processes clarifies the 
contemporary link between public debt and class inequality.
Streeck identifies a broad trend that has taken place across seven of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries—
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United 
States—since the mid-1980s: namely, the stagnation, or even decline, in tax 
revenues, along with an increase in government expenditures. This widen-
ing gap between revenues and expenditure accounts for the growing levels 
of public indebtedness in advanced capitalist countries over the past four 
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decades. More specifically, Streeck argues that it is low tax receipts, rather 
than high government spending, that drive the increase in government 
borrowing.
Drawing on some of the classical work of fiscal sociologists such as Adolph 
Wagner, Rudolf Goldscheid, and Joseph Schumpeter, Streeck sets out to 
explain this relationship between spending and taxation.26 He suggests that 
increasing government expenditures are merely a function, or an inevitable 
outcome, of capitalist development. As market relations deepen and the com-
modification of ever-more aspects of life ensues, the state must spend more 
on things like infrastructure and social protection.
Stagnating tax revenues are, however, the result of a more overtly politi-
cal process. For Streeck, as capitalism deepens, wealth and income become 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the propertied classes, which in 
turn augment their power to resist the state’s attempt to extract resources 
from them.27 Thus the main factor  that explains the  emergence of the 
debt state over the past four decades has been the successful tax resistance 
waged on the part of increasingly powerful elites. Tax stagnation within this 
framework proceeds hand in hand with declining tax progressivity.
For the most part, the arguments that Streeck makes are conceptual, and 
the empirical data that he does offer apply to the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development experience as a whole. It remains to be seen, 
then, whether the notion of a debt state can be applied accurately to the US 
experience of the past few decades.
I begin by examining in greater detail federal government revenues and 
expenditures. In table 5, simple averages are used to show that government 
revenues have remained more or less constant as percentages of GDP from 
the postwar to the current period, while government expenditures have 
increased. Figure 8 fleshes out this observation by plotting US federal expen-
ditures and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP from 1950 to 2014.
In the postwar period, increasing federal expenditures were met by increas-
ing tax revenues, resulting in a low public debt. But this started to change from 
the 1970s onward. With the exception of the 1990s, federal revenues have been 
increasing, while federal taxes have been stagnant. I mentioned earlier that 
the top 1 percent of households and large corporations now pay a substantial 
share of federal taxes. However, this observation ignores the fact that the tax 
revenues as a percentage of national income have stagnated since the early 
1970s. The growing gap between revenues and expenditures accounts for the 
growing levels of public indebtedness over the past four decades.
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To this point, the US case exemplifies two of the main features that 
Streeck associates with the debt state: namely, stagnating revenues and 
increasing government expenditures. But what about the third main feature 
of the debt state, declining tax progressivity?
Table 5 outlines a broad historical shift in the US tax regime away from indi-
rect forms of taxation, and due to this shift, the bondholding class of wealthy 
households and large corporations now pays the bulk of (stagnant) government 
revenues. Yet at the same time, there has been a discernible decline in the pro-
gressivity of the US tax system over roughly the past four decades. Tax progres-
sivity is measured by the effective tax rate: the total taxes paid as a percentage of 
pretax income. In the United States there has been a clear regressive shift for 
both the household and corporate sectors. The top percentile of households and 
the largest corporations now pay a significant portion of the federal tax bill, but 
they are paying less and less tax as a proportion of their total income.
The effective federal income tax rate for the 2,500 largest corporations held 
steady from 22 percent in 1977–81 to 23 percent in 2006–10. This represents 
a significant decline from the postwar period of 1956–61, when the effective 
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Figure 8. US federal expenditures and tax revenues as percentages of GDP, 1950–2013.
Revenues and expenditures include both on-budget and off-budget items. (White House 
Office of Management and Budget [table 1.2].) 
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the effective federal tax rate for households fell from 35 percent in 1979 to 29 
percent in 2011. Earlier research by Piketty and Saez, which ignores the role 
of transfers and is therefore not directly comparable to the CBO data, finds 
that the effective tax rate of the top 1 percent fell from 44 percent in 1960 to 
38 percent in 2001.28
Expressed as a logical sequence in figure 9, the relationship that Streeck 
posits between public debt and inequality can be summarized as follows: 
Declining tax progressivity means greater inequality and increased savings 
for wealthy households and large corporations. Declining tax progressivity 
also means a rising public debt.29 As a result of changes in the tax system, 
elites have more money freed up to invest in the growing stock of government 
bonds, which, thanks to their “risk-free” status, become particularly attrac-
tive in times of crisis.30 In essence, what the debt state means is that govern-
ments in advanced capitalist countries come to rely on borrowing from elites 
instead of taxing them. And in choosing to furnish elites with risk-free assets 
rather than to levy taxes on their incomes, the debt state comes to reinforce 
existing patterns of social inequality.31
The concept of the debt state helps to illustrate how the fiscal conflict 
underpinning the public debt—though it has changed dramatically—has 
not disappeared altogether. Unlike in early nineteenth-century Britain, the 
contemporary US experience does not allow us to draw a straight empirical 
line from the taxes of the working class to the interest income of the wealthy 
bondholding class. Yet the emergence and consolidation of the debt state, 
with its trio of tax stagnation, spending increases, and declining progressiv-
ity, nevertheless creates winners and losers.32
Fixing or Flipping?
Growing wealth and income inequality has come to shape almost every 
aspect of social life in recent years. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that inequality also permeates the public finances. The analysis in this chap-
ter suggests that the resurgence of the bondholding class is an outcome of 
the debt state as it has evolved since the early 1980s. This begs the question: 
how stable is the current arrangement? A broad segment of society is grow-
ing weary of the ever-increasing debt burden of the federal government, and 
assessing the top-down and bottom-up pressures that debt state encounters 
is crucial for gauging its stability.
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Taking the top-down view, the dominant owners of the public debt, the 
modern day incarnation of Adams’s bondholding class, represent a powerful 
force in favor of the status quo. In the current context of turbulence and 
uncertainty, the top 1 percent and large corporations have come to rely on 
the US Treasury market as a safe haven for investment. Any effort to drasti-
cally reduce the debt without a sustained recovery would likely encounter 
resistance from dominant owners.
A look back to the second administration of Bill Clinton reveals what the 
bondholding class really thinks about any serious attempt at debt reduction. 
Riding the highs of the “new economy” boom in the late-1990s, the federal 
government ran budget surpluses and reduced the public debt from 67 per-
cent of GDP in 1995 to around 57 percent by the turn of the millennium. 
And in 2000, Clinton himself was predicting that the public debt would be 
completely repaid by 2013.33
But rather than wholly embrace the Clinton-era budget surpluses, domi-
nant owners of the public debt instead started to voice concerns over the 
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Figure 9. The logical sequence of Streeck’s debt state.
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and most liquid financial market and which are used as the benchmark risk-
free asset to price all other types of assets.34 Even the federal government 
expressed doubts about its debt reduction plan. A secret report entitled “Life 
After Debt,” written in 2000 and made public by National Public Radio 
in 2011, expressed concerns that sharp debt reduction would compromise 
the liquidity and risk management capacities of the rapidly booming finan-
cial sector.35 And in a telling 2001 speech to the Bond Market Association, 
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan expended a great deal of effort 
justifying the debt-reduction strategy by placating fears about the negative 
effects of debt reduction on financial markets. If powerful interests respond 
in a lukewarm way to debt reduction in a period of confidence and prosperity, 
then why should they seriously embrace any strategy for debt reduction in the 
current context of global crisis and uncertainty?36
To be sure, further increases in the public debt might affect the perceived 
creditworthiness of the federal government and draw the ire of wealthy elites 
who constitute the largest fraction of federal bondholders.37 Growing elite 
unease with the public debt has manifested itself in the emergence of groups 
like the Fix the Debt campaign, led by billionaire Pete Peterson, and set up 
for the express purpose of lobbying for a reduction in the public debt.
Yet even a cursory glance at the fiscal strategy of the Fix the Debt cam-
paign shows that it is much more concerned with cutting social programs 
than with reducing the public debt. And as Paul Krugman points out, it is 
difficult to regard all the fear mongering about federal debt and deficits as 
anything more than a ploy for groups like Fix the Debt to broaden support 
for what they really want: drastic cuts in social spending.38 In fact, austerity 
rather than debt reduction turns out to be an ideal fiscal strategy for power-
ful interests. Not only do social spending cuts help to preserve the value and 
sanctity of existing Treasury securities, they also relieve some of the pressures 
for tax hikes, which would fall more heavily on the incomes of the dominant 
owners of the public debt.
Nevertheless, a sustained austerity program involving social spending 
cuts will be difficult to enact for a number of reasons. If, as Streeck suggests, 
gradual increases in government spending are merely a functional outcome of 
capitalist development, then they will be difficult to reverse. Major spending 
cuts are also difficult to implement because of the social tensions engendered 
by growing wealth and income inequality. Cuts to social programs will only 
exacerbate inequality and are likely to encounter resistance, especially given 
the increasingly regressive nature of transfer payments since 1979.
F i sc a l  Con f l ic t :  Pa s t  a n d  Pr e s e n t  • 69
Overall, then, the current manifestation of the debt state, characterized 
by a large public debt accumulated through a stagnant and regressive tax 
structure, serves the interests of wealthy households and large corporations. 
In the current context, it is an arrangement that powerful forces are unlikely 
to want to change.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, things look remarkably different when we view 
the situation from the bottom-up. Those outside of the ruling elite are less 
content with the current manifestation of the debt state. Groups like Flip the 
Debt,39 which emerged as a progressive response to Fix the Debt, accept the 
widespread fears about growing public debt levels and the need to enhance 
the fiscal credibility of the federal government.40
But in response to stubbornly high unemployment and increasing wealth 
and income inequality, Flip the Debt advocates the gradual reduction of the 
public debt through tax hikes on the superrich that have gained the most 
from the political-economic order since the early 1980s. Flip the Debt’s 
slogan—“Hey 1%! Pay your damn taxes!”—places the responsibility for debt 
reduction squarely on the shoulders of the wealthy households and large 
corporations that have saved an estimated $2.3 trillion using tax loopholes, 
offshore tax havens, and tax cuts.
So how is this all likely to unfold? Despite pressures from below, I argue 
that the status quo is likely to persist, at least for the foreseeable future 
because of the powerful grip that wealthy households and large corporations 
currently have over the US political economy. Explaining the resiliency of the 
debt state also requires that we go beyond domestic politics to place it within 
its global context. In the next chapter, I examine how the rapid rise of foreign 
ownership of the public debt since the 1970s has served to reinforce the debt 
state in its current manifestation.
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The Puzzle
Political forecasting in times of global turbulence is always 
risky business. Yet it seems safe to say that one precrisis prediction has failed 
to come to fruition. Those warning that the onset of crisis would lead China 
and other foreign creditors to engage in a panicked sell-off of US public debt 
appear off the mark, at least for the time being. Instead of there being a rapid 
decrease, foreign appetite for US Treasury securities has held steady and 
shows little signs of abating (see figure 3).
The fact that global investors continue to put their faith in the US public 
debt might seem counterintuitive, if not completely contradictory. After all, 
the US subprime mortgage market was the epicenter of the global meltdown. 
Since 2008, the US public debt has ballooned, breaching the 100 percent of 
GDP mark for the first time outside of World War II and raising questions 
about the fiscal credibility of the federal government. Successive rounds of 
quantitative easing initially added to these worries, stoking fears that the 
United States was simply “printing money” in order to inflate away its grow-
ing public debt burden. Political wrangling over the debt ceiling, the fiscal 
cliff, and budget sequestration has further compromised US fiscal credibil-
ity. To add insult to injury, in 2011, the debt ceiling debacle even compelled 
Standard and Poor’s to downgrade the credit rating of the US federal govern-
ment. Still, investors from all over the world continue to park their money 
in the US public debt, and the federal government continues to borrow at 
historically low rates.1 How can this be the case?
Ch a p t er  F i v e
Bonding Domestic and Foreign Owners
As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they 
render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in 
time occasion the transport of our people and our industry
Dav i d  H u m e
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This puzzle serves as our starting point for examining in detail the link-
ages between domestic and foreign ownership of the US public debt. In this 
chapter, I argue, through the intentional use of wordplay, that a major part 
of the explanation for US resiliency as a global safe haven has to do with the 
mutually reinforcing “bond” of interests that exists between domestic and 
foreign creditors to the US federal government.
As will be demonstrated, the confidence of foreigners in the US public 
debt is bolstered by the existence of a powerful domestic group of owners 
working to ensure the continued sanctity of the Treasury market as a global 
safe haven. Meanwhile the seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for Treasury 
securities means cheaper credit in the United States, which in various ways 
helps deflect challenges to the dominant position of domestic owners of 
the public debt within the wealth and income hierarchy. Cheap credit for 
the federal government helps to alleviate pressures for socially destabilizing 
expenditure cuts and increased progressive taxation, while cheap credit for 
households helps to placate low- and middle-income Americans who have 
experienced severe wage stagnation since the early 1980s.
To put the argument another way, the domestic political configuration 
of the debt state reinforces foreign confidence in the US public debt, while 
foreign borrowing reinforces the domestic political configuration of the debt 
state. The analysis therefore points toward a powerful bloc of forces that will 
continue to support the status quo as it relates to domestic power relations 
within the United States, as well as the dominant position of the United 
States in global finance.
A constant theme throughout this book has been to engage with new cri-
sis-era research that helps us think in new ways about the political economy 
of public debt ownership. This chapter is no exception in this regard. My 
arguments here are developed out of a critical engagement with the recent 
work of Eswar Prasad, whose vital intervention develops unique insights into 
the linkages between domestic and foreign ownership of the US public debt.
The Dollar Trap
In his recent book The Dollar Trap: How the U.S. Tightened Its Grip on 
Global Finance, Eswar Prasad tackles the question of why the US Treasury 
market, despite obvious problems, has managed to maintain its status as a 
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safe haven for investment throughout the global financial crisis.2 Prasad’s 
own answer to this question includes what we might term both systemic and 
domestic factors.
According to the systemic explanation, US resiliency is not necessarily a 
sign of US strength; instead, it is a sign of weakness and dysfunction in the 
rest of the world. Put simply, at the current time the United States remains 
the best investment option in a world of bad investment options. This means 
that the United States maintains its safe haven status simply because of the 
relative scarcity of safe assets in the rest of the world.
In order to illustrate why the United States remains, in relative terms, 
the safest option for global investment, Prasad takes a brief look at the lack 
of alternatives.3 Since its introduction, the euro has played an increasingly 
significant role in global finance, but the debt crisis in peripheral member 
states has exposed the limitations in the euro’s prospects for overtaking the 
US dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency. Meanwhile, the govern-
ment bond market in the United Kingdom lacks the depth and liquidity to 
become a serious contender. Despite a large government debt, Japan has its 
own economic troubles and its bond market is not nearly as internationalized 
as the US Treasury market. China may one day overtake the United States as 
a global safe haven, but as of now its financial markets, as well as its political 
and legal institutions, are too underdeveloped to wage any serious challenge.
Assets other than government bonds are also unlikely to unseat US 
Treasury securities. In the early stages of the crisis, China spearheaded 
calls to give a more prominent role to special drawing rights (SDRs), the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) supranational reserve asset.4 In 2009, 
for the first time in three decades, the IMF approved a new $250 billion issu-
ance of SDRs. Yet even with the most recent issuance, SDRs represent only 
4 percent of global reserve assets. Initiatives to further strengthen the role of 
SDRs have been met with staunch resistance from the United States, which 
holds veto power over IMF decision-making in this area. The collapse of what 
were regarded as some of the world’s most solid corporations during the crisis 
means that the safety of private securities has been compromised.5
Thus in the current climate, global investors have little choice. In abso-
lute terms, their investments in US Treasury securities appear to be of 
questionable quality, but in relative terms, they are the safest option. Prasad 
illustrates the systemic trap of dollar domination by citing a now-famous 
quote from Luo Ping, the director-general of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. When asked whether China would diversify its holdings away 
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from US assets, Ping gave the following response: “Except for U.S. Treasuries 
what can you hold? Gold? You don’t hold Japanese government bonds or 
U.K. bonds. U.S. Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone, including 
China, it is the only option . . . so we hate you guys but there is nothing much 
we can do.”6
Alongside this systemic explanation, Prasad offers another equally impor-
tant but mostly neglected explanation for US resiliency. Obviously if foreign-
ers own half of the US public debt, the other half is owned domestically. 
And Prasad argues that these domestic owners of the public debt constitute 
a “powerful political constituency” in the United States.7 Prasad suggests 
that the most important domestic owners of the US public debt are retirees 
or those approaching retirement age. This group has a small appetite for risk 
and a high amount of savings and thus invests heavily in Treasury securities, 
either directly or indirectly through its ownership of pension and mutual 
funds.
Prasad claims that the power and influence of owners of the public debt 
is amplified precisely because of their age. Older people, he points out, tend 
to vote in greater numbers and many of them live in swing states such as 
Florida, which play a key role in determining the outcomes of presidential 
elections. This powerful domestic group provides a check on the federal gov-
ernment, which might otherwise be tempted to inflate away its growing debt 
obligations now that foreigners, especially strategic rival China, would bear 
a significant part of the burden of this default by stealth.
To summarize, Prasad’s argument is that the interests of domestic and 
foreign owners of the public debt are united. Both domestic and foreign 
owners have a keen interest in the continued sanctity and creditworthiness 
of the US Treasury market as a global safe haven for investment. As a result, 
foreigners can maintain their confidence in their holdings of US Treasury 
securities thanks in large part to the power and influence of domestic owners, 
who play a key role in pressuring the US federal government to uphold its 
debt obligations.
A Simple Rule
Prasad develops what is arguably the most nuanced account to date of the 
political economy of foreign ownership of the public debt. The main strength 
of his analysis is that it overcomes the aggregate bias of the existing  literature 
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that was surveyed in chapter 2 and demonstrates the powerful domestic 
interests that bolster the creditworthiness of the US Treasury market as a 
safe haven for global investment.
Yet given my own emphasis on class in this book, it probably comes as no 
surprise that I am skeptical of Prasad’s anchoring of the power of domestic 
owners of the public debt in terms of age. So what exactly is the problem of 
identifying domestic owners as retirees and near retirees? And how does an 
alternative focus on class better explain the linkages between domestic and 
foreign ownership of the public debt? Is there a rigorous method for evaluat-
ing age and class as analytical categories?
I propose a simple quantitative rule that helps to provide a better assess-
ment of the power of domestic owners across different categories. The rule 
can be summarized as follows: If a smaller group holds an ownership share 
greater than or equal to a larger group, then the smaller group should be 
privileged in an analysis of power. Put differently, this simple rule states that 
if two groups represent the same portion of the population, the one with the 
larger ownership share should form the focus of an analysis of power.
Before applying this simple rule to empirical data, I should stress that it 
offers merely a quantitative starting point for choosing different analytical 
categories. As with the selection of certain cutoff points within a specific 
category (e.g., the top 1 percent or top 10 percent of households), the selec-
tion of cutoff points across different categories (e.g., class or age) is still 
evaluated in terms of what it can reveal about the world. In this sense, the 
quantitative/qualitative framework that was developed in chapter 3 informs 
the analysis here.
Table 6 uses data from the Federal Reserve’s 2013 SCF to compare the pat-
tern of public debt ownership for the age and class categories. Table 1 uses a 
broad measure of the public debt: it includes direct household holdings of the 
pubic debt, as well as household holdings of pension and mutual fund wealth, 
which are assumed to represent indirect ownership of the public debt.
Let’s start first with the age category. The first row in table 6 plots the 
share of the public debt, direct and indirect, owned by households aged 60 
and older. The data show that households whose members are in the 60-plus 
age group own over half of the public debt, yet they make up only about 
one-third of the population. Expressed as a ratio, this ownership share was 
1.6 times larger than its share of the population. In absolute terms, this means 
that the value of the ownership share of households whose members are in 
the 60-plus age group was around fifty-seven thousand dollars per capita in 
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2013. So at first blush, Prasad’s arguments find some empirical confirma-
tion: retirees and near-retirees do indeed dominate ownership of the public 
debt in the sense that their ownership share is larger than their share of the 
population.
But let’s see what happens when we compare age to class. The remain-
ing rows in table 6 identify domestic owners based on their class positions 
within the wealth and income hierarchy rather than their age. The second 
row plots the share of the public debt that is owned by the top 1 percent of US 
households ranked by net wealth. In 2013 the top 1 percent owned 33 percent 
of the direct and indirect shares of the public debt and obviously made up 1 
percent of the population. Expressed as a ratio, this means that the ownership 
share of the top percentile was 33 times larger than its share of the population. 
And in absolute terms, this means that the value of the ownership of the top 
percentile was around $1,150,000 per capita.
Rows 3 and 4 in table 6 employ measures that allow for a more immediate 
comparison of the age and class categories. The third row shows the owner-
ship share of the top 3.4 percent of households ranked by their net wealth. 
The point of doing this is to show that only 3.4 percent of the population 
ranked by wealth was needed to match the share of the public debt owned 
by all households whose members are in the 60-plus age group (which, as 
we saw earlier, represented 33 percent of the population). And to further 
belabor the point, in the fourth row, if the top 33 percent of US households 
ranked by net worth is used—that is, the same number of people in the 
60-plus grouping—the ownership of the public debt based on class climbs 
to 95 percent of the total!
table 6 Share of the US public debt (direct & indirect) in 2013: wealth versus age
60+ years Public debt (%) Population (%)
Public debt (%)/ 
population (%) Per capita holdings ($)
Total 53 33 1.6 57,000
Top 1% 33 1 33 1,150,000
Top 3.4% 53 3.4 15.6 550,000
Top 33% 95 33 2.9 100,000
Source: Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
Note: Indirect holdings include ownership of pension and mutual funds. Pension funds include all 
IRA and Keogh accounts and other pension assets; mutual funds include all stock, tax-free, other bond, 
combination, other, and money market mutual funds. Direct holdings include ownership of savings 
bonds, other federal bonds, and US government or government-backed-bond mutual funds.
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Age versus Class
Using our simple rule to interpret the data in table 6, it is clear that, in sheer 
quantitative terms, class, rather than age, is a much more effective category 
for identifying the power of domestic owners of the public debt. Once we 
start to dig deeper, we find other compelling reasons to privilege class in our 
analysis.
One of the main problems of classifying domestic owners of the public 
debt by age is that it assumes that retirees and near-retirees are a monolithic 
category. Yet a brief look at the data on the total percentage of households 
with members aged 60 and older that own the public debt suggests that this 
is far from the case.
Of households whose members are aged 60 and older, 48 percent have 
some ownership stake in the public debt, either directly or indirectly. Yet 
these holdings of the public debt among older Americans are heavily con-
centrated at the top. If we rank all households in the 60-plus age category by 
their net wealth, we find that the top decile owned 76 percent of all direct 
and indirect holdings of the public debt, while the top percentile owned 25 
percent. Ownership of the public debt within the category of retirees and 
near-retirees, therefore, was heavily concentrated at the top. It is not older 
Americans per se, but wealthy older Americans who dominate ownership of 
the public debt.
What about distribution of the public debt within the top 1 percent? To 
be sure, ownership of the public debt is just as concentrated within the top 
percentile as it is within our age category. According to the 2013 SCF, the 
top 0.1 percent of US households owned roughly a quarter of the public debt 
owned within the top percentile. Yet 92 percent of all households within 
the top percentile own Treasury securities directly or indirectly (compared 
with just 48 percent in the 60-plus age category). Widespread ownership of 
the public debt within the top percentile therefore suggests a high degree of 
cohesiveness in purely distributional terms.
In the Dollar Trap, Prasad argued that the power of retirees and near-
retirees derives from voting. Yet this image of older Americans as a coher-
ent bloc of powerful voters conflicts with much of the research conducted 
within the field of gerontology. Existing research indicates that, while older 
Americans do tend to vote in greater numbers, they are, in contrast to the 
top percentile, deeply divided in terms of their policy preferences and even 
in terms of their partisan affiliations.8
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While the research discussed in chapter 3 revealed “political homogene-
ity” in the preferences of the top percentile, the empirical record elsewhere 
consistently shows disagreements among seniors over politically conten-
tious issues such as social spending.9 Recent polling conducted by the Pew 
Research Center on political typologies found that the ideological profiles of 
older Americans were evenly split into polarized categories. Of Americans 
aged 65 and older, 33 percent fell into categories aligned with Democrats (e.g., 
“solid liberals” and “faith and family left”) and 32 percent fell into catego-
ries aligned with Republicans (e.g., “steadfast conservatives” and “business 
conservatives”).10
Even party affiliation among older Americans is divided. Recall the SESA 
data cited in chapter 3, which found that 58 percent of respondents within the 
top percentile supported the Republican Party. This is a degree of political 
consensus not found among older Americans. Pew Research Center polling 
data show that party identification is almost evenly split among those aged 
59 and older, with 44 percent of those surveyed identifying as Republican or 
lean Republican and 46 percent identifying as Democrat or lean Democrat.11
These examples reveal divisions among older Americans and bring into 
question the popular media image of seniors as a juggernaut within US poli-
tics. In fact, the growing consensus within the field of gerontology suggests 
that this image of powerful retirees and near-retirees is merely an inaccurate 
and potentially harmful myth perpetrated by the popular media.12
A Deeper Bond
The quantitative and qualitative evidence indicates clearly that the locus of 
power for domestic owners of the public debt is to be found not with older 
Americans but with the top percentile of Americans at the apex of the wealth 
and income hierarchy. What, then, are the exact consequences of this obser-
vation? What does our alternative emphasis on the class identity of domestic 
owners of the public debt reveal that Prasad’s account neglects?
In a very general sense, the alternative focus on class does not alter Prasad’s 
main conclusion. Whether they are viewed in terms of class or age, we still 
end up concluding, in line with Prasad, that domestic owners are a formi-
dable political force whose interests are aligned with their foreign counter-
parts. All the alternative focus on class does is reveal that domestic owners 
of the public debt are much more powerful than Prasad suggests. As a result, 
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foreign owners of the public debt can be even more reassured about the abili-
ties of the powerful constituency of domestic owners to pressure the federal 
government to uphold its creditworthiness and thereby ensure the sanctity 
of the Treasury market as a safe haven for global investment.
Although the alternative focus on class does not alter Prasad’s main 
conclusion, it does illuminate other bonds between domestic and foreign 
owners of the public debt that are neglected in his analysis. If the focus is on 
class, it becomes clear that foreigners are not the only ones to gain from the 
ownership structure of the public debt as it is currently configured. Powerful 
domestic owners also derive benefits from foreign investment in the US 
Treasury market.
How exactly does this work? Barry Eichengreen notes a “remarkable 
degree of consensus” among economists on the role that foreign invest-
ment in US Treasury securities plays in lowering US interest rates.13 Francis 
Warnock and Veronica Warnock find that capital inflows to the US 
Treasury market have a “statistically and economically significant impact” 
on lowering the yield on 10-year Treasury securities.14 The downward pres-
sure on interest rates extends to various other US financial instruments, 
including household mortgages. In my discussion of how access to cheap 
credit for domestic borrowers is facilitated, I identify two main channels 
through which foreign ownership helps to reinforce the power of domestic 
owners of the public debt.
First, cheap credit for the federal government helps to maintain the status 
quo of the public finances. In particular, cheap credit serves to deflect calls 
for spending cuts and increased taxation, especially increased progressive 
taxation, which would fall more heavily on the incomes of the dominant 
owners of the public debt. Second, cheap credit for low- and middle-income 
households allows them to maintain consumption habits in the wake of 
decades-long stagnation in their wealth and income. Thus the cheap house-
hold credit that is facilitated by foreign capital flows helps to relieve tensions 
created by growing inequality and to dampen resentment toward the domi-
nant owners of the public debt. Each of these channels is discussed in turn.
Reinforcing the Debt State I: The Public Finances
The federal government is currently borrowing record amounts, excluding 
the period of the two world wars, and it is doing so at nearly record-low costs. 
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The availability of cheap credit relieves political pressures on the federal gov-
ernment to steer an alternative course in terms of its public finance policies. 
And this status quo in the public finances, in turn, serves the interests of 
the domestic owners of the public debt at the top of the wealth and income 
hierarchies.
What exactly does cheap credit mean for a debt state that, as chapter 4 
showed, faces domestic challenges on several fronts? Thanks to the seemingly 
insatiable foreign appetite for US Treasury securities, the federal government 
faces less pressure to implement spending cuts. As Streeck argues, gradu-
ally increasing government expenditures are merely a function of capitalist 
development and therefore difficult to reverse in the long term. Substantial 
spending cuts would prove particularly destabilizing in the current climate. 
This is especially the case because, as we saw in chapter 3, the system of fed-
eral transfer payments has become increasingly regressive alongside growing 
wealth and income inequality. Foreign ownership of the US public debt 
therefore helps the federal government to resist politically contentious calls 
from the top down to boost its creditworthiness through deep cuts to entitle-
ment programs.
Most importantly, with foreign willingness to underwrite the US deficits 
seemingly ad infinitum, the federal government feels less pressure to heed 
bottom-up demands for increased progressive taxation. The low cost of bor-
rowing that is facilitated by foreign capital lessens the immediacy of growing 
calls to reverse over three decades of tax cuts for wealthy households and 
large corporations. In this way, cheap finance from abroad sustains the status 
quo of the debt state, which, driven by declining tax progressivity, serves the 
interests of dominant owners of the public debt.
Reinforcing the Debt State II: Household Credit
There is another less obvious but important channel through which foreign 
owners of the public debt reinforce the power of their domestic counterparts. 
As the work of Warnock and Warnock suggests, foreign purchases of US 
Treasury securities have clear knock-on effects, lowering the costs of borrow-
ing not only for the government but also households and corporations. By 
facilitating access to cheap household credit, foreign ownership of the public 
debt also helps to relieve social tensions that have emerged from decades-long 
wealth and income stagnation for the vast majority of Americans.
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Discussions of inequality tend to focus on the top percentile’s share of 
total wealth and income, which has been increasing since the early 1980s. 
Yet top earners have not only come to take a greater share of the overall pie, 
they have also seen the absolute levels of their fortunes expand. Meanwhile, 
the wealth and income of those below the top percentile have stagnated over 
the same period.
The recent work of Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman revealed great 
disparities in wealth and income growth since the early 1980s.15 According to 
their research, low- and middle-income Americans in the bottom 90 percent 
of distribution have seen their “real” wealth and income increase by 0.1 per-
cent and by 0.7 percent, respectively, from the mid-1980s to 2012. In contrast, 
the real wealth and income of the top percentile grew by 3.9 percent and by 
3.4 percent, respectively, over the same period. With stagnant wealth and 
income, those in the bottom 90 percent have virtually zero savings, while 
those in the top 1 percent have managed to save 36 percent of their income.
With stagnant wealth and income, combined with deteriorating savings, 
households in the bottom 90 percent face the specter of declining living 
standards and, for those not already at the very bottom, declining positions 
within the class hierarchy. Engelbert Stockhammer documents how low- and 
middle-income Americans, in an effort to stave off these nasty consequences, 
have rapidly accumulated debt.16 Debt-to-income ratios for households in 
the bottom 50 percent increased from 0.61 in 1989 to 1.37 in 2007, whereas 
for households in the 50th–90th percentile, they increased from 0.81 to 1.48. 
Meanwhile the debt-to-income ratio for the top percentile has increased 
much more modestly from 0.25 to 0.37 over the same period.17
Thus one of the main consequences of rising inequality has been a con-
comitant explosion in household indebtedness. In his renowned book Fault 
Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Raghuram 
Rajan was one of the first to systematically examine the link between inequal-
ity and household indebtedness and, most importantly, to situate it within 
a global context.18
Rajan argued that expanding household credit is the path of least resis-
tance for the US federal government in dealing with rising inequality. Faced 
with wealth and income stagnation and a dwindling share of the distribu-
tional pie, low- and middle-income Americans are placated by access to cheap 
credit. The US government’s placating role is especially important consider-
ing that a great deal of household borrowing goes toward home ownership, a 
key facet of the American dream.19 On the flipside, elites in the top percentile 
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favor the expansion of household credit, seeing it as a more palatable solu-
tion to inequality than redistribution through progressive taxation. Yet, as 
Rajan is careful to point out, there are domestic limits to credit expansion 
as a means of addressing inequality. Efforts to boost consumption by credit 
expansion fan the flames of inflation and put pressure on the Federal Reserve 
to raise interest rates, a move that would, in turn, curb household borrowing 
and consumption. Rajan identified two global factors that help the United 
States to supersede these domestic limits. First, the flood of cheap imports, 
mostly from China, relieves inflationary pressures. Second, the flood of 
cheap capital from export-led countries into the US Treasury market puts 
downward pressure on US interest rates.
Household debt serves as a compensatory mechanism in the face of wealth 
and income stagnation for low- and middle-income households. By facilitat-
ing widespread access to credit, the constant flood of foreign money into the 
United States helps to dampen resentment toward the top percentile, which 
not only takes a bigger share of the distributional pie but has also seen its 
wealth and income grow in absolute terms since the early 1980s.
By deflecting pressures for progressive taxation, and by helping to facilitate 
access to cheap credit for low- and middle income Americans, the constant 
flood of foreign money into the US Treasury market helps relieve tensions 
created by growing wealth and income inequality. In this way, foreign owner-
ship plays a key role in reinforcing and sustaining the debt state.
The Bond of Interests
The analysis in this chapter points toward a formidable bloc of forces whose 
interest in maintaining the status quo is twofold. On the one hand, the pow-
erful political constituency that dominates ownership of the public debt helps 
to sustain foreign confidence in the US public debt. This dynamic bodes well 
for the continued role of the United States as a safe haven for global invest-
ment. Thus the findings here give added support to the arguments of those 
who suggest that, at least in the short-term, foreign ownership of the public 
debt works to sustain the power and influence of the United States in global 
finance. On the other hand, foreign borrowing means a flood of cheap credit 
into the United States, which relieves some of the domestic tensions associ-
ated with growing wealth and income inequality. Foreign ownership of the 
US public debt therefore reinforces the political stability of the debt state.
82 • B on di ng  D om e s t ic  a n d  For e ig n  Ow n e r s
Thus far my analysis of the debt state has helped to clarify the redistribu-
tive consequences of the public debt and has also linked domestic and foreign 
ownership of the public debt in ways that have been neglected in the existing 
literature. The precise political consequences of the debt state still need to be 
examined. What exactly does the debt state mean for the political process? 
Does concentration in ownership of the public debt allow the bondholding 
class to influence government policy making and behavior? What does the 
debt state mean for democracy? These questions serve as the starting point 
for the inquiry in the next chapter.
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Public Debt as Political Power
So far this book has sought to demonstrate how the debt state rein-
forces existing patterns of wealth and income inequality. But what still needs 
to be explored is what the emergence and consolidation of the debt state mean 
for policy making and the representation of interests within government. Does 
concentration, as H. C. Adams once suggested, allow the bondholding class to 
control the government as shareholders control a corporation? How do we go 
about empirically exploring the effects of concentration in ownership of the 
public debt on the political process? And what do the results of this empirical 
exercise tell us about the nature of democracy under the debt state?
As mentioned in chapter 1, plenty of anecdotal accounts highlight the 
incredible power that bond market investors wield over government. Within 
these accounts, however, the bond market is treated as an impersonal, even 
mystical, force, which precludes the possibility of identifying owners of the 
public debt along class lines. By speaking in these impersonal terms, those 
that focus on the almighty bond market only keep the identities of owners of 
the public debt anonymous. And anonymity serves to strengthen the power 
of dominant owners.
Yet engaging in more systematic research and assigning causal power to 
ownership concentration prove to be difficult. Modern governments are, 
after all, complex entities that are subject to a variety of different influences. 
Ch a p t er  Si x
Who Rules the Debt State?
If a public debt is widely distributed among all income groups in 
the community, a larger number of people will acquire conscious 
interest in government fiscal policy. This is as it should be in a 
democracy. Moreover, if the debt is widely distributed, political 
controversies between bondholders and non-bondholders are 
not likely to arise.
W i n t h rop  A l dr ic h 
For m e r  C h a i r m a n  of  C h a se  N at ion a l  B a n k
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The US Treasury market may be central, especially to monetary and fiscal 
policy, but it is not the only channel through which power and influence 
over government can be exerted. There are many other ways that wealthy 
households and large corporations can influence government that go beyond 
their concentrated ownership of the public debt.
To take one obvious example, think of the pressures for financial deregu-
lation that large financial corporations exert through lobbying and revolving 
doors between their upper management and government institutions.1 The 
very emergence of the debt state was bound up with financial deregulation, 
which enabled the financial sector to expand credit in order to meet the state’s 
increasing borrowing requirements.2 As a result, it is difficult to gauge with 
any precision, especially given the patchiness of the available data, to what 
extent a change in government policy has been brought about by a change 
in ownership of the public debt or by lobbying for financial deregulation, or 
by both. In this sense, ownership concentration and lobbying are entangled 
within the same power process that has led to the creation of the debt state.3
Despite these limitations, it is still possible to investigate the extent to 
which government policy has transformed in ways that prioritize the interests 
of government bondholders over other segments of the population. This exer-
cise does not reveal much about the causal effects of ownership concentration, 
but it does allow us to gauge the role of policy in reinforcing or counteracting 
the pattern of social inequality that is associated with the debt state.
Analyzing the content of the Economic Report of the President (ERP), 
I show in this chapter how growing concentration in ownership of the 
public debt has proceeded in tandem with a transformation in government 
policy, one that provides an ideological climate that privileges the interests 
of government bondholders over the general citizenry. These findings do not 
prove that increasing concentration in ownership of the public debt gives the 
bondholding class power over government policy. Nevertheless, the research 
findings indicate that, under the debt state, inequality in ownership of the 
public debt and inequality in representation within government policy are 
two sides of the same coin. I argue that in this sense the rise of the debt state 
plays a key role in the broader erosion of the very foundations of democratic 
governance in America over the past three decades.
To illustrate the linkages between ownership of the public debt and the 
transformation of government policy, I return to Streeck’s work. In particu-
lar, I engage with his conceptualization of the two competing subjects at the 
heart of the debt state: what he terms the Marktvolk and the Staatsvolk.
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Marktvolk versus Staatsvolk
Streeck argues that the debt state marks a new stage in the relationship 
between capitalism and democracy.4 Previously (i.e., during the post–World 
War II period) elites would exercise indirect political influence in deciding 
whether or not to invest in the national economy. But now with a massive 
ownership stake in escalating public debts, these same elites can also exercise 
direct political influence in deciding whether or not to invest in government 
bonds. Governments in advanced countries, therefore, face a delicate balanc-
ing act between catering too much to the demands of citizens, thus risking 
investors’ loss of confidence, and kowtowing to investors, thus delegitimizing 
themselves in the eyes of the citizenry.
Especially since the onset of the global financial crisis, Streeck has argued 
that the Marktvolk appears to be gaining the upper hand in this power strug-
gle. More and more the demands of citizens in advanced capitalist countries 
are subordinated to the supposed exigencies of the “market.” As part of the 
unrelenting austerity drive, citizens are asked to moderate their claims on the 
public purse in order to ensure the confidence of the government’s creditors. 
A highly stylized framework from Streeck outlining the basic characteristics 
of these two subjects is reproduced in table 7.
For the nationally bound Staatsvolk, or general citizenry, influence over 
the government is exerted primarily through the political and civil rights of 
democratic citizenship. In other words, the Staatsvolk exerts power over the 
political process by voting in periodic elections and by voicing public opinion 
in between them. In exchange for their loyalty, especially the dutiful pay-
ment of taxes, the government is expected to furnish the Staatsvolk with the 
social rights associated with the welfare state and to maintain access to public 
services. The Staatsvolk in Streeck’s framework is therefore representative of 
T. H. Marshall’s canonical model, which identifies political, civil, and society 
rights as the core elements of citizenship in modern capitalist societies.5
For the transnationally oriented Marktvolk or market people, influence is 
exerted over government in their role as private creditors. In particular, the 
power of the Marktvolk is derived from its role as the lender to government, 
with the public debt representing a contractual claim on the government’s 
future revenues. While the power of the Staatsvolk stems primarily from 
voting and public opinion, the power of the Marktvolk stems from its ability 
to sell its existing holdings of government bonds, or, when the government 
auctions new debt, to command higher interest rates or refuse to purchase 
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the newly auctioned debt outright. In place of loyalty, the government seeks 
the confidence of the Marktvolk, which the government ensures by reliably 
servicing its debts.
One of the government’s main priorities in relation to the Marktvolk 
should therefore be to maintain the sanctity of the government bond market 
as a safe and secure outlet for investment. The interests associated with the 
Marktvolk in table 7 are treated here as specific means to achieve the broader 
goal of differential capitalization. In seeking to create a favorable investment 
climate, the Marktvolk pushes the government to subordinate all other goals 
to these financial imperatives. The confidence and power of the Marktvolk 
thus hinge on whether the government obediently serves the financial logic 
of differential capitalization over other concerns.
Who exactly make up the Marktvolk? Streeck admits that, given the pau-
city of research on the public debt, the precise identity of the Markvolk is 
difficult to pin down.6 But he does claim that the Marktvolk more than likely 
is composed of wealthy individuals and large corporations and can therefore 
be seen as a proxy for the resurgent bondholding class that forms the focus 
of this book.
Because of increasing indebtedness and growing concentration in owner-
ship of the public debt, Streeck argues that the debt state has come to serve 
the interests of the Marktvolk at the expense of the Staatsvolk. But what is 
the precise mechanism through which the government comes to privilege the 
interests of the dominant owners of the public debt? The stylized framework 
formulated by Streeck lends itself to a structural concept of power, since it 
assumes that the influence of the Marktvolk is not determined by any con-
scious decision or agency on the part of social actors.7
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Source: Streeck, Buying Time, 81.
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No government officials deliberately planned the debt state in its current 
manifestation, nor did they consciously facilitate the heavy concentration in 
the public debt that has ensued since the early 1980s. Similarly, the bondhold-
ing class or Marktvolk did not embark on a deliberate strategy to transform 
the public finances in order to increase its share of the public debt. Instead, 
the emergence of the debt state was the by-product of dramatic changes in 
the tax system since the early 1980s, with policy makers adopting supply-side 
views that call for tax reduction and with increasingly powerful elites revolt-
ing against progressive taxation. The onset of the global financial crisis only 
reinforced these dynamics by adding to an already rapidly increasing debt 
burden in a context of growing inequality.
This structural approach makes a great deal of sense when we consider the 
absence of any instrumental power exerted on the part of dominant owners. 
Chapter 2 noted the existence of powerful lobby groups working on behalf 
of Western European and American creditors to foreign governments. But 
at present there is no specific lobbying group that represents the interests of 
owners of the US public debt, whether foreign or domestic. Any influence 
that the Marktvolk exerts over policy is therefore likely to be indirect.
Clarifying the Conditions
How can Streeck’s highly stylized framework be empirically operationalized? 
The first step involves clarifying the factors that allow us to gauge when the 
interests of the Marktvolk come to supersede those of the Staatsvolk. Within 
the framework that Streeck has set up, it is implied that, not only the degree 
of ownership concentration, but also the outstanding level of public indebt-
edness, matters in assessing the relative power of the two subjects at the heart 
of the debt state. In other words, a government with a public debt of 3 per-
cent of GDP might feel less compelled to worry about its creditworthiness 
in financial markets, even when its debt is 100 percent concentrated in the 
hands of powerful groups. Similarly, a government with a public debt of 200 
percent of GDP might feel more compelled to maintain its good standing 
with investors, even when its debt is widely held.8
Alongside the degree of ownership concentration and the outstanding 
level of public indebtedness, the interests of the Marktvolk might supersede 
those of the Staatsvolk when the foreign ownership of the public debt is high. 
The US federal government borrows in its own currency and does not face the 
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same constraints of those governments, especially those in emerging markets, 
that tend to borrow in foreign currency and therefore run the risk of default 
should their foreign exchange reserves collapse. Nevertheless, whether real 
or perceived, increased foreign indebtedness is thought to increase the threat 
of exit, as global investors are able to rapidly move large sums of capital out 
of the United States. The threat of exit that accompanies increased foreign 
ownership serves potentially to discipline governments in ways that cater to 
the interests of its creditors.
On the basis of these three main factors, it is possible to develop clear 
hypotheses to empirically explore the conditions under which the govern-
ment comes to favor the interests of the Marktvolk over the Staatsvolk. Given 
the patchiness of the data on concentration in ownership of the public debt, 
an empirical exploration of these conditions is limited to periods when the 
data are most complete. In the context of this study, it is necessary to return 
to the historical snapshots first encountered in the section on corporate own-
ership of the public debt in chapter 3. My hypotheses for each of these periods 
are outlined in table 8.
In the postwar period (1957–61), the level of the public debt was falling 
rapidly from its historic highs during World War II. But at 56 percent of GDP, 
the public debt was still at a moderate level. Meanwhile, concentration in own-
ership of the public debt during this period was relatively low. In 1962, the top 
percentile owned 25 percent of the household share of the public debt, while 
from 1957 to 1961, the top 2,500 corporations owned on average 66 percent of 
the corporate share of the public debt. Foreign ownership of the US public debt 
in the postwar period was very low, with the rest of the world commanding a 
mere 4 percent share. Given the moderate levels of debt, low domestic owner-
ship concentration, and minimal foreign indebtedness, the expected influence 
of the Marktvolk during this period would be at the low end of the spectrum.
Public debt levels continued to fall through the 1960s and 1970s and, as 
table 8 shows, stood at a low of 34 percent for the early neoliberal period 
(1977–81). Concentration in corporate ownership of the public debt remained 
more or less unchanged at 65 percent, on average, for 1977–81, while concen-
tration in household ownership had increased to 34 percent by 1983. The 
share of the public debt owned by the rest of the world in 1977–81 shot up 
to 18 percent. A combination of low levels of public debt, low-to-moderate 
ownership concentration, and moderate foreign indebtedness means that the 
expected influence for the Marktvolk would have been low to moderate in 
the early days of neoliberalism.
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Finally, the most recent period (2006–10) in table 8 allow for the clearest 
hypothesis. During this period, public debt levels were very high at 75 percent 
of GDP. Concentration in ownership of the public debt was also very high. 
The largest 2,500 corporations increased their ownership of the corporate 
share of the public debt to 82 percent, on average, for 2006–10, and the top 
percentile increased its ownership of the household share of the public debt 
to 38 percent for 2007 and 42 percent for 2010. During the period from 2006 
to 2010, the share of the public debt owned by the rest of the world surged to 
47 percent. Under these conditions, the expected influence of the Marktvolk 
would have been high.
Measuring Influence
In what follows, I engage in a simple empirical exercise, subjecting the frame-
work outlined in tables 7 and 8 to content analysis.9 Focusing on our three 
snapshot periods, I measure the frequency with which the respective terms 
associated with the Marktvolk and the Staatsvolk appear in government doc-
uments.10 Put simply, when government prioritizes the interests of the bond-
holding class, terms associated with the Marktvolk in table 7 are expected to 
gain prominence over those associated with the Staatsvolk.
My analysis examines the content of the ERP, which is produced annu-
ally by the chairperson of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers. 
The ERP is examined because it is the key document through which the US 
president, the main elected figure in federal politics, outlines and justifies his 
or her economic policy to the public. Practical reasons also inform my choice 
of the ERP. The report spans the time periods that are of interest and have 
been digitalized for more expedient content analysis.
Table 9 plots the results of the content analysis. One thing that stands 
out immediately is that some of the terms appear very infrequently or do not 
table 8 Conditions for Marktvolk influence
 1957–61 1977–81 2006–10
Level of public debt moderate low high
Ownership concentration low low–moderate high
Foreign ownership low moderate high
Influence of Marktvolk low low–moderate high
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appear at all (e.g., civil rights, voters, and debt service). Meanwhile other terms, 
particularly national and international, dominate. The lopsided distribution 
of references to these terms in the ERP points to some of the limitations of 
subjecting this highly stylized framework to content analysis.11
In absolute terms, table 9 shows considerable changes in the references 
to the two subjects of the debt state. On the one hand, references to the 
Staatsvolk increase from the first period to the second period (from 607 to 
782) and then decrease in the third period (626). On the other hand, refer-
ences to the Marktvolk increase through the three periods.
What is of most concern, however, is not the absolute number of refer-
ences but the relative references, which are expressed as a ratio in the bottom 
line of table 9. A ratio of less than 1 means that the terms associated with 
the Staatsvolk appear more often in the ERP than those associated with the 
Marktvolk. A ratio of more than 1 means that the terms associated with the 
Marktvolk appear more often in the ERP than those associated with the 
Staatsvolk.
As the data make clear, the results of the content analysis do not cor-
respond perfectly with the conditions that are set out in table 8. From the 
postwar period to the early neoliberal period, the influence of the Marktvolk 
was expected to increase slightly, from low to low-moderate. However, the 
ratio of references to the Marktvolk relative to the Staatsvolk increased more 
significantly from 0.74 in 1957–61 to 1.3 in 1977–81. One reason for this large 
jump might have to do with the turbulence that plagued the early neoliberal 
period, which fueled worries about inflation and the role that interest rates 
play in containing it.
The shift from the early neoliberal period to the current era is much more 
in line with the expectations set out in table 8. Over the past three decades 
references in the ERP to the terms associated with the Marktvolk have 
become twice as frequent as references made to those associated with the 
Staatsvolk. Thus, in line with rising public indebtedness, ownership concen-
tration, and foreign indebtedness since the early 1980s, the terms associated 
with the Marktvolk have rapidly gained prominence within government 
policy making.
Of course this simple content analysis does not prove that the emergence 
and consolidation of the debt state lead to increasing power for dominant 
owners of the public debt. As Hacker and Pierson are careful to point out, 
such empirical analyses of business power need to distinguish between asso-
ciation and causation.12 Just because the content of policy is congruent with 
W ho  Ru l e s  t h e  De b t  S tat e?  • 91
certain interests does not mean that the policy shift itself was caused by the 
direct or indirect power of the Marktvolk. Rather than being a reflection of 
intent on the part of dominant owners of the public debt to shape policy in 
line with their preferences, the change in policy might have, as I mentioned 
earlier, been brought about by some other power process. The change might 
also have been brought about by mere accident, or the line of causation might 
well be the reverse: the shift in policy might transform the interests and pref-
erences of dominant owners of the public debt.
But what this content analysis does illustrate, even if only modestly, is how 
the emergence of the debt state has been accompanied by a transformation 
in policy, one that provides an ideological climate privileging the interests 
of the Marktvolk. In this way, the results of this modest empirical exercise 
support Nitzan and Bichler’s definition of power as confidence in obedience. 
Whether intentional or not, what the research suggests is that dominant 














































































































Ratio: 0.74 Ratio: 1.3 Ratio: 2.0
Source: Economic Report of the President (various years).
Note: The numbers under each term represent the number of times that term is referred to in the ERP 
over the five-year span. The ratio in the bottom row is the number of references to terms associated with 
the Marktvolk relative to the number of references to terms associated with the Staatsvolk (see table 7). 
Due to minor changes in the coding procedure, the data differ slightly from those presented in Hager, 
“Corporate Ownership.” Data and coding procedures are available from the author on request.
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owners of the public debt can be increasingly confident that when making 
policy, the government will obediently elevate financial imperatives above 
the concerns of the general citizenry.
The research suggests above all that, under the debt state, inequality in 
ownership of the public debt and inequality in representation within govern-
ment policy are two sides of the same coin. And this observation provokes 
a question of grave importance for public policy: What does the debt state 
mean for American democracy?
The Debt State and Democracy
Perhaps the most well-known conceptualization of the relationship between 
the public debt and democracy comes from the school of political economy 
known as “public choice.” For theorists of public choice, a growing public 
debt is a consequence of democracy.13 According to the logic of this theory, a 
shortsighted and selfish electorate demands increased spending and limited 
taxation, which opportunistic politicians are eager to provide in the hopes of 
gaining and retaining power. The painful burden of repaying the large public 
debt that results from this arrangement is shifted forward in time to the cur-
rent generation’s children and grandchildren. In this way, increasing public 
indebtedness is symptomatic of a major deficiency in democratic governance. 
To avoid unfairly burdening future generations, governments must find ways 
to shield the public finances from democratic influence. This includes mea-
sures that would place predefined (i.e., nondemocratically determined) limits 
on government borrowing.
The notion of the debt state turns public choice theory’s understanding of 
the relationship between public debt and democracy on its head. As Streeck 
argues, the increase in public indebtedness across the advanced capitalist 
countries since the 1970s has been accompanied by a significant decline in 
democratic mobilization.14 Some basic indicators of democratic participa-
tion, including rates of unionization, instances of industrial strike action, 
and even voter turnout, have been falling across the advanced capitalist 
world. This suggests that the rapid growth of the public debt over the past 
four decades is not an outcome of the deficiencies of democracy but is instead 
bound up with a broader erosion of the very foundations of democratic rule.
The US experience since the early 1980s provides empirical confirma-
tion for Streeck’s general arguments concerning the decline in democratic 
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 mobilization. For example, the share of American workers belonging to a 
union has declined from roughly 25 percent in 1980 to 11 percent in 2012, 
while the number of work stoppages involving one thousand workers or more 
fell from 235 in 1979 to 11 in 2014.15 At the same time, since the post–World 
War II period, the United States has witnessed a slight decline in voter turn-
out rates for federal elections.16
Perhaps more troubling than falling voter turnout rate has been the 
increasing class bias of voting. As Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler dem-
onstrate, since 1988, voter turnout for wealthy Americans (those in the top 
quintile of distribution) has grown steadily relative to voter turnout for the 
poor (those in the bottom quintile of distribution).17 This growing class bias 
is significant, not only because the rich are overrepresented within formal 
democratic institutions, but also, as the SESA findings indicate, because 
the political preferences of the rich differ markedly from those of low- and 
middle-income Americans.18
The rich tend to support economic policies that are more conservative, 
while poor nonvoters are much more likely to support government spending 
for progressive redistribution and the improvement of social services. With 
the electoral system increasingly biased toward the economically conserva-
tive views of the rich, it is little wonder that a content analysis of govern-
ment policy documents would point to a privileging of the interests of the 
Marktvolk over the Staatsvolk.
Why Sound Finance?
The findings in this chapter raise the question of why the US federal gov-
ernment feels compelled to privilege the interests of the Marktvolk. As a 
monetarily sovereign entity (one that issues debt in a currency that it fully 
controls), the US federal government can never run out of money and cannot 
technically go bankrupt. This means that the federal government is freed 
from budget constraints and could in principal pursue Keynesian objectives 
of noninflationary full employment. So why, as my research here suggests, 
does the US federal government continue to put so much stock in maintain-
ing its creditworthiness in financial markets? Are politicians merely ignorant 
of the policy tools at their disposal?
As Michal Kalecki reminded us long ago, “Obstinate ignorance is usu-
ally a manifestation of underlying political motives.”19 In a capitalist system, 
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government pursuit of full employment through debt financing encounters 
political opposition from big business, whose power to discipline government 
and society depends on its abilities to withdraw investment and to sack work-
ers. Both aspects of this power are compromised, if not rendered completely 
irrelevant, when a government takes full advantage of monetary sovereignty. 
As a result, Kalecki points out, the “social function of the doctrine of ‘sound 
finance’ is to make the level of employment dependent on the ‘state of confi-
dence’ ” (and not the other way around).20
What Kalecki is arguing is that although monetary sovereignty makes 
noninflationary full employment attainable in principle, there are power-
ful political barriers to achieving those ends in practice.21 Sound finance is 
ideology, plain and simple. And concentrated ownership of the public debt is 
one crucial lever through which powerful forces ensure that the doctrine of 
sound finance remains firmly entrenched in government policy.
Confronting the Debt State
It is important to stress that the debt state, characterized by increasing pub-
lic indebtedness and high concentration in ownership of the public debt, is 
by no means the sole reason for the decline in democratic mobilization in 
America. Instead, growing inequities in the ownership of the public debt 
are part and parcel of a broader, multifaceted, trend toward inequality writ 
large. As part of this broader trend, inequality in ownership of the public 
debt reinforces a political system that the vast majority of Americans feel 
disengaged from and that works more and more in the interests of a small 
but powerful segment of society.
If concentration in ownership of the public debt is only part of a larger 
problem of inequality, then attempts to reverse ownership concentration can 
only be one part of a larger solution. Yet how can the decades-long process 
that has led to such disparities in ownership of the public debt be reversed? Is 
there any way to formulate a progressive alternative to the debt state? What 
kind of measures could be introduced to tackle the inequality that currently 
characterizes the system of public finance?
Given the research findings and conclusions I have drawn throughout this 
book, the kinds of solutions that I propose differ markedly from those advo-
cated by public choice. If the debt state is indeed contributing to the erosion 
of democracy in America, then the focus should be on trying to enhance, 
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rather than curb, democratic influence over the public finances. In the con-
cluding chapter of this book, I explore some measures that would tackle the 
growing inequality at the heart of the debt state. Serious discussion of these 
measures would help to bring the public debt into the prevailing debates 
about inequality, which in turn would mark a modest first step in bringing 
the public finances under democratic control.
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A Debate with Data
Political economists concerned with ownership of the 
public debt have been engaged in a long-standing debate that lacks reliable 
data. The analysis in this book has provided some needed clarity on the basic 
facts surrounding the ownership structure of the public debt. Most impor-
tantly, I mapped how domestic ownership of the public debt has become 
rapidly concentrated in favor of a resurgent bondholding class of wealthy 
households and large corporations over the past three-and-a-half decades, 
especially in the context of the global financial crisis.
Ownership, I argued, is ultimately a question of power. And I claimed 
that my quantitative map of the domestic structure of public debt ownership 
would need to be evaluated in terms of the type of story it helps us to tell 
about the exercise of power within contemporary capitalist society. More 
specifically, the validity of this framework would hinge on the insights that 
it gives us into the broader political economy of the public debt, into the 
winners and losers of the public finances, and into the underlying conse-
quences of a changing pattern of ownership for the prevailing order. What 
sorts of insights, then, did the uncovering of a resurgent bondholding class 
contribute to our understanding of the public debt in particular and the US 
political economy more generally?
The first insight was to clarify some of the age-old debates concerning 
the redistributive consequences of the public debt. Growing concentration 
Ch a p t er  Sev en
Conclusion
Informing Democratic Debate
It is absurd to say that our country can issue $30,000,000 in 
bonds and not $30,000,000 in currency. Both are promises to 
pay; but one promise fattens the usurer, and the other helps 
the people.
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in ownership of the US public debt has been bound up with the emergence 
and consolidation of what Wolfgang Streeck has referred to as a debt state: a 
system of public finance characterized by functional increases in government 
spending, stagnant tax revenues, and declining tax progressivity. What the 
findings indicate is that the modern debt state does not redistribute income 
along class lines in the way that it did in the nineteenth century. But given 
that it is mostly those at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy who have 
the means to invest in the safe assets that result from a growing public debt, 
the debt state nevertheless reinforces unequal power relations in society.
These research findings also garnered new insights into the complex 
interlinkages between domestic and foreign ownership of the public debt. 
I examined how the rapid globalization in ownership of the public debt 
since the early 1970s has reinforced the debt state. The analysis uncovered 
a formidable bond of interests between domestic and foreign owners of the 
US public debt. As I argued, the existence of a powerful group of domes-
tic owners allays foreign fears about the creditworthiness of the US federal 
government, while the constant flood of foreign capital into the Treasury 
market means cheap credit for domestic borrowers in the United States. By 
helping to maintain household consumption in the face of stagnating wages, 
and by relieving pressures for spending cuts and progressive taxation, cheap 
credit from abroad helps to offset some of the societal tensions associated 
with growing inequality.
Finally, this book has offered a new understanding of the contemporary 
relationship between the debt state and government policy making. My anal-
ysis did not prove that increasing concentration in ownership of the public 
debt leads to direct power over government. What I did uncover, however, 
is that growing inequality in ownership of the public debt has proceeded 
in tandem with a shift in policy making, one that privileges the interests of 
dominant owners of the public debt (the Marktvolk) over the general citi-
zenry (the Staatsvolk). In this way, the rise of the debt state contributes to a 
broader erosion of democratic representation in America.
So where do we go from here? As Piketty noted, exploratory research 
into patterns of distribution is a necessary first step, allowing us to generate 
knowledge that can “inform democratic debate and focus attention on the 
right questions.”1 In what ways can the knowledge generated in this study 
help to inform democratic debate? What are the right questions to ask given 
the findings of this research? If the rise of the debt state is, as I have suggested, 
a source of societal ill, then what should be done to challenge it?
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In this brief concluding chapter I explore some policy measures that might 
address the growing inequality that characterizes the debt state. But first, 
it is necessary to reiterate what was originally said in chapter 1 about the 
implications of the research findings contained in this book. Once again, it 
is crucial to point out that the story that I tell here is not one about the dan-
gers of a large public debt but about the dangers of an unequally distributed 
large public debt. With unequal distribution, we have seen that the public 
debt, and the debt state under which it arose, has come to reinforce patterns 
of social inequality and stultify democratic governance. As a result, I am 
interested not in advocating measures that seek to reduce or eliminate the 
public debt but in finding ways to combat the inequality that underpins the 
public finances.
In what follows, I evaluate two meaningful measures that I argue would 
help to tackle the inequality at the heart of public indebtedness. One 
measure involves replacing government bonds with currency, which would 
help to slow further increases in inequality. Another measure involves 
implementing progressive forms of taxation, which would work to reverse 
inequality.
Eliminating Interest
As hinted at in the Edison passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
one measure that the federal government could employ to counteract 
inequality would simply be to stop issuing new public debt. In place of 
interest- bearing debt, the federal government could instead issue non- 
interest-bearing currency.2 One of the main contributions of MMT has 
been to explicate, through careful dissection of policy and accounting, the 
operational feasibility of this type of policy move.
Proponents of MMT point out that the US Treasury spends by crediting 
accounts or issuing checks before it collects taxes or issues bonds.3 Since the 
government is the monopoly issuer of the currency, it has the unique ability 
to inject net financial assets into the system. Taxation allows a government to 
drain purchasing power from the private sector and to ensure private demand 
for government currency. By demanding that tax obligations, as well as other 
government-imposed fines and fees, be met in its own currency, a monetarily 
sovereign government can induce the population to provide it with goods 
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and services. Bond issuance by the Treasury serves as a mechanism that 
“mops up” the excess reserves in the banking system created by the initial 
government spending. Federal Reserve purchases/sales from/to the public 
of (normally short-term) bonds serves to inject/absorb liquidity to affect the 
short-term rate of interest.4
Coordination between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve would allow 
the Treasury to issue currency (spend) without bond issuance, pushing the 
cost of borrowing for the government to zero. This strategy would of course 
only be viable and desirable within an MMT framework so long as it was 
part of a broader macroeconomic strategy of attaining noninflationary full 
employment.
What would this policy move achieve in practice? Even with nearly 
record-low interest rates, in 2014 debt service costs represented $229 million 
or 6.5 percent of total federal government spending. Substituting government 
bonds for currency would eliminate one source of income for the bondhold-
ing class, given that a substantial portion of this interest flows into their cof-
fers. Still, efforts to halt the issuance of public debt turn out to be a blunt 
instrument for tackling inequality for a number of different reasons.
First, the refusal to issue additional public debt might help to stem further 
increases in inequality since it would eliminate the flow of interest income 
to the bondholding class. But such measures would do nothing to reverse 
already-existing inequality. To put it another way, the flow of future income 
payments would cease if currency substituted for government bonds, but the 
(unevenly distributed) stock of assets would remain the same.
Second, refusal to issue public debt would also eliminate an important 
source of income for government trust funds. Though the analysis in chap-
ter 3 showed that the distribution of these transfer payments is increasingly 
regressive, intragovernmental debt still broadly represents the interests of the 
bottom 99 percent of Americans, who would suffer from the elimination of 
federal interest payments.
Third and most importantly, although it would be operationally feasible, 
any attempt to halt issuance of new public debt would face major political 
obstacles. In particular, the federal government would draw the ire of domi-
nant owners of the public debt, who rely on income derived from interest 
and on the capital gains from buying and sell bonds. These owners use the 
threat of commanding a higher price for borrowing in order to discipline 
government financing decisions. Issuing currency without bond issuance 
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would make plain the fact that a monetarily sovereign entity like the US 
federal government need not borrow or tax in order to finance its expendi-
tures. This would, in turn, bring into question the ideology of sound finance 
that has served to reinforce unequal power relations. Eliminating the public 
debt would mean eliminating an important lever of power over government 
policy. And this is something that is likely to be met with staunch resistant 
from above.
Tackling Inequality Directly
In order to actually reverse the unequal power relations at the heart of the 
modern debt state, the causes of this growing inequality need to be identi-
fied. As I have argued, the emergence and consolidation of the debt state, 
with rising public indebtedness and increasing inequality in ownership of the 
public debt, is driven by tax stagnation and declining tax progressivity. This is 
a roundabout way of saying that the US federal government has come to rely 
on borrowing from wealthy households and large corporations instead of tax-
ing them. It follows logically from this observation that the strengthening of 
progressive tax policies that have been undermined over the past few decades 
would help to combat inequality in ownership of the public debt and in the 
ownership of wealth and income more generally.
What would measures to increase the progressivity of the federal tax 
system actually entail? Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva have estimated that a 
marginal tax rate of 80 percent on the top 1 percent would need to be insti-
tuted in order to reverse the massive increases in inequality that have been 
experienced in the United States since the early 1980s.5 In Capital, Piketty 
called further for an annual global wealth tax of up to 10 percent.6 If they 
were combined with coordination at the global level to minimize tax com-
petition between the advanced capitalist countries and to clamp down on 
tax evasion, proposed measures such as these would mark a serious effort to 
restore progressivity to the federal tax system
Of course efforts to implement more progressive forms of taxation would 
be met with stiff political resistance. Domestically, powerful groups would 
be unlikely to accept such measures, given that the regressive transformation 
of the tax regime is one of the key factors accounting for the explosion of 
top incomes since the early 1980s.7 The political barriers to progressive taxa-
tion seem all the more daunting when taking into account the fate of recent 
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proposals that are considerably more modest than those of Piketty and his 
collaborators. For example, President Obama’s so-called Buffett Rule, named 
after billionaire Warren Buffett, sought to impose a modest income tax of 
30 percent on millionaires, but it has not been implemented due to staunch 
opposition from the Republican Party ever since it was first introduced in 
2011.
Nevertheless income tax rates on the top 1 percent and top 0.1 percent 
did increase significantly in 2013, suggesting that efforts to restore tax pro-
gressivity are not only desirable but also politically feasible.8 And despite 
the political challenges involved, a focus on restoring progressive taxation 
seems like a goal worth pursuing. This is the case precisely because of the 
central role of the tax system in fostering growing inequality in the past few 
decades. A monetarily sovereign entity like the US federal government does 
not need taxes to finance its expenditures. Yet a carefully designed system of 
progressive taxation would go a long way in reversing inequality and restor-
ing democratic control over elements of society that have seen their power 
grow immensely under the debt state.
Public Debate on Public Debt
At the beginning of each of the main chapters of this book, an evocative 
quote on ownership of the public debt frames the analysis. The quoted pas-
sages came, not only from luminary political economists and sociologists 
such as David Hume, Stanley Jevons and Rudolf Goldscheid, but also from a 
high-ranking politician in former Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., 
and from prominent members of the business community such as Jay Cooke, 
Winthrop Aldrich, and Thomas Edison.
Readers will note that all of the quotations are of considerable vintage, 
spanning the period from the eighteenth century to the first half of the 
twentieth century. Their inclusion was not the result of a narrow historical 
fixation on my part. The fact of the matter is that it is nearly impossible to 
find such concerns with ownership of the public debt today among America’s 
leading voices. Most of the debate on ownership of the public debt is con-
fined to academic circles and the majority of this debate takes place outside of 
the mainstream of the academy. And unlike their predecessors, today’s politi-
cians, policy makers, and members of the business community are simply not 
concerned with the growing inequalities in ownership of the public debt.
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Outside the corridors of power the situation looks more promising. 
Progressive movements like the Flip the Debt campaign have forced issues of 
power and inequality into debates about the growing US public debt burden. 
Flip the Debt views the explosive increase in the public debt as an outcome of 
growing inequality. According to progressive movements, the recent explo-
sion in the public debt is the result of tax cuts for, and tax evasion by, the top 
1 percent and large corporations. For these reasons, Flip the Debt argues that 
the just way to reduce the public debt is not through crippling austerity but, 
instead, through progressive taxation to force those at the top of this increas-
ingly unequal society to pay their “fair share” of taxes.
But what progressive movements like Flip the Debt have not considered 
is the ownership structure of the public debt and the role that it plays in 
reinforcing existing relationships of power and inequality.9 In this time of 
global turbulence and uncertainty, the powerful groups that Flip the Debt 
calls on to pay more taxes have become heavily reliant on the US Treasury 
market as a safe haven for investment. This simple fact suggests that these 
powerful groups would not only fervently resist efforts to tax them but 
would also reject any serious efforts to reduce the public debt. Taking into 
account the ownership structure of the public debt indicates that the top 1 
percent and large corporations are likely to favor the status quo of the debt 
state that has typified the system of US public finance in the neoliberal 
era. Uncovering the powerful interests at the heart of the public debt also 
makes plain the intentions of top-down campaigns such as Fix the Debt. 
Rather than being serious efforts to reducing the public debt, these cam-
paigns engage in debt and deficit fear mongering to try to rally broad public 
support for austerity.
So before any of the measures proposed earlier can be taken seriously, I 
suggest that the broader issues concerning the ownership structure of the 
public debt need to first enter into the public consciousness. The purpose 
of the research here is, not only to set the record straight in a long-standing 
debate among political economists, but also, if in only some small way, to 
initiate a wider public debate about the public debt.
A careful dissection of the ownership structure of the public debt allows 
for a better understanding of the possibilities for, as well as the barriers to, 
progressive alternatives to the prevailing political economic order. What the 
research in this book indicates is that any effort to confront and challenge the 
current order must first recognize the powerful interests that favor the status 
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quo. The dominant owners of the public debt that make up the bondholding 
class stand as a formidable obstacle to any efforts that would roll back the 
debt state that has come to reinforce their dominant position within society. 
But even though this group is incredibly power, it is not omnipotent. Just as 
the political changes that led to the debt state were implemented, they can 
also be reversed. After all, the bondholding class may dominate the modern 
debt state, but that domination continues only so long as the rest of society 




This appendix examines systematically how ownership of the public debt has been 
divided among the various aggregate sectors of the US political economy. Its pur-
pose is to lay the groundwork for the main analysis in the book, which goes beyond 
broad aggregates to examine the class composition of public debt ownership within 
these sectors.
To develop this aggregate sectoral map, the appendix makes use of macroaccount-
ing techniques that have been developed and refined by post-Keynesians. Of course 
talk of accounting is no way to make friends (or to sell books). But the primer serves 
a useful purpose in helping to demystify, at least in part, the very mystical realm of 
public indebtedness.
The Map and the Territory
Figure A.1 maps the sectoral breakdown of public debt ownership. Note that this 
figure is not meant to reflect the relative size of each sector’s holdings at any point 
in time. Instead, the figure serves as an illustrative guide to the breakdown of 
the sectoral composition of the US public debt and will be referred to frequently 
throughout the rest of the appendix.
At the top of the figure in the first row is the broadest measure of the outstanding 
liabilities of the US federal government: the gross public debt. The gross measure of 
the public debt includes all of the financial instruments (e.g., bills, notes, bonds, and 
other securities) issued and backed by the “full faith and credit” of the US federal 
government. The US Treasury issues most of these instruments, but they also include 
A ppen di x
Accounting for the Public Debt
To retain care and scrupulosity about each detail from within 
the teeming wormball of data and rule and exception and contin-
gency which constitutes real-world accounting—this is heroism.
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a small amount of securities issued by other agencies such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.1 Not included in the gross measure of the public debt are the liabilities 
of state and local governments, or government-sponsored enterprises, (GSEs) such 
as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Sallie Mae.2
Figure 2 in chapter 2 charted the long-term evolution of the gross public debt 
as a percentage of GDP from 1792 to the present. It showed that the level of the 
gross public debt oscillated dramatically, declining during periods of prosperity and 
stability and rising sharply through wars, depression, or both.
Moving to the second row of figure A.1, ownership of the gross public debt is 
divided into two parts. In the first column is intragovernmental debt, that por-
tion of the public debt that is owned by the federal government itself. Subtracting 
intragovernmental holdings from the gross public debt gives us the “debt held by the 
public,” which is shown in the second column of row 2.
Intr agovernmental Debt
Figure A.2 indicates that one of the most significant owners of the public debt is the 
federal government itself. From 1940 until the late 1980s, intragovernmental debt 
hovered steadily around 10 percent of GDP. This share has since grown to around 
30 percent of GDP.
Why does the US federal government hold its own debt? And why has the federal 
government’s ownership share of the public debt grown so rapidly over the past 
three decades? The answer to these questions lies in understanding how govern-
ment trust fund accounts operate. In June 2015, the five federal trust funds, the 
Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund Account, the Employees Retirement System, 
the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and the 
Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, accounted for 74 percent of 
the ownership of intragovernmental debt.3 By far the largest of the trust funds, the 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund Account, referred to commonly as the 
Social Security Trust Fund, held 53 percent of intragovernmental debt in June 2015.
Gross Public Debt
Intragovernmental Debt Debt Held by the Public
DomesticForeign
Nationality
Official Private Federal Reserve Households Business
Figure A.1. Mapping sectoral ownership of the US public debt.
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Trust Fund Accounting
To explain the process by which the federal government comes to hold its own debt 
requires a discussion of the somewhat peculiar world of trust fund accounting. 
Government trust funds are accounting devices created by US federal law. Within 
the budgeting practices of the US federal government, certain taxes and expendi-
tures are “earmarked” for certain trust fund accounts. For example, in the case of 
social security, budget conventions dictate that payroll taxes be earmarked for the 
Social Security Trust Fund. Expenditures associated with paying out social security 
benefits are also earmarked in the same Social Security Trust Fund. When payroll 
tax receipts exceed the amounts paid out in social security benefits, the social secu-
rity account runs a surplus. When the payroll tax receipts fall short of the amounts 
paid out in social security benefits, the social security account runs a deficit.
The trust fund is required by law to invest its surplus balances in special non-
marketable, interest-bearing, US Treasury securities. In effect, the trust fund lends 
its surpluses to the Treasury in exchange for securities that are backed by the full 
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Figure A.2. Intragovernmental debt and debt held by the public as percentages of GDP, 
1940–2015.
(White House Office of Management and Budget [table 7.1].)
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transaction within the US federal government, hence the name intragovernmental 
debt. The outstanding level of intragovernmental debt reflects the overall balances 
of government trust fund accounts. A surplus in these accounts leads to an increase 
in intragovernmental debt, while a trust fund account deficit leads to a decrease in 
intragovernmental debt.
Large increases in the level of intragovernmental debt since the 1980s are primar-
ily due to major reforms enacted in 1983.4 Based on the recommendations of the 
National Commission on Social Security Reform, the Social Security Reform Act 
of 1983 mandated increases in payroll taxes out of fear that the Social Security Trust 
Fund account was facing impending insolvency.5
Intragovernmental debt operates according to the principles of stock-flow-con-
sistent (SFC) accounting. As the name suggests, SFC accounting is a double-entry 
system that matches increases and decreases in stocks of wealth with increases and 
decreases in respective flows of income. SFC accounting states that, on the flow side, 
the deficit of one entity is another’s surplus, and that, on the stock side, the debt of 
one entity is another’s asset.6 In the case of trust fund accounting, a surplus in one 
entity, the trust fund, is matched by a deficit for another entity, the US Treasury 
(and vice versa). The inflow of payroll taxes becomes a stock of wealth. In this case, 
the wealth is in the form of Treasury securities, which count as an asset to the credi-
tor (the trust fund) and a liability to the debtor (the Treasury).
It is important to keep in mind that this SFC relationship is an internal account-
ing device.7 The overall balance in the trust fund accounts has no direct bearing 
on the federal government’s surplus/deficit with external entities. Since trust fund 
accounting earmarks only a portion of federal taxes and expenditures, it has no 
direct relationship to the external budget surplus/deficit of the federal government. 
For example, as has been the actual case in the United States for most of the past 
decade, the Social Security Trust Fund account could run a large surplus (i.e., pay-
roll taxes greatly exceed payouts) while the overall budget balance of the federal 
government could be massively in deficit.
The Great Equalizer?
Despite its significance, intragovernmental debt has only an indirect bearing on 
debates concerning the ownership structure of the US public debt. Some analysts have 
suggested that intragovernmental holdings in trust funds such as social security have 
mitigated the private concentration of public debt ownership (see chapter 3). According 
to this line of argument, the very significant holdings of intragovernmental debt serve 
the public interest by providing the Social Security Trust Fund with a safe and secure 
asset to invest future retirement benefits for low- and middle-income Americans.
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The problem, though, is that these claims are always asserted and never explored 
through systematic empirical research. It is often assumed that intragovernmental 
debt—the safe bundle of future social security benefits—serves broad swathes of the 
US population. Yet this claim is made without any consideration of whether this is 
actually the case or even how it can be subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny in the 
first place. My analysis of the US public debt in chapter 3 makes up for this gap in 
the literature and explores empirically the winners and losers of intragovernmental 
debt. Suffice it to say at this point that, once we start to crunch the numbers, the issue 
becomes much more complicated than these simple arguments would have us believe.
Debt Held by the Public
Now to turn to debt held by the public as represented in the right-hand column 
of row 2 in Figure A.1. Unlike intragovernmental debt, which accumulates from 
the internal transactions of the federal government, debt held by the public, as the 
name suggests, accumulates from the federal government’s transactions with exter-
nal entities.
Aside from savings bonds, most of the debt held by the public is marketable. This 
means that the external entities that accumulate debt held by the public are free 
to sell their Treasury securities on the open market. There are three main types of 
Treasury securities that make up the debt held by the public: Treasury bills (short-
term securities with maturities of less than a year), Treasury notes (medium-term 
securities with maturities of up to ten years), and Treasury bonds (long-term securi-
ties with maturities of ten years and longer). In 1997, the federal government intro-
duced a new type of security: Treasury inflation-protected securities (medium- to 
long-term securities that are tied to the consumer price index to eliminate inflation 
risk). The composition of the marketable portion of the public debt has changed 
slightly over time. For example in 1980, Treasury bills, notes, and bonds made up 33, 
52, and 13 percent of the marketable public debt, respectively. By 2014, these relative 
shares were 12, 66, and 13 percent, respectively. Meanwhile the share of the market-
able public debt held as Treasury inflation-protected securities has jumped from 0.7 
in 1997 to 9 percent in 2014.8
In accounting for the federal government’s transactions with external entities, no 
earmarking of specific tax revenues and expenditures takes place. When the federal 
government’s total tax revenues exceed its total expenditures for a given period of 
time, it runs a budget surplus. When the federal government’s total tax revenues fall 
short of total expenditures for a given period of time, it runs a budget deficit. And 
when the federal government’s total tax revenues equal total expenditures for a given 
period of time, it runs a balanced budget.
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External Accounting and Sector al Balances
According to the SFC framework, a budget deficit for the federal government 
always registers as a surplus for external entities (and vice versa). This is not a theo-
retical postulate; it is a simple accounting identity that is derived from the stan-
dard national income and product accounts. The “sectoral balances” accounting 
technique identified most often with post-Keynesian macroeconomics helps us to 
understand in a systematic way the relationship between the federal government 
and external entities.9
Sectoral balances are accounting categories that are derived from the standard 
national income and product accounts. The balances are associated with a three-
way aggregate division of the macroeconomy: this division consists of the domestic 
private sector (households and firms), the government sector (which, in the US case, 
includes federal, state, and local governments), and the foreign sector (households, 
firms, and governments from the “rest of the world”).
Each of these sectors has an inflow of income and an outflow of expenditures 
over a period of time. If the income of a given sector is more than its expenditures, 
the sector runs a surplus; if the income of a given sector is less than its expendi-
tures, the sector runs a deficit; and if the income of a given sector is equal to its 
expenditures, the sector is balanced. As an accounting identity, the overall balance 
of deficits and surpluses between the aggregate sectors must, by definition, sum 
to zero: domestic private balance plus domestic government balance plus foreign 
balance equals zero.
The Algebr a
In unraveling the balance between sectors, I start with GDP, the most common 
measure of national income. GDP, a flow concept, is defined as the market value of 
all goods and services produced in a national economy over a period of time. GDP 
can be tabulated either on the basis of sources of national income or on the basis of 
uses of national income. From a sources perspective, GDP is the sum of consump-
tion spending (C), private investment spending (I), government spending (G), and 
net exports (exports [X] minus imports [M]):
1. GDP (sources) = C + I + G + (X – M)
From a uses perspective, GDP is the sum of consumption spending (C), private 
saving (S), and taxes (T):
2. GDP (uses) = C + S + T
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Given that these tabulations are different ways of expressing the same magnitude, 
GDP, I combine them in the following identity:
3. C + I + G + (X – M) = GDP = C + S + T
When C, I, G, and (X – M) are subtracted from both sides of the equation, I rearrange 
and arrive at:
4. (T – G) + (S – I) + (M – X) = 0
Equation 4 expresses the overall balances of income and expenditures for the gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental sectors. The sum of the governmental balance, 
government taxes minus government spending (T – G); the private sector balance, 
private saving minus private investment spending (S – I); and the foreign balance, 
imports minus exports (M – X) equals zero:
5. (T – G) + (S – I) + (M – X) = 0
[government balance + private balance + foreign balance = 0]
Finally, I break down the consolidated government sector balance into the federal 
balance (Tf – Gf ) and the state and local balance (Ts + l – Gs + l):
6. (Tf – Gf ) + (Ts + l – Gs + l) + (S – I) + (M – X) = 0
In Balance
Moving from algebra to actual data, figure A.3 examines the historical relation-
ship between the government and nongovernment balances. The figure plots the 
quarterly balances of each of the four aggregate sectors expressed as a share of GDP: 
the federal government, the state and local government, the private domestic, and 
the foreign balances.
The foreign balance as a percentage of GDP in figure A.3 is expressed in terms of 
the US capital account. According to balance-of-payments accounting, a current 
account deficit (the inflow of imports is greater than exports) must be matched by 
a capital and financial account surplus (the inflow of credits is greater than debits). 
This is another way of saying that the US trade account deficit is registered by the 
rest of the world as a surplus.
As the figure makes clear, the sum of federal and state and local government 
balances is mirrored by the sum of private sector and foreign balances. During the 
post–World War II period, the US capital account, as well as state and local gov-
ernment, was usually in a small deficit. These small federal government surpluses/
deficits oscillated countercyclically with small private sector surpluses/deficits. Since 
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the early 1970s, dramatic changes have taken place. The state and local government 
sector has continued to record a small and relatively stable deficit, while the other 
three sectors have fluctuated significantly.
Let’s return now to the right-hand column in row 2 of figure A.1. As explained 
above, the federal government runs a deficit with external entities when its expen-
ditures exceed its revenues. And faced with this shortfall, the federal government 
must borrow (i.e., issue public debt). This means that a federal budget deficit, the 
flow concept, is matched by a corresponding increase in the debt held by the public, 
the stock concept.10
Rows 3 and 4 of figure A.1 further decompose the federal debt held by the public 
into domestic and foreign ownership.
Domestic Ownership
Row 4 of figure A.1 shows the three main domestic sectors that own the debt held 
by the public: the Federal Reserve, domestic households, and domestic business.11 
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Figure A.3. US sectoral balances as percentages of GDP, 1946–2015. 
Annual data from 1946–51 and quarterly data from 1952 onward. (Federal Reserve flow of 
funds accounts [table F.4].)
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The Federal Reserve. The share of the public debt owned by the Federal Reserve, 
the US central bank, is significant. As figure A.4 indicates, since 1945 the Federal 
Reserve has owned on average 14 percent of the debt held by the public, with its 
share peaking at a high of 24 percent in 1974 and reaching its nadir of 7 percent 
in 2008. Why does the Federal Reserve own the public debt? And why are Federal 
Reserve holdings of the public debt not counted as part of intragovernmental hold-
ings (the left-hand column of row 2 of figure A.1)?
The Federal Reserve comes to own the public debt primarily through its open 
market operations, which involve purchases and sales of short-term federal securities 
(e.g., Treasury notes and bills) as a method of adjusting the federal funds rate (the 
short-term interest rate at which depository institutions lend excess balances to one 
another).12 Bond purchases, which increase the Federal Reserve’s share of the debt 
held by the public, are undertaken to increase liquidity in the banking system and 
put downward pressure on the federal funds rate. This makes bond purchases by the 
Federal Reserve an expansionary policy action meant to increase the money supply 
and stimulate bank lending. Bond sales, which decrease the Federal Reserve’s share 
of the debt held by the public, are undertaken to decrease liquidity in the banking 
system and put upward pressure on the federal funds rate. In other words, bond 
sales by the Federal Reserve are a contractionary policy action meant to decrease the 
money supply and discourage bank lending.
Federal Reserve holdings of the public debt therefore play a key role in the steer-
ing of the government’s monetary policy. And this raises the question of why central 
bank holdings are counted as part of debt held by the public and not intragovern-
mental debt. In short, the inclusion of the Federal Reserve’s ownership of the public 
debt in debt held by the public reflects the institution’s role as “a peculiar sort of 
public-private hybrid.”13
On the one hand, the US president appoints the Federal Reserve chairman and 
the central bank coordinates its activities with the US Treasury in order to carry out 
the federal government’s monetary and fiscal policies. And in this way, the Federal 
Reserve is firmly embedded within the institutional architecture of government.
On the other hand, a consortium of banks privately owns the Federal Reserve, 
whose expenses are primarily paid for, not out of federal taxes, but out of the interest 
it receives on its holdings of Treasury securities. In pursuing open market opera-
tions, the Federal Reserve can only change the overall composition of private sec-
tor assets (i.e., the amounts held by households and business as bonds or as cash, 
etc.). However, unlike the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve cannot alter the overall 
number of private sector assets in the system. The Federal Reserve is in fact legally 
prohibited from purchasing bonds directly from the Treasury. Thus the Federal 
Reserve’s restricted access to federal securities through the open market explains 
why its share of the public debt is counted as part of debt held by the public.
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Though the Federal Reserve’s holdings of the public debt differ fundamentally 
from intragovernmental debt, the two are similar in the sense that they have only 
an indirect bearing on debates about the ownership structure of the public debt that 
were surveyed in chapter 2. Several heterodox political economists have argued that 
the Federal Reserve works in the interests of powerful government bondholders.14
But no existing study has examined, in any detail, whose interests are served by 
the Federal Reserve’s own holdings of the public debt. The question of who wins and 
who loses from open market operations in particular and monetary policy in general 
is a complex one that falls outside the scope of analysis here.
Households. To the right of the Federal Reserve in row 4 of figure A.1 stands 
the next domestic sector, US households, which forms part of the focus of chap-
ter 3.15 The thick series in figure A.5 plots the US household sector’s share of debt 
held by the public. In the postwar period, the share of the US public debt owned 
by US households was consistently around 30 percent. Then from the mid-1970s 
onward this share started to decline significantly, reaching its nadir of 3 percent in 
2007. With the onset of the current crisis, household ownership of the public debt 
rebounded to 13 percent in 2010, but it declined to 7 percent in 2014.
What explains the fall in household ownership of the public debt? The decline has 
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Figure A.4. Federal Reserve’s share of the US public debt, 1945–2015.
Data are annual from 1945–51 and quarterly from 1952 onward. (Federal Reserve flow of 
funds accounts [table L.209].)
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the past three decades. Financial investment options for households have exploded 
and portfolios have diversified as a result. The decline in household ownership of the 
public debt also has to do partly with the decline in household savings in the three 
decades preceding the current crisis. By disaggregating the domestic private sector 
balance into domestic households and domestic businesses, we are able to chart the 
evolution of household savings over time. The thin series in figure A.5 shows the 
household balance. Here we see that household savings increased gradually over the 
postwar period, peaking at 9 percent of GDP in the mid-1970s. Yet from the mid-
1970s until the onset of the current crisis, household savings deteriorated sharply and 
actually went into negative territory during several years. With savings in free fall in 
the aggregate, US households had less to invest in financial assets in general and in the 
public debt in particular. Savings have increased since the crisis as households attempt 
to repair their balance sheets, freeing up funds to invest in the public debt.
Save for the most recent developments, the longer-term decline in household 
ownership of the public debt is quite dramatic. But we should keep in mind that, 
as far as domestic entities are concerned, the household share is still significant. For 
example, though much has been made of the rise of “pension fund capitalism” and 
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Figure A.5. US households’ share of the US public debt and household sector balance as 
percentages of GDP.
Data for thin series are annual from 1945–51 and quarterly from 1952–2015; data for thick 
series are annual from 1946–50 and quarterly from 1951 onward. (Federal Reserve flow of 
funds accounts: thin series [table L.209]; thick series [tables F.2 and F.4].)
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remains comparable to the amounts held in investment vehicles such as pension and 
mutual funds. In fact, since 1990 households have on average owned 14 percent of 
the debt held by the public, only one percentage point lower than the share of all the 
major types of investment funds.17
Businesses. Domestic business, a category that includes all incorporated 
nonfinancial firms, as well as incorporated and unincorporated financial firms, is 
represented in the farthest right-hand column in row 4 of figure A.1 and also forms 
part of the focus of chapter.18 The thick series in figure A.6 plots the US business 
sector’s share of debt held by the public. From World War II to the mid-1970s, the 
share of domestic business was more than halved from 60 to 24 percent. The ensuing 
decade saw a recovery in US business’s share of the public debt, which climbed to 
43 percent in 1986. Then business’s share started another descent, reaching a low 
point of 20 percent in 2007 and climbing to 28 percent in 2015.
Domestic business’s share of the public debt tracks fairly closely with its overall 
sectoral balance. The thin series in figure A.6 plots the balance of domestic business. 
Here we see that the deficit of US business increased gradually over the postwar 
period, as households lent their savings to fuel the greenfield investment boom of 
that period. Over the past four decades, the business sector has been more or less 
in balance, save for sharp deteriorations before the dot-com crash and the current 
crisis. In the early stages of the crisis, business savings increased massively, but they 
have since fallen and have reached negative territory.
The Rest of the World
Aside from the surpluses of the late 1990s, the US domestic sectors (i.e., the govern-
ment and private sectors combined) have run a deficit for almost four decades. The 
federal government has been the main driver of this domestic deficit, though outside 
of recessions and crises, the domestic private sector has also seen its surplus eroded 
gradually over roughly the same period. According to sectoral balances, persistent 
government deficits coupled with a decline in domestic private savings have entailed 
an increased current account deficit (i.e., a current account surplus for the rest of 
the world) and increasing foreign ownership of the US public debt since the 1970s.
The left-hand column of the third row of figure A.1 shows that another major 
component of ownership is the rest of the world. Figure 3 charted the rapid rise in 
foreign ownership of the US public debt since 1970. The remainder of the appendix 
digs deeper and examines the identities of foreign owners of the public debt. As will 
become clear, the task of identifying the ultimate foreign owners of the US public 
debt is fraught with serious challenges.
Figure A.1 becomes slightly more complicated when foreign ownership is disag-
gregated in row 4. There are two separate categories, which reflect the incompatibility 
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of available data sets on the composition of foreign ownership. Taken together, the 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department publish two types of data on foreign 
ownership of the US public debt. The first type of data divides ownership by official 
(government) and private holdings, which is represented in the top part of row 4. 
The second type divides foreign ownership by the nationality of the owner, which is 
represented in the bottom half of row 4.
And here is where the trouble starts. The US federal government holds itself to 
strict standards of confidentiality, which means that the two types of data can never 
be bridged. In other words, it is possible to determine how much of the US public 
debt is owned by foreign official and private investors in the aggregate, but not, for 
example, how much of the US public debt is owned specifically by Brazilian official 
and Brazilian private investors. Even if the United States abandoned confidentiality 
and made these data available, the nature of globalized finance would still make the 
ultimate ownership of foreign holdings of the US public debt difficult to pin down.
Official versus Private. Let’s begin with the most basic division between foreign 
official and foreign private ownership of the US public debt. The division between 
official and private foreign ownership is shown in figure A.7. During the postwar 
Bretton Woods era, when the foreign share of the public debt was very low, the 
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Figure A.6. US business’s ownership of the US public debt and business sectoral balance 
as percentages of GDP. 
Data for thin series are annual from 1946–50 and quarterly from 1951 onward; data for thick 
series are annual from 1945–51 and quarterly from 1952 onward. (Federal Reserve flow of 
funds accounts: thin series [tables F.2 and F.4]; thick series [table L.209].)
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of the Bretton Woods regime, foreign ownership of the US public debt increased. 
And the subsequent globalization of finance meant a diversification of ownership in 
favor of private investors. Private investors gradually increased their holdings, which 
were almost zero in the early 1970s, to a peak of 49 percent of the total foreign share 
of the US public debt in 1998. The next decade saw a rapid reversal, with the official 
share climbing to 79 percent in 2009. Since then, the official share has fallen slightly 
but at 69 percent remains significantly higher than the private share.
Data dividing foreign ownership of the US public debt into official and private 
holdings may seem straightforward, but they still need to be interpreted with some 
caution. According to Sobol, some of the US public debt held in foreign banking 
systems is ultimately owned by foreign central banks and other official institutions 
and yet it is counted as part of private holdings.19 As a result, there is a chance that 
the data understate the “official” holdings, though the complexities of financial 
intermediation mean we cannot know with any certainty the precise number of 
official holdings that get counted as private.
Nationality. The data breaking down ownership of the US public debt by country 
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Figure A.7. Official and private shares of the US public debt owned by the rest of the 
world, 1957–2014.
(Federal Reserve flow of funds accounts [table L.106].)
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collected in table A.1, show that there have been important changes in the national 
composition of foreign ownership of the public debt over the past two decades. What 
is most striking is the rapid ascendance of China as a major owner of the US pub-
lic debt. From 3 percent in 1994, China’s share of foreign holdings of US Treasury 
securities reached a high of 26 percent in 2010. For 2014, China and Japan clearly 
dominated at, respectively, 21 percent and 20 percent of the foreign share of the public 
debt, followed by Belgium, Caribbean Banking Centers, and the Oil Exporters.
As Sobol explains, nationality in the statistics on foreign ownership of the US 
public debt is determined by residency.20 For example, if an American citizen liv-
ing in Paris purchases US Treasury securities, these are counted as part of French 
ownership of the US public debt. If the subsidiary of a Japanese bank located in the 
United States buys US Treasury securities, these are counted as part of domestic 
(US) holdings, while the holdings of the subsidiary of a US bank in London are 
counted as part of the United Kingdom’s holdings.
The intricate webs of global capital flows and financial intermediation, what stat-
isticians refer to as the “custodial bias,” make it difficult to pin down the nationality 
of the ultimate foreign owners of the US public debt. To give another hypothetical 
example, if an American resident invests in a German investment fund that invests 
primarily in US Treasury securities, these get counted as German holdings, even if 
the ultimate owner of the fund itself is an American.
A recent example helps to illustrate just how difficult it can be to use existing data 
to make definitive claims about the nationality of owners of the public debt. Official 
statistics showed that China had decreased its holdings of the US public debt from 
$1.3 trillion in 2013 to $1.27 trillion in 2014.21 Yet something curious was at play: the 
decline in China’s holdings of US Treasury securities was matched by a simultane-
ous increase in Belgium’s holdings, which more than doubled from $180 billion to 
$381 billion over the same period. Careful readers of table A.1 might have noticed 
that in 2014, Belgium—not exactly one of the world’s financial powerhouses—sud-
denly became the third largest owner of US Treasury securities. Though it is impos-
sible to know with certainty, there has been rampant speculation that the People’s 
Bank of China has simply been moving its holdings to Belgium, a financial hub, 
partly to mask its politically contentious ownership of the US public debt!
Making Sense of Foreign Ownership
Problems with the data make it difficult to make any definitive claim about the 
identities of foreign owners of the US public debt. As chapter 3 makes clear, the 
data on domestic ownership are also not without limitations. But the data are reli-
able enough to compile reasonable estimates of the ultimate identities of domestic 
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owners. Because similar data on foreign ownership are lacking, there is no compa-
rable stand-alone chapter in this book that attempts to pin down the identities of 
foreign owners any further than we have already done here.
At the same time, there is no sense in being overly cautious in making claims 
about the identities of foreign owners of the public debt. Despite the various issues 
listed above, since the late 1990s foreign ownership of the US public debt has become 
increasingly dominated by official investors, on the one hand, and Japan and China, 
on the other. Putting two and two together allows us to safely generalize that the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the two countries’ 
central banks, have been the major foreign owners of the US public debt over the 
past two decades.
What is known is that these two countries have been running persistent trade 
surpluses with the United States during this period and that their central banks 
have, in turn, been accumulating massive foreign exchange reserves.22 Though the 
exact composition of these foreign-exchange reserves is unclear, a significant number 
of the dollars held by the PBC and the BOJ get invested back into US Treasury 
securities for two main reasons. First, China and Japan are keen to maintain their 
investments in US dollars in order to maintain the value of the dollar and, in turn, 
their own trade competitiveness, as a sudden, massive sell-off of dollars and Treasury 
securities would lead to a decline in the value of the dollar. Second, Treasury securi-
ties provide a secure interest-bearing investment for dollar reserves.
This dynamic, whereby China and Japan invest their dollar reserves in US 
Treasury securities, is widely acknowledged, even if its causes and consequences are 
hotly disputed. Foreign ownership data may be severely limited, but it is uncontro-
versial to isolate the PBC and the BOJ as the major foreign owners of the US public 
debt.
Whose Private Wealth?
Macroaccounting techniques are useful in helping to understand how government 
budget deficits relate to public debt, as well as the process by which public debt 
gets accumulated as private wealth by various external entities. These accounting 
techniques also allow us to map the sectoral composition of public debt ownership 
and its changes over time.
But as useful as macroaccounting techniques are for grasping how the public 
debt gets accumulated as private wealth, they do not allow us to go one step further 
to uncover in class terms whose wealth the public debt represents. That is why the 
main chapters of this book go beyond the aggregate focus of macroaccounting and 
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